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395 (Ala. 1971) ("The injury must have had its origin in some risk incident
Such risk is incident to the employment when it is connected with the dutu being
performed under the obligations of such employment " A slip and fall injury on the
claimant's home driveway was not compensable).

'going & coming" rule recognized:

other relevant or analogous case law:

Lauderdale County Coop . Inc. v. Shook, 376 So.2d 199 (Ala. Civ App 1979) (Where
the employee is acting in a dual capacity and the employer derives a benefit from his
actions, an injury having its origin in such act may be found to have arisen out of and in the
course of employment).
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relevant statutory provision

Alaska Stat. §23.30.395 (2) (1998).
**The definition of "arising out of and in the course of employment" expressly excludes
"activities of a personal nature away from employer-provided facilities."
**The statute also provides for a presumption in favor of the employee. Alaska Stat.
§23.30.120 (2) (1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:
other definition of "incidental"
to employment:

Northern Corp. v. Saari. 409 P.2d 845 (Alaska 1972) (Travel from to and from a report
work camp to a recreational facility was found to be work-related. Notably, the Alaska
statute expressly covers employer-required travel to a remote job site).
Marsh v. Alaska Workman's Comp. Bd.. 584 P.2d 1134 (Alaska 1978) (Assault on
bartender by customer did not result from work-connected activities. The activity must be
"reasonably foreseeable and incidental" to the employment, and not just "but for" the
employment.).

"going & coming" rule recognized:

Sokolowski v. Best Western Golden Lion Hotel 813 P.2d 286 (Alaska 1991) (adopting
the special hazard exception to the going and coming rule).

other relevant or analogous case law:

Anchorage Roofing Co. r Inc. v. Gonzales. 507 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1973) (recognizing the
dual purpose rule for a mixed business and personal trip).
Anderson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp. 498 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1966)
(Recreational activities at a remote site are in the interest of the employer as well as the
employee and will therefore be considered within the course of employment).
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Arizona
relevant statutory provision

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1021 (1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Gaumer v. Industrial Comm'n. 382 P.2d 673 (Ariz. 1963) ("Where an injury is suffered
by an employee while engaged in acts for his own purposes or benefit (other than acts
necessary for his own personal comfort and convenience while at work ) such injury
is not in the course of his employment.").

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:

Peterson v. Industrial Comm'n. 490 P.2d 870 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971) (The employee's
suffocation death which occurred during the traveling employee's sleep at a rooming
house was compensable since a reasonable period of sleep is necessarily incidental to the
work of a traveling employee required to take overnight lodging away from home).

"going & coming" rule recognized:

Poole v. Industrial Comm'n. 850 P.2d 686 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (The benefit to the
employer from having the employee on call, was insufficient to apply the substantial
benefits exception to the going and coming rule for an injury from an automobile accident
while returning home from the personal errand of getting a haircut).

other relevant or analogous case law:

Gonzales v. Industrial Comm'n. 531 P.2d 555 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) ("[WJhere an
employee, on his lunch hour, without the consent or knowledge of the employer, takes the
employer's equipment to accomplish a task solely for his personal benefit, the fact that his
activity might incidentally benefit the employer does not establish that he was within
the course of his employment").
Edwards v. Industrial Comm'n. 385 P.2d 219 (Ariz. 1963) (The employee's accidental
drowning during swimming at hotel during a business trip was not an "an incident to his
work or in any way associated with it.").
Loveless v. Industrial Comm'n. 432 P.2d 600 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967) (An injury sustained
by a an employee who was on duty 24 hours a day as a watchman was non-compensable
when his son accidentally discharged a firearm belonging to the claimant [and supplied by
the employer], because the claimant's activity was personal in nature").
A-3

Peetz v. Industrial Comm'n. 604 P.2d 255 (Ariz. 1979) (claimant's injury from accidental
shooting while demonstrating the gun's safety devices to his wife, did not arise out of
employment but a personal activity). Accord D.E.S. Youth Conservation Corps, v.
Industrial Comm'n. 630 P.2d 58 (Ariz. 1981).

Arkansas
relevant statutory provision

Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-401 (1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Coleman's Bar-B-Oue v. Fuller. 559 S.W.2d 714 (Ark. 1978).

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:
"going & coming" rule recognized:

American Red Cross v. Hogan. 681 S.W.2d 17 (Ark. App. 1985).
Lepard v. West Memphis Mach. & Welding. 908 S.W.2d 666 (Ark. App. 1995) (Some
nexus between the employment and travel must be present. This is not met merely by
travel in a company vehicle or by the voluntary delivery of a paycheck.).

other relevant or analogous case law

American Red Cross v. Wilson. 519 S.W.2d 60 (Ark. 1975) (A slip and fall on a home
stairway while obtaining Christmas decorations stored at the employee's home and used at
local nursing homes by the claimant's employer was found to be compensable .).
Robbins v. Jackson. 339 S.W.2d 417 (Ark. 1960) (The "concurrent benefit" rule cannot be
applied to circumvent the necessity of first showing the injury arose out of and in the
course of employment.).
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California
relevant statutory provision
"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Cal. Lab. Code § 3600 (West 1998).
Ralphs Grocery Co. V. W.C.A.B. 68 Cal. Rptr.2d 161 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1997) (Fatal
heart attack following telephone conversation with employer while at home did not arise
while employee was performing a service incidental to his employment. "Although
'liability under the compensation law has been extended to cover personal acts necessary to
the comfort, convenience and welfare of the employee,' that exception has been limited to
instances where 'the employee at the time of injury was at work and either on the
employer's premises or on a business errand.'").

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:
"going & coming" rule recognized:

Ralphs Grocery Co. v. W.C.A.B.. 68 Cal. Rptr.2d 161 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1997).
Wilson v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd.. 545 P.2d 225 (Ca. 1976) (Transporting work-related
materials in employee's car does not make the travel work-related. "Such cartage is
common and must be viewed as incident to commute rather than as part of the
employment.") (emphasis added).

other relevant or analogous case law

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n. 247 P.2d 697 (Ca. 1952) (injury
sustained during employee's recreational activity beyond property controlled by employer
was not sustained in the course of or incidental to his employment).
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Colorado
relevant statutory provision

Colo. Rev. Stat. §8-41-301B Ann. (West 1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

University of Denver v. NemethT 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953) (en banc) (recognizing the
general personal comfort rule).

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:

University of Denver v. Nemeth. 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953) (en banc) (finding that
playing football was incidental to the student's employment with the university because
the facts showed that the university required those who held the job and received free
meals to engage in football under the penalty of losing the job and meals).

"going & coming" rule recognized:

other relevant or analogous case law

Younger v. City and County of Denver. 810 P.2d 647 (Colo. 1991) (An injury "arises
out of' employment if it would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and
obligations of the employment placed claimant in the position he was injured).
Accord Stamper v. Hiteshew. 797 P.2d 784 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
Brogger v. Kezer. 626 P.2d 700 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980) (An injury from a fall off of a
ladder while painting a home which was also used as the company's office was
compensable.).
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Connecticut
relevant statutory provision

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 31-275 and 31-284 (West 1997).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Iliff v. Norwalk Tire & Rubber Co.. 16 A.2d481 (Conn. 1940).
Mazzone v. Connecticut Transit Co.. 694 A.2d 1230 (Conn. 1997) (eating in the lunch
hour and other personal acts while on the employer's premises are incidental to
employment).

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:

McNamara v. Town of Hamden. 398 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Conn. 1979) (An activity is
incidental to employment "if the activity is regularly engaged in on the employer's
premises within the period of employment, with the employer's approval or
acquiescence."). Accord Masko v. Board of Educ. of Wallingford. 710 A.2d 825 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1998).

'going & coming" rule recognized:

McNamara v. Town of Hamden. 398 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Conn. 1979) ("There is a crucial
difference between the going and coming cases . . . and other types, because in the going
and coming cases the injury has not occurred on the premises of the employer").
Spatafore v. Yale University. 684 A.2d 1155 (Comm. 1996) ("[I]n situations tangential to
employment, 'the need arose to reach out for the additional element of employer benefit to
make up for the fact that employees going to or coming from work do not satisfy the first
two course-of-employment requirements, place and period of employment").

other relevant or analogous case law

Tovish v. Gerber Electronics. 630 A.2d 136 (Conn. Ct. App. 1993), affid, 642 A.2d 721
(Conn. 1994) (Shoveling driveway snow to remove an obstacle to the salesman's exit his
home to visit customers was found to be incidental to employment. The dissent, however,
found that the decedent's act of shoveling the driveway was a common homeowner's task
performed in preparation for work.).
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Delaware
relevant statutory provision

19 Del. C. §2301 (15) (1998).
The statute contains unique details in its definition of injuries arising out of and in the
course of employment.

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Bedwell v. Brandywine Carpet Cleaners. 684 A.2d 302 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1996) (employees
are within the course and scope of employment while engaged in acts which minister to
their personal comfort).

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:
"going & coming" rule recognized:

other relevant or analogous case law:

19Del. C. § 2301 (15) (1998).

Chickadel v. Davis. 1990 Del. Super LEXIS 342 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1990) (The claimant must
have been furthering the interests of the employer at the time of accident. Alternatively,
she must have been so employed and engaged in an activity she would be expected to
perform at a time and place when and where she could have been expected to be. A
personal errand during lunch does not satisfy this requirement).
Storm v. Karl-Mil. Inc.. 460 A.2d 519 (Del. 1983) (dual purpose test not met).
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Florida
relevant statutory provision

Fla Stat. ch. 440.02 (17), 440.09 (1998)

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine
other definition of "incidental"
to employment

City of St Petersburg v. Cashman. 71 So 2d 733 (Fla 1954) ("[A]n injury shall be deemed
to have occurred in the course of "employment" if it is sustained by a workman, on the
premises of his employer while preparing to begin the day's work
or while doing
other acts preparatory or incidental to the performance of his duties, which are reasonably
necessary for such purpose ")

'going & coming" rule recognized

Gilbert v. Publix Supermarkets. 724 So 2d 1222 (Fla Dist Ct App 1998) (Injuries
suffered by an employee in an automobile accident while traveling to work were not
compensable The employee's preparation of a company newsletter at home did not make
the home a second work-site Further, her delivery of the newsletter was "merely an
incidental part of the trip She would not have made the drive if the personal motive
(going to work) was removed ")

other relevant or analogous case law:

Vigliottiv K-Mart 680 So 2d 466 (Fla Dist Ct App 1996) (recognizing the application
of the "premises rule" under the new statute), accord Perez v Public Supermarkets, Inc..
673 So 2d 938 (Fla Dist Ct App 1996)
Heath v Thomas Lumber Co . 140 So 2d 805 (Fla 1962) (A Fatal heart attack from
exertion while pruning an orange tree given to him by his employer was not compensable
"Although decedent's employer may have received some vague or minute benefit from
his work
the sole purpose of such work was benefit to himself" No dual purpose was
shown )
Glasser v. Youth Shop. 54 So 2d 686 (Fla 1951) (A slip and fall on a stairway at home
was not compensable notwithstanding the fact that the employee was carrying work record
books that he had been working on at home that morning )
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Georgia
relevant statutory provision

Ga. Code Ann. § 34-9-1 (4) (1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:
other definition of "incidental"
to employment:

Murphy v. Ara Services. Inc.. 298 S.E.2d 528, 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (For an injury to
arise out of work, "[t]he causative danger must be peculiar to the work . . . It must be
incidental to the character of the business, and not independent of the relation of master
and servant.").

"going & coming" rule recognized:

Street v. Douglas County Road Department et aL 287 S.E.2d 586 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981).

other relevant or analogous case law

Avers v. Gulf Life Insurance Company. 81 S.E.2d 234 (Ga. Ct. App. 1954) ("If in the
performance of an act which he was directly employed to do, or an act reasonably
necessary to be done in order to perform the act he was employed to do, the employee
receives accidental injury, such injury is compensable. If the act does not come within
either of these classifications, the injury is not compensable." The claimant failed to show
that his duties specifically included a week-end trip with a prospective customer, or that
the trip made was reasonably necessary to sell insurance.). Cf Martinson v. Industrial

Commission, 606 P.2d 256 (Utah 1980).
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Hawaii
relevant statutory provision

Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 386-3 (a) (Michie 1999).
Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 386-85 (Michie 1999) (Statutory presumption in favor of the
employee must be rebutted by substantial evidence from the employer).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Pacheco v. Orchid of Hawaii. 502 P.2d 1399 (Hawaii 1972) (reasonable and necessary
activities during work breaks are incidental to employment).

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:

Tate v. GTE Hawaiian Tel. Co.. 881 P.2d 1246 (Hawaii 1994) (Incidental contains an
element of the usual and reasonable both as to the needs to be satisfied and as to the means
used to satisfy them.).

"going & coming" rule recognized:

Smith v. State Dept. of Labor and Indus.. 907 P.2d 101 (Hawaii 1995) ("going and
coming" and "premises" rules expressly adopted).

other relevant or analogous case law:

Zemis v. SCI Contractors, Inc.. 911 P.2d 77 (Hawaii 1996) (Hawaii has adopted a
"unitary test" that considers whether there is a sufficient work connection to bring the
accident within the scope of the statute. Injuries from an assault by a co-working arose
from a purely personal dispute unrelated to work were not compensable even though the
assault took place on the employers' premises.).
Tate v. GTE Hawaiian Tel. Co.. 881 P.2d 1246 (Hawaii 1994) (An activity that is best
described as an incident of an activity that was itself an incident of employment is too far
removed to be compensable.).
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relevant statutory provision

Idaho Code §72-102 (1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:
other definition of "incidental"
to employment:

O'Loughlin v. Circle A Construction. 739 P.2d 347 (Idaho 1987) (If the injury can be seen
to have followed as a natural incident of the work, and to have been contemplated by a
reasonable person familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned
by the nature of the employment, then it arises "out o f the employment. But it excludes
an injury which can not fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate
cause, and which comes from a hazard to which the workmen would have been equally
exposed apart from the employment.).

"going & coming" rule recognized:

Ridgway v. Combined Ins. Cos. of Am.. 565 P.2d 1367 (Idaho 1977).

other relevant or analogous case law:

Eriksen v. Nez Perce County et al.. 235 P.2d 736 (Idaho 1951) (injuries while engaged in
personal acts are not compensable).
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Illinois
relevant statutory provision

111. Rev. Stat. ch. 820, para. 305/1 (1999).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

All Steel Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n. 582 N.E.2d 240 (111. App. 1991) (An employee going
to the parking lot to warm his car during lunch break was reasonably necessary act of
personal comfort which occurred in the course of his employment).

other definition of "incidental"
to employment.

Klug v. The Industrial Commission et aL 46 N.E.2d 38 (III 1943) (A risk is incidental to
the employment when it belongs to or is connected with what an employee has to do in
fulfilling his contract of service. Upon arriving at a work site after lunch, the claimant's
opening of a car door to lock up the car was not related to or incidental to any work she
was required to perform in fulfilling her contract of service.).

'going & coming" rule recognized:

Burmeister v. Industrial Comm'n. 284 N.E.2d 625 (111 1972).

other relevant or analogous case law:

Mazursky v. The Industrial Commission et aL 4 N.E.2d 823 (III 1936) (An injury does
not "arise out o f work when the employee, while on the employer's premises, is engaged
in an activity for his own personal benefit.).
Loyola University v. The Industrial Commission et aL 96 N.E.2d 509 (III 1951) (u[T]he
injury is compensable if received while the employee is doing those reasonable things
which his contract of employment expressly or impliedly authorizes him to do. . . . Was it
part of the injured person's employment to hazard, to suffer, or to do that which caused the
injury?" Whether an act is reasonably contemplated by the employment is to be
determined by considering among other facts, the nature of the act, the nature of the
employment, and the terms of the contract of employment.).
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Indiana
relevant statutory provision

Ind. Code § 22-3-6-1 (e) (1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. Morgan. 494 N.E.2d 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) ("Risks
incidental to and deemed arising out of employment include acts of employees which are
reasonably necessary to their life, comfort or convenience, even though such acts are
technically not acts of service.").
Accord Olinger Construction Co. v. Mosbey. 427 N.E.2d 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:
"going & coming" rule recognized:

Segally v. Ancervs. 486 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).

other relevant or analogous case law:

Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. Morgan. 494 N.E.2d 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)
(traveling employee engaged in a purely personal errand will not be compensable).
Olinger Construction Co. v. Mosbey. 427 N.E.2d 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (employee
stabbed in motel room by co-worker covered by traveling employee doctrine).
Segally v. Ancerys. 486 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) ("In cases where accidents occur
away from the employer's premises, the Act applies only to employees who have been
engaged in activities which are found to be , in some material respects, incidental to
employment or beneficial to the employer. The pivotal question in cases arising under
the Act is whether or not the employee's exposure to the hazard which caused injury
was increased by reason of employment.").
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relevant statutory provision
"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Iowa Code §85.61 (1997).
Miedema v. The Dial Corporation. 551 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1996).

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:
"going & coming" rule recognized:

2800 Corp. v. Fernandez. 528 N.W.2d 124 (Iowa 1995).

other relevant or analogous case law:

Hanson v. Reichelt 452 N.W.2d 164 (Iowa 1990) (Actual risk doctrine adopted. "If the
nature of the employment exposes the employee to risk of such an injury, the employee
suffers an accidental injury arising out of and during the course of the employment").
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relevant statutory provision

Kan Stat Ann. §§44-501 and 44-508 (1993 & Supp 1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine
other definition of "incidental"
to employment
"going & coming" rule recognized:

See generally Repstine v Hudson Oil Co.. 126 P 2d 225 (Kan 1942) (The employee's
carrying money from filling station home with him at night was not sufficient make his
travel work-related "The fact that the employee happened to be doing something
incidental to or in connection with his work does not mean that the accident which
happened to him arose 'out of his employment ")
Tompkins v. George Rinner Construction Co.. 398 P 2d 578 (Kan 1965) (dual purpose
test)

other relevant or analogous case law

Thompson v. Heckendorn Manufacturing Co.. 367 P 2d 72 (Kan 1961) (Salesman hit his
head in the garage as he traveled inside from his car to make a business call Held not
compensable because the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment)
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Kentucky
relevant statutory provision

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §342.0011(1) (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Blue Diamond Coal Co. V. Walters. 287 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1956) (Acts necessary for
comfort and convenience of the employee while at work, though strictly personal to
himself and not acts of service are incidental to the service.).

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:
"going & coming" rule recognized:

Brown v. Olwsley . 564 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1978) (travel from home to the place of
employment is not performing some service for the employer).
Cf Kaycee Coal Co. v. Mary M. Short. 450 S.W.2d 262 (Ky. 1970) (when the home
becomes a work site, travel from the home to another work site is covered as travel
between two places of employment).

other relevant or analogous case law

Meem Haskins Coal Co. v. Jent 108 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1937) (dual purpose test used to
analyze an injury which occurred during the employee's permissive use of a company
machine shop to make a repair to personal property).
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Louisiana
relevant statutory provision
"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

La. Rev. State Ann. § 23:1031 (West 1998).
Mitchell v. Brookshire Grocery Co.. 653 So.2d 202 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (A slip and fall
injury in the employer's parking lot is compensable since the working day embraces
reasonable intervals before and after work "just as it embraces reasonable periods of rest,
relaxation, and attendance to personal needs.").

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:
"going & coming" rule recognized:

May v. Sisters of Charity. 651 So.2d 375 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
Wilson v. City Shreveport. 682 so.2d 882 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (applying the special
mission exception).

other relevant or analogous case law:

Guaglino v. Ace Bakery Div. Of Lakeland Bakery, Inc.. 275 So.2d 874 (La. Ct. App.
1973) (the electrocution death of a bakery manager using a blower belonging to the
employer to blow off grass clippings from his driveway was not compensable).
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Maine
relevant statutory provision

Me. Rev. Stat. 39-A § 201 (1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Cf Moore v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, et aL 669 A.2d 156 (Me. 1995) (When "an
employee in the course of his employment uses a restroom whose condition is a cause of
an injury to the employee, the injury arises out of the employment").

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:
"going & coming" rule recognized:

other relevant or analogous case law:

Comeau v. Maine Costal Services, et aL 449 A.2d 362 (Me. 1982) ("The crucial question
is whether a sufficient work-connection has been exhibited so as to justify an award of
compensation under a liberal interpretation of this remedial Act." The court finds that a
"somewhat tenuous" employment relationship will not satisfy this standard" and affirms
the denial of compensation. Nevertheless, the concurring opinion criticizes the majority
opinion's adoption of the equivalent of the "quantum theory" of work-connection, finding
that this theory enormously expanding the parameters of the work-connection test).
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Maryland
relevant statutory provision

Md Code Ann , Labor and Employment § 9-101 (1998)

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine

Spencer v Chesapeake Paperboard Co . 47 A 2d 385 (Md 1946) (an injury during a rest
period was considered incidental to the employment)

other definition of "incidental"
to employment

Blake Construction Co.. et al v. Wells. 225 A 2d 857 (Md 1967) ("The causative danger
must be incidental to the nature of the business, and not independent of the relation of
master and servant
[I]t is not the purpose of the workman's compensation Act to
impose upon the employer the obligation of a general insurer ")
Miller, et al. v. Coles. 194 A 2d 614 (Md 1963) (injuries from a bar fight were not
incident to employment as an equipment salesman, but were incident to being evicted, even
though claimant alleged that he was at the bar to meet a customer)

"going & coming" rule recognized:

Morris v Board of Educ. 663 A 2d 578 (Md 1995)

other relevant or analogous case law

Fairchild Space Co. v. Baroffio. 551 A 2d 135 (Md 1985) (There was no evidence the
employer required the employee to perform work at home Thus, "dual purpose"
exception to the going and coming rule was found inapplicable )
Sica v Retain Credit Co.. 227 A 2d 33 (Md 1967) (Recreational or social activities may
be in the course of employment if a work relationship is established by variety of facts
The standard is similar to that adopted by the Utah court in Black )
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Massachusetts
relevant statutory provision

Mass. Gen. L. ch.152, § 26 (1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Kubera's Case. 69 N.E.2d 673 (Mass. 1946).

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:

D'Angeli's Case. 343 N.E.2d 368 (Mass. 1976) (emergency public service may be
warranted in the course of employment and found incidental to employment).

"going & coming" rule recognized:

Frassa v. Caulfield. 491 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. App. 1986) (going and coming rule not
applicable to employee without a fixed place of employment).

other relevant or analogous case law
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Michigan
relevant statutory provision

Mich. Comp. Laws § 17.237(301).
The code expressly adopts the tenets of "premises rule" and expressly provides that an
"injury incurred in the pursuit of an activity the major purpose of which is social or
recreational is not covered under the act."
** The great majority of the case law in Michigan refers to the former section which was
replaced in 1985. All annotations to these cases are solely to the Michigan reporter.

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:
other definition of "incidental"
to employment:
"going & coming" rule recognized:

Camburn v. Northwest Sch.. 559 N.W.2d 370 (Mich. App. 1996) (the special mission
exception was not applicable to a teacher injured in an automobile accident on her way to
a seminar since the employer was not directly benefitted by employee's attendance and
attendance was neither compulsory nor definitely expected).
Owenv. Chrysler Corp.. 371 N.W.2d 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) ("[M]oving the car into
the garage for purposes of placing a suitcase in the car was at most preparation for the
eventuality of travel. The activity was not within the scope of the special mission so as to
support an award of compensation.").
White v. Public Service Comm'n. 61 N.W.2d 31 (Mich. 1953) (the fact that the
Commissioner took work home with him would not establish that his transportation to and
from home was incident to and a part of his employment).

other relevant or analogous case law:

A-22

Minnesota
relevant statutory provision

Minn. Stat. § 176.011 (1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Williams v. Hoyt Const. Co.r Inc.. 237 N.W.2d 339 (Minn. 1976) ("personal benefit"
rule). Schneppmna v. T & E Service, Inc.. 177 N.W.2d 306 (Minn. 1970) ("personal
benefit" rule not applicable to off-duty employee on the employer's premises).

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:

Weidenbach v. Miller. 55 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 1952) (when an employee, without either
express or implied instructions from his employer, voluntarily performs services for a third
party, his actions are not incidental to employment).
Brusven v. Ballord. 14 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. 1944) (injury from an accident during off hours
in an on-site residence were not incidental to employment, but arose from personal risks).
Thompson v. George E. Thompson Co.. 270 N.W. 594 (Minn. 1936) (an injury suffered
while installing a storm window on the family home, which was also used as the principal
place of business, was not incidental to the corporation's business).

'going & coming" rule recognized:

McConville v. City of St. Paul. 528 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. 1995).

other relevant or analogous case law:
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Mississippi
relevant statutory provision

Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-7 (1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Quitman Knitting Mill v. Smith. 540 So.2d 623 (Miss. 1989) (reaction to cold tablet
purchased from employer was reasonably incident of employment).

other definition of "incidental"
to employment.
"going & coming" rule recognized:

Wilson v. Service Broadcasters, Inc.. 483 So.2d 1339 (Miss. 1986) (compensability based
upon the application of an exception to the going and coming rule which made the travel
from home work-related).

other relevant or analogous case law

Persons v. Stokes. 76 So.2d 517 (Miss. 1954) (An eye injury from a richoeting pellet from
gun shot at a treed squirrel was not compensable. "The employer did not require, foster,
or encourage the hunting of squirrels by his employees while on the job." ).
Ready's Shell Station & Cafe v. Ready. 65 So. 2d 268 (Miss. 1953) (Employee-housewife
who had regularly performed bookkeeping services at night in her home living room
suffered a compensable injury when, while moving a gun off of the couch, she suffered a
shotgun amputation of her left thumb. Employee was found to be in the act of engaging in
the work on her books when she was injured.).
**The court was equally divided on the issue of whether the employee's injury arose "in
the course o f her employment. The dissenting judge declared, "This is just too fantastic,"
finding:
Mrs. Ready undertook to move the gun as house-keeper — not as
bookkeeper. It was not necessary to remove the gun to do the book work.
She could have utilized several other seating places. Of course, as a
housekeeper she would have removed the gun from the couch the moment
A-24

she saw it there . . . Mrs. Ready was not merely removing the gun from the
sofa and laying it aside - but she said her purpose was to place it in the
closet where it usually stayed. She was acting as a housekeeper — not a
bookkeeper — in doing that.
Id. There was no discussion of the employee's activity being "incidental" to her
employment.
Earnest v. Interstate Life & Accident Insurance Co.. 119 So.2d 782 (Miss. 1960)
(distinguishing Ready and concluding that an injury from a shotgun accidentally discharged
while the traveling insurance salesman was "killing time" waiting for a customer was not
compensable).
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Missouri
relevant statutory provision

Mo. Rev. State. § 287.020 (1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Fingers v. Mount Tabor United Church of Christ. 439 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969)
("[0]ur appellate courts have ruled as compensable injuries received by fixed-hour
employees while engaged in various personal activities on the employers' premises.").
Byhee v. Ozark Airline. 706 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (going to fill the tires of
a personal vehicle while on the company parking lot was incidental to employment).
Cherry v. Powdered Coatings. 897 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (moving a
personal vehicle in the employer's parking lot pursuant to the employer's instructions
was incidental to employment).

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:

Yaffe v. St. Louis Children's Hosp.. 648 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. App. 1982) ("An employee's
injury occurs in the course of employment if the injury is the result of an activity which is
reasonably incidental to the conditions or performance of her work and the employer
could have reasonably anticipated it.. . . the focus is on the mutual benefit to the
employer and employee." A volunteer workers' shopping in the employer's gift shop is
where the employee is granted a discount is incidental to employment).
Fingers v. Mount Tabor United Church of Christ. 439 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969)
(an employee who resides on the employer's premises and is subject to 24-hour call, must
still demonstrate that the activity he was engaged in was work-related rather than personal
in order to be in the course of employment).

"going & coming" rule recognized:

Donzelot v. Park Drug Co.. 239 S.W.2d 526 (Mo. App. 1951).

other relevant or analogous case law:

Shannon v. St. Louis Board of Education. 577 S.W.2d 949 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979)
(applying the mutual benefit or dual purpose rule, a teacher's fall while attending a
class for the benefit of her employer was found to be compensable).
Jemison v. Superior Auto Mall. 932 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (the dual
purpose test was not met when an employee picked up a spray can of paint requested by
his employer while out on a lunch break and personal interview).
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Montana
relevant statutory provision

Mont. Code Ann. § 39-71-407 (1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Steffesv. 93 Leasing Co.. 580 P.2d 450 (Mont. 1978).
Strickland v. State Compensation Mutual Insurance Fund. 901 P.2d 1391 (Mont. 1995)
(personal comfort doctrine did not provide coverage an employee on a personal errand off
of the employer's premises).

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:
"going & coming" rule recognized:

Heath v. Montana Municipal Insurance Authority. 959 P.2d 480 (Mont. 1998) (employee
injured on public sidewalk adjacent to her employer's premises was not subject to any risk
created by the employment).

other relevant or analogous case law

Barthule v. Karman. 886 P.2d 971 (Mont. 1994) (Controlling factors relied upon to
determine a work-related injury include: (1) whether the activity was undertaken at the
employer's request; (2) whether employer, either directly or indirectly, compelled
employee's attendance at the activity; (3) whether the employer controlled or participated
in the activity; and (4) whether both employer and employee mutually benefitted from the
activity.).
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Nebraska
relevant statutory provision

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-101 (1999).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Chrisman v. Farmers Coop. Assoc. 140 N.W.2d 809 (Neb. 1966) (All acts reasonably
necessary or incident to the performance of the work, including such matters of personal
convenience and comfort, not in conflict with specific instructions, as an employee may
normally be expected to indulge in, under the conditions of his work, are regarded as being
within the scope or sphere of the employment." Working on a personal vehicle on the
employer's premises, during the time of employment was permitted by the employer and
thus incidental to claimant's work.).
Accord Cannia v. Douglas County. 481 N.W.2d 917 (Neb. 1992) (j°gging while attending
a jail management course was reasonably incidental to employment as it was encouraged
as a part of the course).

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:
"going & coming" rule recognized:

Reynolds v. School Dist.. 461 N.W.2d 758 (Neb. 1990).

other relevant or analogous case law

Hardin v. Moorman Manufacturing Co.: 140 N.W.2d 820 (Neb. 1966) (performing repairs
on the traveling salesman's personal vehicle, although also used for business purposes, was
not incidental to his employment).
Rowan v. University of Neb.. 299 N.W.2d 774 (Neb. 1980) (an art professor's fall off a
ladder while opening the window of a home studio was not compensable on the basis that
the employer was not required to assume the risk incidental to the defective window in the
private studio).
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Nevada
relevant statutory provision

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 616C. 150(1) (1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:
other definition of "incidental"
to employment:
"going & coming" rule recognized:

other relevant or analogous case law:

Rio Suite Hotel & Casino v. Gorsky. 939 P.2d 1043 (Nev. 1997) (To arise out of
employment "the injured party must establish a link between the workplace conditions and
how those conditions caused the injury. A claimant must demonstrate that the origin of
the injury is related to some risk involved within the scope of employment").
Heidtman v. Nevada Industrial Commission. 368 P.2d 763 (Nev. 1962) (the entry into an
archery contest was a personal deviation from a claimed business trip).
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New Hampshire
relevant statutory provision

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §281-A:2 (V) (1987 & Supp. 1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:
other definition of "incidental"
to employment:
"going & coming" rule recognized:

Cook v. Wickson Trucking Co.. Inc.. 600 A.2d 918 (N.H. 1991) (offering a ride to a
stranded co-employee encountered on the road after work is simply too vague and
attenuated a benefit to make the trip work related).

other relevant or analogous case law:

Maheux v. Cove-Craftr Inc.. 164 A.2d 574 (N.H. 1960) (an injury while engaged in a
personal activity which is reasonably undertaken and not expressly forbidden on the
employer's premises is "in the course o f employment).
Accord Hanchett v. Brezner Tanning Co.. 221 A.2d 246 (N.H. 1966) (An employee's
death which occurred while repairing his personal vehicle in company shop was
compensable. The court found that the employer did not forbid this activity and it was
reasonably to be expected. Accordingly, it was an activity incidental to employment).
Murphy v. Town of Atkinson. 517 A.2d 1170 (N.H. 1986) (an injury may be compensable
if it occurred during an activity related to employment, which may include a personal
activity if reasonably expected and not forbidden, or an activity of mutual benefit to
employer and employee).
Anheuser-Busch Co.r Inc. v. Pelletier. 641 A.2d 1018 (N.H. 1994) (to satisfy the mutual
benefit theory, the employer must derive a substantial and direct benefit).

A-30

New Jersey
relevant statutory provision

N.J. Rev. Stat. § 34:15-36 (1999).
** The statute expressly provides that "when the employee is required by the employer to
be away from the employer's placement of employment, the employee shall be deemed to
be in the course of employment when the employee is engaged in the direct performance
of duties assigned or directed by the employer."

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:
other definition of "incidental"
to employment:

Coleman v. Cycle Transformer Corp.. 520 A.2d 1341 (N.J. 1986) ("Injuries sustained
within the scope of the work-period and the work-place while the employee was engaged
in personally motivated, but customary, or reasonable activities").

'going & coming" rule recognized:

other relevant or analogous case law

Van Devander v. West Side M. E. Church. 160 A. 763 (N.J. 1932) (care of a dwelling
house ordinarily falls upon the occupant, and an injury sustained while performing a
maintenance duty is not incidental to the work, either directly or indirectly).

A-31

New Mexico
relevant statutory provision

N. M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-19 (1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:
other definition of "incidental"
to employment:

Velkovitz v. Penasco Independent School District. 633 P.2d 695 (N.M Ct. App. 1980);
overruled on other grounds, 633 P.2d 685 (N.M. 1980) ("A risk is 'incidental to the
employment' only where the risk belongs to or is connected with what an employee must
do in fulfilling her contract. . . . What is reasonably incident to the employment depends
upon the practices permitted in the particular employment and on the customs of the
employment environment generally." Skiing was not incidental to employment since it was
not a practice of the claimant's employment as a teacher or sponsor of the school's
students.).
Losinski v. Drs. Corcoran. Barkoff and Stagnoner PA.. 636 P.2d 898 (N.M. Ct. App.
1981) (the claim was denied on the basis it did not "arise out o f employment since the risk
did not flow from the employment as a rational consequence").

"going & coming" rule recognized:

Constantineau v. First Nat'l Bank. 810 P.2d 1258 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).

other relevant or analogous case law

Clemmer v. Carpenter. 648 P.2d 341 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (dual purpose rule).
Edens v. New Mexico Health & Social Serv.. 547 P.2d 65 (N.M. 1976) (scope of
employment is determined from directs of employer).
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New York
relevant statutory provision

N.Y. Workers' Compensation Law § 2 (7) (McKinney 1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:
other definition of "incidental"
to employment:
"going & coming" rule recognized:

Bobinis v. State Ins. Fund. 653 N.Y.S.2d 408 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (The employee was
struck by a car in a store parking lot during an errand on his way home. The employee's
home was not a second site of employment. Further, the employee's claim that he stopped
to purchase a pen for work was an insufficient work relationship.).
Neacosia v. N.Y. Power Auth.. 626 N.Y.S.2d 44 (N.Y. 1995) (Special mission exception
satisfied. It is not sufficient that an employee has "undertaken a personal errand that had
some incidental work-related purpose." Rather, there must be "evidence of affirmative
conduct by the employer soliciting or encouraging the errand.").
Freebern v. North Rockland CD A. 410 N.Y.S.2d 371 (N. Y. App. Div. 1978) (The dual
purpose test must be applied with caution to employees who have frequent occasion to
carry home work of varying degrees of importance and substantiality. The going-andcoming rule is not be subjected to a process of gradual erosion, through the device of
finding some tidbit of work performed at home.).

other relevant or analogous case law

McCoy v. New York City Housing Auth.. 613 N.Y.S.2d 467 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) ("To
be compensable the injury must be a natural consequence of the employee's duties before it
can be said to arise out of employment, and there must be a causal relationship between
the accident and the employment." A fatal automobile accident away from the work site
did not arise out of and in the course of the workers' employment).
De Jesus v. New York State Police. 467 N.Y.S.2d 916 (N.Y. App. Civ. 1983) ("There
must be a nexus between the accident and the employment to invoke the benefits of the
Workers' Compensation Law." This was not met by mere fact that the officer was subject
to 24-hour recall).
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North Carolina
relevant statutory provision

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6) (1991).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Cf Smith v. Dacotah Cotton Mills, Inc.. 230 S.E.2d 772 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) (injury
during a break while on the public street was not compensable).

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:

Bell v. Dewey Brothers. Inc.. 72 S.E.2d 680 (N.C. 1952) (an injury while washing
personal vehicle on the employer's premises is not compensable since it did not result from
a risk incident to employment).
Robbins v. Nicholson. 188 S.E.2d 350, 354 (N.C. 1972) ("The injury must spring from the
employment or have it origin therein, [citation omitted] The injury must come from a risk
which might have been contemplated by a reasonable person as incidental to the service
when he entered the employment. It may be said to be incidental to the employment when
it is either an ordinary risk directly connected with the employment, or an extraordinary
risk which is only indirectly connected with the service owing to the special nature of the
employment.").
Fortner v. J.K. Holding Co.. 349 S.E.2d 296 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (an injury which
occurred while the claimant was hanging plants in her home was not compensable although
the employer had instructed the claimant to dispose of the plants and received an
incidental benefit from her actions).
Roman v. Southland Transportation Co.. 508 S.E.2d 543 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998)
("Incidental to . . . may be defined as something contingent on or related to actual
employment duties.").

'going & coming" rule recognized:

Brvan v. T.A. Loving Co. & Assoc. 24 S.E.2d 751 (N.C. 1943).

other relevant or analogous case law

Sandy v. Stackhouse Inc.. 128 S.E.2d 218 (N.C. 1962) (the risk must be incidental to the
character of the business and not independent of the relation of master and servant).
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Brvan v. First Free Will Baptist Church. 147 S.E.2d 633 (N.C. 1966) (A minister's back
injury while moving a stove from his employer's parsonage did not arise out of and in the
course of his employment although the activity benefitted his employer. Rather, his back
injury arose out of his performing an act personal to himself and his family.).

North Dakota
relevant statutory provision

N.D. Cent. Code § 65-01-02 (11) (1995 & Supp. 1997).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:
other definition of "incidental"
to employment:

Welch v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau. 31 N.W.2d 498 (N.D. 1948)
(the claimant's errand to obtain required forms for his work was incidental to his other
duties).

"going & coming" rule recognized:

other relevant or analogous case law

O'Leaery v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau. 243 N.W. 805 ( 1932) (the essence
of the dual purpose test is utilized).
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Ohio
relevant statutory provision

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4123.01 (Anderson 1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Inland Manufacturing Div.. General Motors Corp. v. Lawson. 240 N.E.2d 100 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1967) ("Where a workman does such things as are usually and reasonably incidental
to the work of the employer, including the taking of refreshment, rest and smoke, which
are not forbidden by the employer and in so doing is injured, it cannot be said as a matter
of law that the injury was received outside the course of his employment").

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:
"going & coming" rule recognized:

Ruckman v. Cubbv Drilling. Inc.. 689 N.E.2d 917 (Ohio 1998).

other relevant or analogous case law:

Ruckman v. Cubby Drilling. Inc.. 689 N.E.2d 917 (Ohio 1998) ("Totality of the
circumstances' test to determine whether there exists a sufficient causal connection
between injury and employment to justify a claimant's participation in the fund. That test
requires primary analysis of the following facts and circumstances: '(1) the proximity of the
scene of the accident to the place of employment, (2) the degree of control the employer
had over the scene of the accident, (3) the benefit the employer received from the injured
employee's presence at the scene of the accident."'). Accord Lord v. Daugherty. 423
N.E.2d (Ohio 1981).
Hampton v. Trimble. 655 N.E.2d 432 (Ohio 1995) (traveling employee's slip and fall on
their home driveway while walking from the car to the door was compensable since the
claimant did not complete her travel until she reached the door of her home; ef "portal to
portal" rule).
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Oklahoma
relevant statutory provision

Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 3. (1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Furr v. Wal-Mart. 966 P.2d 1193 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:
"going & coming" rule recognized:

other relevant or analogous case law:

Corbett v. Express Personnel. 936 P.2d 932 (Okla. 1997) (risks purely personal—namely
those which are not reasonably connected with the claimant's employment—are not
compensable).
American Management Systems, Inc. v. Sheila Mae Burns. 903 P.2d 288 (Okla. 1995) (a
claimant must proffer evidence of a causal nexus to an identified employment-related
hazard).
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Oklahoma
relevant statutory provision

Okla. Stat. tit. 85, §3.(1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Furrv. Wal-Mart. 966 P.2d 1193 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:
"going & coming" rule recognized:

other relevant or analogous case law

Corbett v. Express Personnel. 936 P.2d 932 (Okla. 1997) (risks purely personal—namely
those which are not reasonably connected with the claimant's employment—are not
compensable).
American Management Systems, Inc. v. Sheila Mae Burns. 903 P.2d 288 (Okla. 1995) (a
claimant must proffer evidence of a causal nexus to an identified employment-related
hazard).
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Oregon
relevant statutory provision

Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.005 (1997).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Hayes. 943 P.2d 197 (Or. 1997) ("By 'reasonably incidental to'
employment, we include activities that are personal in nature — such as a telephone call
home or a brief visit with a co-worker — as long as the conduct bears some reasonable
relationship to the employment and is expressly or impliedly allowed by the employer ").

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:
"going & coming" rule recognized:

Knishwita V, McPonakTs Restaurants of Oregon, Inc., 919 P.2d 465 (Or. 1996).

other relevant or analogous case law:

Gilmore v. Norpac Foods, Inc.. 867 P.2d 1373 (Or. 1994) (Oregon has adopted a unitary
approach, in which "arising out o f and "in the course o f are two elements of a single
inquiry, that is, whether the relationship between the injury and the employment is
sufficient that the injury should be compensable.).
Hansen v. State Accident Insurance Fund. 558 P.2d 1303 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) (An injury
to a part-time ski instructor while in a ski contest was not compensable. Any benefit
accruing to the employer from the claimant's participation in the contest was only
incidental at best).
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Pennsylvania
relevant statutory provision

77 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 411 (1) (Supp. 1999).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:
other definition of "incidental"
to employment:
"going & coming" rule recognized:

Police v. W.C.A.B.. 694 A.2d 1181 (Pa. Commw. Ct), appeal den.. 719 A.2d 748 (Pa.
1997).

other relevant or analogous case law

Knowles v. Parker Wylie Carpet Co.r Inc.. 195 A. 445 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1937) ("Ordinarily,
when an accident occurs to an employee off the employer's premises, there is no
presumption that at the time of the accident he was in the course of his employment. The
burden rests upon the claimant to prove . . . he was actually engaged in a furtherance of
the business or affairs of his employer").
Jones v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board. 489 A.2d 1006 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1985) (Portal to portal ruled applied to traveling employee. Thus a slip and fall on tthe
claimant's sidewalk when she went from her car to her home was compensable.).
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Rhode Island
relevant statutory provision

R.I. Gen. Laws § 28^29^2 (1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:
other dv aition of "incidental"
to employment:

Rico v. All Phase Electric Co.. 675 A.2d 406 (R.I. 1996) (adoption of the "premises rule,"
recognizing injuries in the employer's parking lot while entering work to be "incidental" to
employment).

"going & coming" rule recognized:

Rico v. All Phase Electric Co., 675 A.2d 406 (R.I. 1996).

i

D'Alessio v. State of Rhode Island, et aL 509 A.2d 986 (R.I. 1986) (Injury while
attending to duties from a union meeting was found to be compensable because the union
activities in this case were found to be beneficial to the employer. The court noted,
however, that in some cases the benefit of a union activity to an employer may be so
tenuous that recovery should be denied).
Dawson v. A & H Mfg. Co.. 463 A.2d 519 (R.I. 1983) (Rhode Island applies the "actual
risk" doctrine which requires the employee to show that the risk, even though common to
the public, was in fact a risk of his employment)

relevant or analogous case law
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South Carolina
relevant statutory provision

S.C. Code. Ann. §42-1-160 (Law Co-op 1985 & Supp. 1998).

"incidental" to employment

Osteen v. Greenville County School Dist. 508 S.E.2d 21 (S.C 1998) ("The personal
comfort doctrine aids a court in determining whether, and under what circumstances,
entirely personal activities engaged in by an employee at work may be considered
incidental to employment." The claimant's activity of filling a personal cooler with ice for
a family picnic was found not to be a "natural incident" of her employment and thus noncompensable.).

defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:

Beam v. State Workmen's Compensation Fund. 200 S.E.2d 83 (S.C 1973) (travel at the
request or in the interest of the employer is incidental to employment).
Moore v. Family Service of Charleston County. 237 S.E.2d 84 (S.C 1977) (injury from
fall on home stairway while carrying four volumes of professional books was compensable
since the employee was engaged in a special mission for her employer).

"going & coming" rule recognized:

Camp v. Spartan Mills. 3396 S.E.2d 121 (S.C. App. 1990).

other relevant or analogous case law:

Leopard v. Blackman-Uhler. 458 S.E.2d 41 (S.C. 1995) (claimant's injury during voluntary
company Softball game held off-premises and after work was not compensable
notwithstanding the fact that the employer supplied the uniforms with a company logo, the
equipment, paid the league dues and published the results of the games in the local
newspaper).
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South Dakota
relevant statutory provision

S D. Codified Laws §62-1-1(7) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1998).
The statute expressly provides that "No injury is compensable unless the employment or
employment related activities are a major contributing cause of the condition
complained of"

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:
oiber definition of "incidental"
tc errr o^ merit'

Lang v. Board of Education
N W.2d 695 (S.D. 1945) (travel from home where he had
commenced his work to the • ool where he was to continue his work was incidental to
employment)

"going & coming" rule recognized:

-~z\

other relevant or analogous case law:

Roberts v. Stell. 367 N.W.2d 198 (S.D. 1985) ("[A]n employee is within the course of his
employment if what he is doing is naturally related or incidental to his employment or he is
doing that which his contract of employment expressly or impliedly authorizes." The court
rejected claimant's assertion that since she lived on the premises and ate her meals there,
grocery shopping was "naturally related or incidental" to her employment)

Board of Education. 17 N W 2d 695 (S.D. 1945) (discussed generally)
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relevant statutory provision

Tex. Labor Code Ann. §401.011 (10) (1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:

Texas Workers' Compensation Insurance v. Rodriguez. 953 S.W.2d 765 (Tex Ct. App.
1997) (An injury while tossing a football on the employer's premises during a brief
work break was compensable. The language used by the court in its analysis is similar
to the personal comfort doctrine.).

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:

St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance v. Confer. 956 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997)
(applying the dual purpose test to an errand by the employee on his way home).

"going & coming" rule recognized:

other relevant or analogous case law:

Blockwell v. Harris County. 909 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (two tests to
determine if an injury may be classified as one sustained in the course of employment: (1) it
must of a kind or character originating in or having to do with the employer's work; and
(2) it must have occurred while the individual was engaged in the furtherance of the
employer's business or affairs").
Loyd v. Texas Employers Ins. Assoc. 280 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. 1955) (The employee, while
on call, slipped off a ladder while painting the side of his house when he went to answer
the phone. Injuries were not sustained in the course of employment notwithstanding the
employee's claim that he was going to answer the phone at the time of the accident
because of his on-call status. The court noted that the call could have been purely personal
or even a wrong number.).
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Vermont
-elevant statutory provision

Vt Stat Ann Tit 21 § 618 (1998).

"ineidentar to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:
other i
m m of "incidental"
to employment:

Kenney v. Rockingham Sch. Dist.. 190 A.2d 702 (Vt. 1963) (A slip-and-fall injury suffered
by a home economics teacher while leaving an evening community education class was
compensable since it was undertaken in good faith to advance the employer's interests
The court specifically noted that "it must be kept in mind that this was an injury sustained
at the work-situs" after doing something of mutual benefit to herself and her employer )
Rae v. Green Mountain Boys Camp. 175 A.2d 800 (Vt. 1961) (the gratuitous act of
holding the reigns of an individual the claimant was requesting to act as a voluntary judge
for his employer was reasonably part of his mission upon which he had been sent by the
employer.).

"going & coming" rule recognized:

other relevant or analogous case law

Holmquist v. Mental Health Services. Etc.. 420 A.2d 108 (Vt. 1980) (an employee's
attendance at a meeting away from the work premises was within the course of
employment as it was encouraged by the employee's supervisor, of mutual benefit to the
employer, and undertaken in good faith.)
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Virginia
relevant statutory provision

Va Code Ann § 65 2-101 (Michie 1998)

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine

Kraf Constr Servs . Inc. v Ingram. 437 S E 2d 424 (Va (1993) (an employee seeking to
quench his thirst at a place provided by the employer is within the employment)

other definition of "incidental"
to employment

Jones v Colonial Williamsburg Found . 382 S E 2d 300 (1989) (the employee's personal
activity of throwing away trash, while the employer's premises, was incidental to
employment)

"going & coming" rule recognized:

Kendrickv Nationwide Homes, Inc.. 355 S E 2d 347 (1987) (an employee going to and
from the place where work is to be performed is not engaged in performing any service
growing out of and incidental to his employment)

other relevant or analogous case law:

Lucas, et al v Lucas, et al. 186 S E 2d 63 (Va 1972) (Virginia employs the "actual risk"
test which requires only that the employment expose the workman to the particular danger
from which he was injured, notwithstanding the exposure of the public generally to like
tasks An accident while performing a special errand undertaken at the approval of the
employer is compensable )
Hill City Trucking. Inc v Christian. 385 S E 2d 377 (Va 1989) (Under the "actual risk"
test, an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate
cause and which comes from a hazard to which the workman would have been equally
exposed apart from the employment is not compensable Injuries incurred during a truck
robbery were not compensable because there was no evidence that the employment
contributed to the risk )
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Washington
relevant statutory provision

"incidental" to empi«
defined in terms of !
comfort" doctrine:

1998 Wash Legis. Serv § 51.08.013 (West).
** Unlike most other states, Washington's worker's compensation act does not possess
an "arising out of employment" requirement.

^1

other definition oi ..xiueniai
to employment:

"going & comii

Pept. Of Labor v. Johnson, 928 P.2d 1138 (Wa. Ct. App. 1997) (An injury at home
while on administrative leave was not incidental to employment. The court chose to
focus narrowly on the specific activity performed by the claimant at the time of the
injury.).

rule recognized:

other relevant or analogous case law:

Ackley-Bell v. Seattle School District No. 1, 940 P.2d 685 (Wa. Ct. App. 1997) ("A
worker is 'acting in the course of employment when 'acting at his or her employer's
direction or in the furtherance of his or her employer's business." An injury incurred
while attending collective bargaining negotiations was compensable.).
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West Virginia
relevant statutory provision

W. Va. Code § 23-4-1 (1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:
other definition of "incidental"
to employment:
"going & coming" rule recognized:

Barkley v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r. 266 S.E.2d 456 (W.Va. 1980).
Bilchak v. SWCC. 168 S.E.2d 723 (W.Va. 1969) (an injury to an employee while going to
or from work while not on the premises is not compensable unless such place of injury is
brought in the course of and as a result of his employment).

other relevant or analogous case law

Emmel v. State Compensation Director, et aL 145 S.E.2d 29 (W.Va. 1965) ("[I]t is not
enough to say that the activity in which the injury occurred was a vague incident of
employment." The court cautioned against liberalizing the interpretation of "in the course
o f employment to the point that the words are rendered meaningless).
Jenrett v. Smith. 315 S.E.2d 583 (W. Va. 1983) ("dual purpose" test adopted and used to
evaluate immunity from tort liability of co-employee).
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Wisconsin
relevant statutory provision

MS Slat ; 102 o: (1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine;

Weiss v. City of Milwaukee, et aL 559 N.W.2d 588 (Wis. 1997) (taking a personal phone
call was incidental to employment).

other definition of "incidental"
to employment:

Applied Plastics, Inc., et al. v. Labor & Industry Review Commission, et al.. 359 N W 2d
168 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (in evaluating whether the injury arose out of an act which was
incidental to employment, the court asked whether "the 'obligations or conditions' of
employment create the 'zone of special danger1 out of which the injury arose").

"going & coming" rule recognized:

Wis. Stat § 102.02 (3) (1998).

other relevant or analogous case law

Black River Dairy Products. Inc. v. Dept. of Industry, Labor & Human Relations. 207
N.W.2d 65 (Wis. 1973) (A traveling salesman slipped and fell while walking from his back
door of his home to his truck When an employee has a duty to travel as a part of his
employment, his work commences as soon as he leaves his home and starts for the first
place at which he is to perform work).
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Wyoming
relevant statutory provision

Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-102 (xi) (1998).

"incidental" to employment
defined in terms of the "personal
comfort" doctrine:
other definition of "incidental"
to employment:
"going & coming" rule recognized:

Western Power Service & Construction v. Van Matre. 657 P.2d 815 (Wyo. 1983)
(payment of a per diem allowance was insufficient to make travel a part of the
employment).

other relevant or analogous case law

Haagensen v. State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div.. 949 P.2d 865 (Wyo.
1997) (A causal connection exists between the employee's injury and the course of
employment when "there is a nexus between the injury and some condition, activity,
environment or requirement of the employment." This was not met when restaurant
employee was injured after remaining on employer's premises 2 Vi to 3 hours after shift
ended.). Cf Walls v. Industrial Common. 857 P.2d 964, 967 (Utah Ct App. 1993).
Stuckey v. State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div.. 890 P.2d 1097 (Wyo.
1995) (nexus between the injury and employment not satisfied when employee injured
during personal use of the county shop).
State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div. v. Espinoza. 924 P.2d 979 (Wyo.
1996) (claimant's momentary horseplay insufficient to break nexus to employment for on
premises injury).
Cronk v. Citv of Cody, et al.. 897 P.2d 476 (Wyo. 1995) (Insufficient nexus to
employment. Off-duty gym workout of a policy officer, while beneficial to the
employment, was not required by the employer. "[I]f an employer does not require its
employees to engage in such activities as a condition of employment, then those activities
A-50

cannot be in the course of employment").
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This case involves a claim, for perma nent total disability
benefits associated with a January 13, 1997 fall on, i ce, resulting
ill quadriplegia. The only issue to be resolved is the question of
whether on not the petitioner had a compensable industrial injury
on January 1 3 , 1997. The petitioner has claimed that, at the time
of the fall, he was performing a duty .incidental to his work
responsibilities and thus his accident entitles him to workers
compensation benefits. The respondents argue that the petitioner
w a s not performing work duties when he was injured, but rather was
merely salting his driveway, a normal homeowner activity. A t the
time of the hearing, the attorneys indicated that they were in
basic agreement with the facts of the fall, and only had
differences on what result was appropriate when the law was applied
to the facts.
As a result, the attorneys requested that the
hearing be canceled and requested that they be allowed to present
the competing legal arguments in written briefs to be submitted
post-hearing.
The ALJ agreed to allow this manner of presenting
the case,
A briefing scheduled was set up, at the time of the
meeting on December 2, 1997.
The briefing was completed as of
January 3 0 , 1998, when the matter was considered ready for
decision.
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FINDINGS OF FACT:
The relevant facts are stated in the briefs submitted by the
parties. The ALJ will recite just those facts essential to the
ALJ's decision to follow.
As of January 30, 1997, the date of injury, the petitioner
was employed by AE Clevite, as a traveling sales representative.
He earned $36,500.00 per year in this position, at that time, and
had a wife, and no minor dependent children. The only place of
employment that the petitioner utilized was his home office. The
petitioner had a separate room in his home that he used as his
office. In that room, the petitioner had a computer, a printer, a
phone, and an answering machine, all of which were provided to him
by his employer. He also had numerous catalogs and price lists
provided by the employer in that room. The employer had set up a
separate phone line to the petitioner's office as well.
The
employer also provided the petitioner with a car, which he used to
travel to various locations to service customers. The petitioner
worked exclusively out of his home and had no central office to
which he reported. The petitioner received all his business mail
and packages at his home.
On January 30, 1997, the petitioner had done some work
traveling, apparently locally, to service some customers. He then
returned to his home, to prepare for a business trip he was to take
two days later. He loaded his car with the necessary lists and
catalogs and other items that he needed for the trip.
The
petitioner was waiting to receive a display that he needed to take
with him. That display was to be delivered to his home, either by
regular mail or some other delivery system (i.e. UPS, etc.). The
petitioner had spoken with the individual responsible for sending
him the display and understood that the display was to be delivered
to him at some time on January 30, 1997. After completing loading
his car, the petitioner became aware that the mail carrier was
close by. This caused the petitioner to be concerned about his
steep driveway and the fact that the surface might be icy. He
therefore went and retrieved a large bag of salt and proceeded to
broadcast the salt onto the driveway.
As he did so, he fell
suffering the neck injury that caused his quadriplegia. The fall
occurred in the afternoon, during the hours that he normally
worked.
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petitioner stated in his deposition that he was
concerned regarding the possibility that the mail carrier might be
delivering the display. He stated that the display was heavy and
awkward (measuring 3 feet by 6 inches) and he thought this might
cause difficulty for the carrier, while negotiating a slippery
driveway. The petitioner stated that he probably would have salted
the driveway out of concern for the carrier, even if the display
was not being delivered by mail. The petitioner had salted his
driveway over the years, as needed. The display actually was never
delivered on January 30, 1997, but instead came to the petitioner's
home on January 3i 1QQ7.
ARGUMENT PRESENTED:
The petitioner argues that the salting of the driveway was
a work-related activity, necessary to ensure that the display he
needed for his business trip, could be delivered to him without
problem.
The petitioner argues that the fact that he may have
gotten some personal benefit out of salting his driveway should not
prevent a conclusion that the salting of the driveway had a work
purpose to it. The petitioner argues that, in choosing to have the
petitioner work out of his home, the employer has, in essence,
converted the petitioner's home into the employer's work premises.
As such, the traditional legal presumption of compensability
applicable to injuries on the employer's work premises should apply
to injuries sustained by the petitioner while working at his home.
The respondent has argued that the salting of the driveway
was simply a homeowner responsibility that the petitioner chose to
do on January 30, 1997 and that it was not an activity that was
engaged in for the benefit of the employer. The respondent argues
that this is clear from the petitioner' own admission that he would
have salted the driveway regardless of whether or not the mail
carrier was bringing the package on January 30, 1997.
The
respondent argues that case law supports the requirement that
injuries sustained at home are compensable injuries only where they
are sustained while the employee is engaged in a clearly workrelated activity. As the petitioner's injury-causing activity in
this case was just a routine homeowner maintenance activity, the
respondent argues that it does not meet the requirement of being in
the course of employment. In addition, the respondent argues that
the risk involved in that activity was not a risk attributable to
the employer, but rather was a personal risk that the petitioner
faced, as a result of being a homeowner.
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DISCUSSION AND AUTHORITY:
Offices in the home have greatly increased recently, as a
result of communication advances (computers) that now allow
information exchanges not possible in the past. With employees
working out of their homes, the prior workers compensation rules
and theories are not very helpful in determining what activities
will be covered and which will be considered deviations from the
course of employment. Bright line tests offered by the "business
premises" and meal time breaks do not apply, where someone is
working in their home. The parties have cited to a few "home
office" cases, but most of the cases cited in the briefs do not
involve home offices, but rather deal with various situations
involving work performed away from the business premises. The ALJ
is inclined to find the cases dealing specifically with home
offices to be more on point, in analyzing the compensability issue
in the instant case. This is because the ALJ finds there is a
fundamental
difference between
situations where work is
occasionally done away from the normal business/work location, and
cases where the home has been designated as the normal, or only,
business/work location.
The two cited cases that clearly involve true home office
situations are Joe/s Ready Shell Station & Cafe v. Ready, 65 So. 2d
268 (Miss. 1953) and Black River Dairy Products. Inc., 207 No. W.
2d 65 (Wis. 1973) (no Utah cases involving home offices have been
cited) . In both cases, the home was the primary, or only, place
where the employee performed work and the courts in both cases
found coverage existed. In the Ready case, the court went to the
extreme of accepting that moving a shot gun was in the course of
employment, because the employee needed to work where the shot gun
was located.
The Black River case actually goes on at length
discussing the fact that the employer was not just condoning the
use of the home as a work location, but actually had decided that
this should be the primary work locale.
Therefore, when the
employee was injured going from his house to his car, the court
noted that the employee was not going to work, but rather was at
work and on the employer's premises, since the employer had
provided no other place of work for the employee, besides his home.
Many of the cases cited deal with whether travel from home
to regular business premises is covered, where the home was
considered an accepted locale to perform some of the work. Kavcee
Coal Co. v. Short, 450 S.W. 2d 262 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970), Wilson v.
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Service Broadcasters, Inc., S o. 2d 13 3 9 (Miss. 1986). These cases
found coverage while the employee was in the process of traveling,
on the basis that travel between several business premises
locations is generally covered
The ALJ finds that these cases are
not really similar factually to the instant case under review.
Most, if not all, of the cases where benefits were denied are cases
where there was no true home office situation. Peetz v. Industrial
Comm'n, 604 P.2d 2525 (Ariz. 1979) after hours injury with business
tool, D.E.S. Youth Conservation Corps v. Industrial Comm'n, 630
P.2d 58 (Ariz. 1981) recreational injury with prohibited weapon
while in 24-hour residency situation, Glasser v. Youth Shop, 54 So.
2d 686 (Fla. 1951) fall at home carrying work books, where there
was no requirement that employee take books home, Rowan v.
University of Nebraska, 299 N. W. 2d 774 (Neb. 1980) art professor
fixing an at-home studio window, where home studio was an option
for professor, but was not required by university, Owens v.
Chrysler Corporation, 371 N. W. 2d 519 (Mich. 1985) employee dies of
heart attack trying to move a vehicle so he could get ready to go
on a business trip, Loyd v. Texas Employers Ins. Asso. 280 S.W. 2d
955 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) on-call employee working on a ladder
outside his home when phone rang and he fell off ladder going to
answer it. In one Louisiana case where benefits were denied, it is
simply unclear if a true home office situation was involved.
Danielson v. Security Van Lines, Inc.,, 1 58 So, 2d 609 (La. 1963) .
The above-noted cases appear to show that cour ts are willing
to take a more expansive view of wha t activities at-home are
covered, if the employee is required to work at home. The courts
in Ready Shell and Black River found coverage, even though the
actual injury-causing activity was not a specific work duty, but
rather was an act that led up to work being performed. In the
cases in which employer-required home offices were not involved,
the courts were more strict in requiring that the injury-causing
activity was an actual work duty. These results are logical. If
the employee has chosen to do some work at home, it cannot be said
that the employer has chosen to accept every risk associated with
the home as an employment risk. However, when the employer chooses
to make the employee's home the only location fpr_work, the
employer can arguably be considered to have accepted the risks
associated with the home, i.e. the home becomes a business
premises. This principal has been stated by Professor Larson in
his treatise. A. Larson, Larson's Workmen's Compensation, Section
18.34, p. 4-428 (] 997) .
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The ALJ finds that the petitioner was injured in the course
of his employment, while salting the driveway to his home on
January 30, 1997.
The ALJ would agree that, even where the
employer has chosen to make the employee's home his only work site,
there is not 24-hour coverage by the employer for any accident that
occurs within the home. Some connection must exist between the
injury-causing activity and the employee's work duties. If the
employee suddenly decides to mow the lawn in the middle of the work
day, because he notices that the grass is getting long, and he is
injured doing so, this is not necessarily a work injury, simply
because the home is the work site. However, in the instant case,
the ALJ finds that the petitioner was engaged in a work-related
duty when he was injured salting the driveway, because he was, in
essence, removing an obstacle which could have impeded his work.
If the display could not be delivered due to the impassable
driveway, he would have been without an item he needed to
accomplish his presentation on the up-coming business trip.
Therefore, the petitioner went about removing the obstacle to the
delivery, i.e the ice on the driveway.
Professor Larson has noted that, just because someone else
might be the immediate beneficiary of the employee moving an
obstacle to work, this does not change the fact that the ultimate
effect of the act is to advance the employer's work. A. Larson,
Larson's Workmen's Compensation, Section 27.21, p. 5-380 (1997).
Therefore, it is more or less irrelevant that the petitioner
benefitted somewhat personally from salting the driveway, because
the ultimate effect was to remove an obstacle to delivery of the
display, allowing him to go forward with his work. If the ultimate
effect is to the benefit of the employer, the general rule is that
the act is considered in the course of employment. A. Larson,
Larson's Workmen's Compensation. Section 27.00 (1997).
The ALJ believes that the petitioner had the delivery of the
display in mind, when he went about broadcasting the salt. Just
prior to his fall, he had been loading items in his car, that he
needed to take on his business trip. It is logical that he would
have then thought of the one missing item, i.e. the display, and
the fact that it was to be delivered that day. In combination, the
sight of the mail carrier in the area, caused the petitioner to go
get the salt. Although he possibly might have decided to salt the
drive way at some point anyway, for his own non-job related
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purposes, this doss not change the fact that, when he did do it, it
was in an attempt to remove the obstacle that could have prevented
delivery of the display. It also does not change the fact that the
ultimate result was that the employer was benefitted by the attempt
to remove the obstacle.
The employer chose to have the
petitioner's home be his only work site. The employer also chose
to have the home be the only place where the petitioner received
his business mail and deliveries, including large awkward packages.
In this choice, the employer accepted the risk associated with
maintenance of the petitioner's driveway, which needed to be
traversed in order to make deliveries.
Based on the foregoing explanation, the ALJ finds that the
petitioner is entitled to workers compensation benefits for his
January 30, 1997 compensable work accident
He is statutorily
permanently totally disabled, per U.C.A. 35-1-67 (nowU.C.A, 34A-2413) • As a result, he is entitled to lifetime benefits.
BENEFITS . „:
The petitioner1 s compensation rate is figured IK... I o Hows:
$3 6,500.00 per year divided by 12 = $3,041.67 per month, divided by
4.33 = $702..46 per week x .667 « $468.54/week, which allows the
petitioner the maximum permanent total disability rate of $379.00
per week. The petitioner is entitled to this amount for life.
Attorney fees are based on the first 312 weeks or $118,248.00,
figured as required by Commission rule R602-2-4, entitling the
petitioner's attorney to the maximum rate of $7,500.00, which
should be deducted from accrued benefits due the petitioner
(currently approximately 77 weeks, or $29,3 83.00).
ORDER:
I T I s THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents, AE Clevite,
Inc./Liberty Mutual Insurance, pay the petitioner, Charles Tjas,
permanent total disability benefits, at the rate of $379.00,
beginning the date of his compensable industrial injury, January
30, 1997 and continuing for the remainder of his life. Accrued
amounts are due and payable in a lump sum, plus interest at 8% per
annum, and less the attorney fees to be awarded below.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents, AE Clevite,
Inc./Liberty Mutual Insurance, pay all medical expenses incurred as
the result of the January 30, 1997 industrial accident; said
expenses to be paid in accordance with the medical and surgical fee
schedule of the Industrial Commission of Utah.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents, AE Clevite,
Inc./Liberty Mutual Insurance, pay K. Dawn Atkin, attorney for the
petitioner, the sum of $7,500.00, for services rendered in this
matter, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid award to the
petitioner, and to be remitted directly to the office of K. Dawn
Atkin.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be received in the offices of the Division of
Adjudication within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying
in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless
received by the Division of Adjudication within thirty (30) days of
the date hereof, this Order shall be final and not subject to
review or appeal.
If a Motion for Review is received by the
Division of Adjudication within thirty (30) days of the date
hereof, any response of the opposing party shall be filed within
fifteen (15) days of the date of the receipt of the Motion for
Review by the Division of Adjudication in accordance with U.C.A.
Section 63-46b-12. A Motion, for Review will be decided by the
Commissioner of the Labor Commission unless any of the parties
requests that the Motion for Review be decided by the Appeals Board
in accordance with U.C.A. Section 34A-1-205 within thirty (30) days
of the date hereof, or in case of a party responding to the Motion
for Review, the request must be made within 20 days of the date of
the Motion for Review was filed with the Division of Adjudication.
DATED this 22nd day of July, 1998.

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge
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Case No. 97-0538

k
k

AE Clevite9 Inc. and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company (referred to jointly as "Clevite%' hereafter) ask the Utah Labor Commission to review the
Administrative Law Judge's award of benefits to Charles Tjas under the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.).
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Did Mr. Tjas's injury of January 13,1997 arise "out of and in the course of his employment
by Clevite?
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission finds the following facts to be relevant to the issue raised by Clevite's
motion for review.1

In proceedings before the ALJ, the parties agreed that Clevite would submit a written
statement of its version of the relevant facts. Mr. Tjas would then submit a written response
modifying Clevite's statement of facts to the extent Mr. Tjas believed necessary. While the
Commission recognizes the parties hoped to achieve efficiency through this procedure, it is
unsatisfactory to the Commission because it neither binds the parties to a definite statement
of stipulated facts, nor provides an evidentiary record sufficient to resolve disputed facts.
In this case, the parties continue to dispute certain details of Mr. Tjas's claim. It is only
because the essential facts of the claim are undisputed that the Commission does not remand
this case for an evidentiary hearing. In future cases, the Commission discourages the use of
the fact gathering process that was attempted here.
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Mr. Tjas, a resident of Salt Lake City, was employed by Clevite as district sales manager for
Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, Montana, and parts of Nevada. Clevite did not maintain an office in Salt
Lake City, but authorized Mr. Tjas to use his personal residence as a base of operations for his work.
To that end, Clevite provided Mr. Tjas with a computer, printer, telephone line, telephone and
answering machine for use in his home. Company correspondence, catalogues and price lists were
delivered by U.S. mail or private courier services to Mr. Tjas's home, and Clevite provided Mr. Tjas
with a car which was garaged there. Mr. Tjas generally made sales calls Monday through Thursday
and performed office work at home on Friday.
Access to Mr. Tjas's home and garage is by way of a steep driveway. In winter, the driveway
is sometimes slickfromsnow or ice and, consequently, is hazardous to cars and pedestrians. It was
Mr. Tjas's practice to remove the snowfromthe driveway, then spread salt on the driveway surface.
The night before Mr. Tjas's accident, several inches of snow fell in Salt Lake City. The next
morning, Monday, January 13,1997, Mr. Tjas drove to several local sales calls, but did notfirstclear
the snowfromhis sidewalk and driveway. Instead, Mr. Tjas's son cleared the snow while Mr. Tjas
was making his sales calls. However, the driveway remained icy.
After returning home in mid-afternoon, Mr. Tjas spent the next hour loading his car with
material for an upcoming sales trip to Montana. He had been told by Clevite to expect delivery of
a large package to be used in connection with the trip. Mr. Tjas did not know whether the package
was to be delivered by U.S. mail or by a private carrier and he was not certain whether it would be
delivered that day or the next Nevertheless, when Mr. Tjas observed his mailman approaching, he
decided to spread salt on his driveway to enable the postman to safely negotiate the driveway and
make his delivery to the Tjas residence.
Mr. Tjas slipped and fell while spreading the salt, thereby suffering the injury for which he
now seeks workers' compensation benefits.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Section 34A-2-401(l) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides that "(e)ach
employee . . . injured... by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment,
wherever such injury occurred,.. . shall be paid compensation . . . and medical... expenses, as
provided by this chapter." It is undisputed that Mr. Tjas: 1) was employed by Clevite; 2) was injured
by accident on January 13,1997; 3) was permanently and totally disabled as a result of his injury.
Consequently, it is only necessary for Mr. Tjas to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his
injury ''arose out of and in the course o f his work for Clevite in order to qualify for the benefits
provided by the Act.
In Buczvnski v. Industrial Commission. 934 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah App. 1997), the Utah
Court of Appeals discussed the meaning of the terms "arising out of employment" and "arising in
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the course of employment" as follows:
Under Utah law, an accident occurs uin the course"' of employment when it
"occurs while the employee is rendering service to his employer which he was hired
to do or doing something incidental thereto, at the time when and the place where he
was authorized to render such service/' M&K Corp. v. Industrial Common. 112
Utah 488 493, 189 P.2d 132, 134 (1948).
An accident arises out of employment "when there is a 'causal relationship'
between the injury and the employment." Commercial Carriers v. Industrial
Common. 888 P.2d 707,712 (Utah Ct App. 1994) (Quoting M & K Corp. 112 Utah
493,189 P.2d at 134), cert, denied 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). MArising out of,'"
however, does not mean that the accident must be "'caused by'" the employment;
rather the employment "4is thought of more as a condition out of which the event
arises than as the force producing the event in affirmative fashion."' Commercial
Carriers. 888 P.2d at 712 (quoting 1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's
Compensation §6.60, at 3-9 (1994)) (emphasis in quoted treatise).
In applying the foregoing standards to Mr. Tjas's claim, the Commission is guided by prior
appellate decisions which articulate the public policy underlying in Utah's workers' compensation
system. As the Utah Supreme Court recently noted in Drake v. Industrial Commission. 939 P.2d
177,182 (Utah 1997):
The Workers' Compensation Act was enacted to provide economic protection for
employees who sustain injuries arising out of their employment, therefore
"alleviat(ing) hardship upon workers and their families." Baker v. Industrial
Common. 405 P.2d 613, 614 (1965). We have held that u(t)o give effect to that
purpose, the Act should be liberally construed and applied to provide coverage" and
that "( a ) n y doubt respecting the right of compensation will be resolved in favor of the
injured employee." State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n. 685 P.2d 1051,1053
(Utah 1984).
However, the principle of "liberal construction" for the Act, as stated in Drake and other
appellate decisions is not without limits. Utah's appellate courts have held that injuries only
tangentially related to work are not compensable. For example, see Walls v. Industrial
Commission. 857 P.2d 964 (Utah App. 1993) (Judge Jackson dissenting.) Whether an injury arises
out of and in the course of employment depends upon the specific facts of each case. Inevitably,
some cases will fall close to the line that divides compensable injuries from noncompensable
injuries. In the Commission's view, this is such a case.
To assist in the resolution of this matter, the Commission has carefully reviewed the appellate
decisions from Utah and other states cited by the parties. For the most part, the cited decisions deal
with injuries either sustained during employee travel, or during activities undertaken at the specific
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direction of the employer. A few of the cited cases do involve "work at home" situations, but the
facts of those cases are substantially different from the facts of Mr. Tjas's claim. Consequemly, no
specific rule can be extracted from such cases that can properly be applied to Mr. Tjas?s
circumstances. Therefore, the Commission returns to the fundamental principles of Utah workers'
compensation law, as described by Utah's appellate courts.
As noted above, an accident occurs "in the course" of employment when it "occurs while
the employee is rendering service to his employer which he was hired to do or doing something
incidental thereto, at the time when and the place where he was authorized to render such service/'
M & K Corp. V- Industrial Common. 112 Utah 488, 493, 189 P.2d 132. 134 (1948). (Emphasis
added.)
In the case at hand, Mr. Tjas and his employer had, by joint agreement turned parts of Mr.
Tjas's home into his workplace. This arrangement may, or may not, have been in Mr. Tjas's best
interest, but the arrangement obviously freed Clevite from the expense and responsibility of
maintaining a stand-alone office. Clevite's arrangement with Mr. Tjas did not transform every part
of his home into a work premise, nor was every activity undertaken by Mr. Tjas in his home workrelated. However, Clevite's ability to have work related materials delivered to Mr. Tjas's home by
mail or courier service was an integral part of the employment relationship between Clevite and Mr.
Tjas.
In analyzing the problems presented when an employee is authorized to perform work at
home, Professor Larson has concluded that "(e)ven when the service performed at home is casual
or relatively unimportant, an injury occurring in the actual performance of it is in the course of
employment
" Larson's Workers' Compensation Law. §18.34, page 4-427. Based on decisions
from several jurisdictions, Professor Larson further concludes that "... once it is established that
the home premises are also the work premises,... it follows that the hazards of home premises
encountered in connection with the performance of the work are also hazards of the employment"
Larsons Workers' Compensation Law. § 18.34, at page 4-428.
In light of the foregoing, the Commission finds that under the specific facts of this case, Mr.
Tjas's efforts to make his driveway safe for the delivery of mail was reasonably incidental to the
performance of Clevite's work. Consequently, the injuries Mr. Tjas suffered while salting his
driveway arise "in the course"of his employment for Clevite.
Having concluded that Mr. Tjas's injuries arose "in the course of his employment, the
Commission must next determine whether the injuries also arose "out of his employment, as also
required by §34A-2-401 of the Act. As previously noted, "arising out of does not mean that the
accident must be caused by the employment. Rather, the employment is thought of more as a
condition out of which the event arises than as the force producing the event in affirmative fashion.
Buczvnski at 1172. Certainly, Mr. Tjas's injuries arose "out of his work related efforts to make his
driveway safe.
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In summary, the Commission concludes, as did the ALJ, that Mr. Tjas's injuries arose out
of and in the course of his employment at Clevite. Consequently, Mr. Tjas is entitled to workers'
compensation benefits for those injuries.

The Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and denies Clevite's motion for review.
It is so ordered.
Dated this 9k day of February, 1999.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals byfilinga petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days
of the date of this order.
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out of employer's parking lot was struck
from behind by coempioyee also leaving
work for the day was not barred from
maintaining common-law action by the
Workmen's Compensation Act. Code 1962,
§§ 72-1 et seq., 72-401.

Williams & Parler, Lancaster, for appellant
Hayes, Hayes & Brunson, Rock Hill, for
respondent
MOSS, Acting Chief Justice.
This is an action brought by Mrs. O. B.
McNaughton, the appellant herein, to recover damages for personal injuries alleged
to have been proximately caused by the
negligence of James F. Sims, the respondent herein. It is alleged that the appellant's
injuries were sustained as the result of an
automobile collision between the automobile
she was operating and one operated by the
respondent.
The respondent, by answer, entered (1) a
general denial; (2) sole negligence; (3)
contributory negligence; and (4) that both
parties, at the time and place of the collision, were employees of Springs Cotton
Mills and the injury of the appellant arose
out of and in the course of such employment, and by virtue of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, Section 72-401 of the
Code, he was exempt from common law
liability to the appellant The appellant replied to this special defense and raised the
question that under the aforesaid Code
section there was no immunity provided.
The matter came on for trial before the
Honorable C. Bruce Little John, and a jury,
at the 1965 January term of the Court of
Common Pleas for Lancaster County. At
the close of the testimony in behalf of the
appellant, the respondent made a motion
for a nonsuit upon the ground that she
could not maintain a common law action

and that her exclusive remedy for her personal injuries was afforded by the Workmen's Compensation Act. The motion of
the respondent was granted by the trial
judge and this appeal followed.
It appears from the record that Springs
Cotton Mills owned and maintained a
fenced parking area immediately adjacent
to its plant where only employees and business visitors were permitted to park their
automobiles. The appellant and respondent
were both employees of Springs Cotton
Mills and had, on August 8, 1963, parked
their respective automobiles in the aforesaid parking area. The parties to this action finished their duties as employees of
Springs Cotton Mills at 4:00 P.M. on August 8, 1963. They left the plant of their
employer and proceeded to the parking lot.
The appellant was proceeding out of said
parking lot in her automoble when she was
struck from behind by the automobile driven
by the respondent. At the time of the accident both parties had completed their
work for Springs Cotton Mills and were on
their way home. There is no suggestion
that the parties to this action, at the time
of the collision, were performinng any work
incident to their employer's business.
Hence, there are no facts upon which any
common law liability of Springs Cotton
Mills to the appellant could be predicated
under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
or otherwise.
The recent decision of this Court in the
case of Williams v. Bebbington, S.C., 146
S.E2d 853, (filed February 15, 1966) is
here controlling and requires a reversal of
the order of nonsuit granted by the lower
court in this case. It is unnecessary for us
to restate what we said in the cited case.
Reversed and remanded ior a new trial.
LEWIS, BUSSEY and BRAILSFORD,
JJ., and LEGGE, Acting Associate Justice,
concur.

BRYAN •. FIRST FREE WILL BAPTIST CHURCH
Cite as 147 S.E.2d 633
267 N.C. I l l
Allen Bennle BRYAN, Employee-Plaintiff,

v.
FIRST FREE W I L L BAPTIST CHURCH,

Employer, Insurance Company of North
America, Carrier, Defendants.
No. 361.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
April 20, 1966.
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3. Workmen's Compensation <$=609
Where injury cannot fairly be traced
to employment as contributing proximate
cause, it does not arise out of employment. G.S. § 97-1 et seq.
4. Workmen's Compensation <S=I705
Whether accident arose out of employment is mixed question of law and fact.
G.S. § 97-1 ct seq.
5. Workmen's Compensation C=»66l

Workmen's compensation case. The
Superior Court, Lenoir County, Edward B.
Clark, Special Judge, entered judgment for
claimant and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, Parker, C. J., held that back
injury sustained by claimant when he was
moving his stove from his employer's parsonage did not arise out of his employment
as minister, although moving of the stove
from the parsonage was for his employer's
benefit.
Reversed.

1. Workmen's Compensation <3=3|358, 1361
M

To obtain award of compensation for
injury under North Carolina Workmen's
Compensation Act, employee must show that
he sustained personal injury by accident,
that his injury arose in course of his employment and out of his employment. G.S.
§ 97-1 et seq.
2. Workmen's Compensation ^=>3, 604
Requirement of Workmen's Compensation Act that injury to be compensable
must be shown to have resulted from accident arising out of and in course of employment is known and referred to as "rule
of causal relation" and that rule prevents
Workmen's Compensation Act from being
a general health and insurance benefit act
G.S. § 97-1 et seq.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
147 S.E.2d—40Vi

Back injury sustained by claimant when
he was moving his stove from parsonage
owned by his employer did not arise out
of his employment as minister, although
moving of the stove from the parsonage was
for benefit of employer. G.S. §§ 97-2(6, 9),
97-29, 97-31(23).

Claim for compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act.
Forrest II. Shu ford, II, the hearing commissioner, based upon stipulations entered
into by the parties at the hearing, found
the jurisdictional facts; that Insurance
Company of North America was the compensation insurance carrier on the risk at
the date of the alleged injury by accident on
17 August 1964; and that plaintiffs average weekly wage was $85. The essential
findings of fact of the hearing commissioner are as follows:
"I. On and prior to 17 August 1964
plaintiff was regularly employed by the
defendant employer as its minister. In
addition to receiving a salary plaintiff
was furnished with a home in which to
live which was called the parsonage. The
parsonage was owned by defendant employer and was used for many church
functions including marriage, counselling,
and other activities.
"2. Sometime prior to 17 August 1964
it was determined that plaintiff's employment with defendant employer would be
terminated as of 1 September 1964. As
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of such date plaintiff was to assume the
duties as minister of the Core Creek Free
Will Baptist Church and was also to become associated with the State Convention of the Church.
"3. The parsonage where plaintiff
lived was in need of repairs including
the replacement of some flooring. At
the request of the Governing Board of
defendant employer, plaintiff agreed to
move out of the parsonage approximately
two weeks prior to the termination of
his employment with defendant employer. This was to be done in order that repairs could be made to the parsonage before the new minister of defendant employer moved into the parsonage.
"4. In accordance with the above stated arrangement plaintiff undertook to
move his household and kitchen furniture
out of the parsonage on 17 August 1964.
The moving of the furniture at such time
was for the benefit of defendant employer in order that its parsonage could be
vacant so that repairs could be made.
"5. On 17 August 1964 some members of the Core Creek Church, into whose
church parsonage plaintiff was to move,
assisted plaintiff in moving his furniture
from the defendant employer's parsonage. Plaintiff and one of the members
of such church attempted to move plaintiff's two-hundred-pound electric stove
from the parsonage. Plaintiff walked
backward while holding one end of the
stove with the other end being carried by
another. The stove was carried through
a passageway in the parsonage. Because
of the narrowness of the passageway,
plaintiff had to put one hand on the bottom and one hand on the top of the stove.
While so going through the narrow passageway, a door on the stove came open,
and while still holding one end of the twohundred-pound stove and trying to close
the door, plaintiff had a pain in his back.
"6. The lifting of the stove was not
a part of the plaintiffs usual and customary work and was out of the ordinary

for him. Plaintiff sustained, as described above, an injury by accident.
"7. The moving of the stove from the
defendant employer's parsonage at the
time that it was being done was primarily for the benefit of defendant employer; it was done while plaintiff was
still minister of the defendant employer
and on the payroll of his employer; and
it occurred upon defendant's premises.
Plaintiffs injury by accident arose out
of and in the course of his employment
with defendant employer.
"8. Following his accident plaintiff
continued to have back pain which became
more severe on 27 September 1964.
Plaintiff thereupon consulted with Dr.
John T. Langley, orthopedic surgeon of
Kinston. Dr. Langley treated plaintiff
conservatively at home for a period of
time but in that plaintiff did not recover
he was hospitalized on 1 November 1964
and a myelogram was done. The findings of such myelogram were positive
and Dr. Langley operated upon plaintiff
for removal of a ruptured disc on 4 November 1964.
"9. Plaintiff sustained no loss of wages or salary as a result of his injury by
accident and thus sustained no temporary
total disability. Plaintiff does have a five
per cent permanent partial disability of
the back as a result of the injury by accident."
The hearing commissioner's conclusions
of law are as follows:
" 1 . On 17 August 1964 plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out
of and in the course of his employment
with defendant employer. G.S. 97-2(6).
"2. As a result of the injury by accident giving rise hereto plaintiff sustained
no temporary total disability. G.S. 97-2
(9); G.S. 97-29.
"3. As a result of the injury by accident giving rise hereto plaintiff sustained
a five per cent permanent partial disability of the back, for which he is en-

titled to compensation at the rate of
$37.50 per week, for a period of fifteen
weeks, commencing 28 December 1964.
G.S. 97-31(23)."
Based upon his findings of fact and conclusions of law, the hearing commissioner
awarded plaintiff compensation, to be paid
to him in a lump sum, subject to a fee allowed to his counsel to be deducted from
compensation awarded plaintiff.
Defendants appealed to the Full Commission, which adopted as its own the findings
of fact and conclusions of law of Commissioner Shuford, together with the result
reached by him, and affirmed the award.
Whereupon, defendants appealed to the
superior court which entered a judgment
overruling each and every exception and
assignment of error by defendants, and affirmed the award of the Full Commission.
From this judgment defendants appeal to
the Supreme Court.
Wallace, Langley & Barwick, by P. C.
Barwick, Jr., Kinston, for defendant appellants.
Aycock, LaRoque, Allen, Cheek & Hines,
by F. Fred Cheek, Jr., and John M. Hines,
Kinston, for plaintiff appellee.
PARKER, Chief Justice.
Defendants assign as errors the trial
judge's overruling their exception to the
hearing commissioner's finding of fact No.
6, which was affirmed by the Full Commission; the trial judge's overruling their
exception to the hearing commissioner's
finding of fact No. 7, which was affirmed
by the Full Commission; and the trial
judge's overruling their exception to the
hearing commissioner's conclusion of law
No. 1, which was affirmed by the Full Commission, which challenged findings of fact
and challenged conclusion of law arc set
forth verbatim above.
[1,2] To obtain an award of compensation for an injury under the North Carolina

Workmen's Compensation Act, an employee
must show that he sustained a personal
injury by accident, that his injury arose
in the course of his employment, and that
his injury arose out of his employment.
Lewis v. W. B. Lea Tobacco Co., 260
N.C 410, 132 S.E.2d 877; Anderson v.
Northwestern Motor Co., 233 N.C. 372,
64 S.E.2d 265; Withers v. Black, 230
N.C. 428, 53 S.E.2d 668. The requirement of the Act that an injury to be
compensable must be shown to have resulted
from an accident arising out of and in
the course of the employment is known
and referred to as the rule of causal relation; i. e. that an injury to be compensable
must arise from his employment. The
rule of causal relation is "the very sheet
anchor of the Workmen's Compensation
Act," and has been adhered to in our
decisions, and prevents our Act from being
a general health and insurance benefit
act. Duncan v. City of Charlotte. 234
N.C. 86, 66 S.E.2d 22; Perry v. American
Bakeries Co., 262 N.C. 272, 136 S.E.2d o43.
This is said in Bell v. Dewey Brothers,
Inc., 236 N.C. 280, 72 S.H.2d 680:
" * * * The words 'in the course
of, as used in the statute, refer to
the time, place and circumstances tinder
which the accident occurred, while 'out
oV relates to its origin or cause.
" 'Arising out of means arising out
of the work the employee is to do, or
out of the service he is to perform.
The risk must be incidental to the employment. [Citing authority ]
"In order to entitle the claimant to
compensation the evidence must show
that the injury by accident arose out of
and in the course of his employment by
the defendant. Both arc necessary to
justify an award of compensation under
the Workmen's Compensation Act. [Citing authority.]"
This is said in Ilildchrand v. McDowell
Furniture Co., 212 N.C. 100, 193 S.E. 29*:
"So it has been stated as a general
proposition that the phrase 'out of and
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in the course of the employment* embraconly those accidents which happen to
servant while he is engaged in the dis
charge of some function or duty which
he is authorized to undertake and which
is calculated to further, directly or indirectly, the master's business."
[3] It is settled law that "[w]here an
njury cannot fairly be traced to the em3loyment as a contributing proximate cause
" * * it does not arise out of the em-•ioyment," Bryan v. T. A. Loving Co..
222 N.C. 724, 24 S.E2d 751; Lockey v.
3ohen, Goldman & Co., 213 N.C. 356f
96 S.E. 342; Walker v. J, D. Wilkinn c , 212 N.C. 627, 194 S E. 89.
[4] Whether an accident arose out -*£
the employment is a mixed question o;
law and fact Sandy v. Stackh'-*-=*' ~^258 N . C 194, 128 SJE-2d 21R
The case of Van Devander v. Wes^
Side M. E. Church, 160 A. 763, 10 N.J.
Misc. 793, is apposite. This was a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law by Don J. Van Devander, opposed
by the West Side M. E. Church. To review a judgment of the Compensation Bureau awarding compensation, the employer
brought certiorari for determination of a
judgment of the Compensation Bureau
awarding compensation to Van Devander
for injuries alleged to have been sustained
by him as the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by the West Side M. E. Church,
the employer. The facts as stated in the
opinion of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey arc as follows: Van Devander is
a Methodist minister and was assigned
by the bishop to and employed as pastor
by West Side M. E. Church. His salary
was $3,450 per annum and he was housed
in the church parsonage (and was apparently required to live there), for which
the sum of $700 was deducted from his
salary. He was furnished no janitor service for the parsonage, and was required
to do all house work, ground keeping,
and care of the furnace himself. On

It November 1930 while removing a barrel
of ashes from the cellar of the parsonage,
he strained his back. The only testimony,
outside of medical evidence, was that of
the petitioner. He testified that he was
required to keep the parsonage in condition
for use by the members of the congregation,
and that it was used for weddings, christenings, and other parish meetings. The Cour*
said in its opinion:
"We are inclined to think that *^
was error to hold that the accident arose
out of the employment. Petitioner was
performing a household duty for his
own benefit which he would have been
required to perform if he lived in a
house owned by himself. In Bryant v.
Fissell, 84 N.J.Law, 72, 86 A. 458, 460,
the act was said to cover risks 'which
are within the ordinary scope of the
particular employment in which the workman is engaged.' Now the employment
here was that of a minister. Carrying
ashes is certainly not incidental to that
office, directly or indirectly. Petitioner
takes the position that the church imposed certain additional duties, namely,
care of the parsonage. But it does
not seem that this is so. Care of a
dwelling house ordinarily falls upon the
occupant and does not have to be so
imposed.' What the c h u ^ did was
to refuse to furnish service -w-»ch would
relieve him of this burden.

*

*

*

*
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*

* * In the instant case we think
th
the time of the accident the resp
- i t was performing an act personal
to i»TiseIf and his family, and not connected with his employment as a minister.
The award is set aside, with costs.'*
See also Lauterbach v. Jarelt, 189 App.
Div. 303, 178 N.Y S. 480, 481, which the
Supreme Court of New Jersey cites in
its opinion as a case that seems to be in
point
l a the instant case claimant's employ—^it by First Free Will Baptist Church
a^ that of minister. He was not employed

to move his furniture out of his employer's
parsonage, when he terminated his employment as minister with First Free Will
Baptist Church. Claimant testified in part The agreement with the church is when
am dismissed as a minister that my
esponsibility is to move out of the parsonge. * * * The parsonage needed som<»
epairs to the floor and around the ar**a
rom where the automatic washer sat. Thp
»oard had gotten together and we had gotten
together and agreed that I should mov?
iut of the parsonage about two weeks
Trior to that time, in order for repair^
*o be done at the parsonage
* *
was not paid anything to move my fur
niture from the parsonage. I did not pav
anyone to move the furniture but the chu r ch
that I was moving to volunteered to help
me transfer the furniture.'* He stated in
part on redirect examination: "Some of
*he furniture in the parsonage belonged to
*he church—some scattered pieces of fur
"iture. * * * Most of the furniture that
the church itself owned was located in
•he living room. It was necessary to move
"ome of this furniture out of the way
o that we cou.'" ^iove through with the
ther furniture *
[5] In our opinion, and we. so hold, tb«=
findings of fact by the hearing commi<
sioner, affirmed by the Full Commission
clearly show that claimant's injury did no*
arise out of and in the course of his em
ployment by First Free Will Baptist Church
as its minister, or in other words the find
ings of fact plainly show that claimant's
injury cannot fairly be traced to his employment as a minister as a contributing
proximate cause. The findings of fact
by the hearing commissioner, affirmed by
the Full Commission, plainly show that

although the moving of the stove from the
parsonage was for his employer's benefit,
and although he was still minister and on
the payroll of his employer, his injury arose
out of his performing an act personal to
himself and his family in moving the stove
to his new church, probably its parsonage,
and it was not connected with his employment as minister by First Free Will Bap
tist Church.
The trial court erred in overruling defendants' exception to the finding of fact
by the hearing commissioner, affirmed bv
the Full Commission, that "plaintiff's injury * * * arose out of and in the
course of his employment with defendant
employer," and in overruling defendants*
exception to the hearing commissioner's
conclusion of law, affirmed by the Full
Commission, that "on 17 August 1Q64 plaintiff sustained an injury * * * arising
out of and in the course of his ernplov
ment with defendant employer"
Therefore, it ;s unnecessan for u«* to
pass on defendants' assignment of error
to the trial court's overruling their *1%*ception to the conclusion of law by the
hearing commissioner, affirmed by the Full
Commission, that plaintiff sustained an \v
jury by accident. As to injury by accident,
see Pardue v. Blackburn Bros Oil & Tire
Co, 260 N C . U3, 132 S F 2d 747
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and
the superior court will remand this cau«e
to the Industrial Commission for an order
m compliance with this opinion.
Reversed.
MOORE, J., not sitting.
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Court of Appeal.s of Colorado, Division One
626 R2d 700; 1980 Colo. App. LEXIS 825

December 4, 1980
SUBSEQUEN I HIS' I OR * : •
Rehearing Denied December J"
Review Denied April 6, 1981.
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PRIOR
Review
MCCI from the Industrial Commission of
the State of Colorado.
DISPOSITION: Order Set Aside and Cause Remanded
with Directions.
CORE TERMS: claimant, painting, undisputed, customers, rear, workmen's, duties
COUNSEL: George J. Francis, Denver, Colorado,
Attorney for Petitioner.
J D. MacFarlane, Attorney General,
Sommerville, Assistant Attorney General. D<
Colorado, Attorneys for Respondents, Industry
Commission of the State of Colorado, John Kezer,
Director, Mike Baca, Richard J. Wise, Harvey L.
Rubinstein, as Members of said Industrial Commission.
Hall and Evans, Frederic A. Ritsema, Robert W.
Harris, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondents,
General Insurance Company, Safeco Insurance Company
and James J. Brogger and Associates, Incorporated.
JUDGES; Judge Coyte. Judge Pierce and Judge Ruland,
concur
OPINIONBY: COYTE
OPINION: [*70i] Claimant seeks review of the
Industrial Commission's denial of her claim for workmen's compensation. We set aside the order.
The following facts are undisputed.

Claimant and her husband were the principal fleers of a corporation, James J. Brogger and Assoc;.-.:.:(Employer), which does engineering work. They maintained the [**2] company office in their home. Payment
on the mortgage of the house was made in part by the
laimant and her husband, personally, and in part by
the employer-corporation. Mr. Brogger and claimant
had owned other properties in which they had lived and
maintained an office. As the office of the company had
moved to various locations, claimant's duties included
painting, varnishing, cleaning, and maintenance work,
in addition to secretarial duties, and "anything pertaining
to running a consulting engineering firm." In the spring
of 1977, claimant and her husband decided that their
home/office needed to be repainted to appear more attractive to customers who were occasionally entertained
on the [*702] patio attached to the rear of the house.
While painting on the rear of the house, claimant fell
from a ladder and was injured.
The Commission found that: "The painting of the second story at the rear of the home is primarily related to
the need for maintenance of the home and only incidentallv if
"
ne business conducted from the home."
s*m concluded that claimant's injury did
ot arise out or and in the course of her employment,
rfased as it is upon undisputed [**3] facts we can, and
do, reject this conclusion as not binding upon us. See
Ceteris v. Times Publishing Co., 38 Colo. App. 48,
::2 P. 2d 1033 (1976).
An employee is entiticu iu WUIMI:
benefits where, inter alia, at the time ^ ^ nV«.
employee is performing service arising out of an
the course of his employment. Section 8-52-102(1
C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Cum. Supp.).
In determining whether an injury has arisen out of
and in the course of employment, the central, inquiry is

626 R2d 700, *702; 1980 Colo. App. LEXIS 825, **3

whether it is apparent:
"from the circumstances attendant upon claimant's injury that the cause was employment-related and that the
time, place, and circumstances of the injury were not so
remote from the purposes of his employment that the act
in which he was engaged when injury occurred must be
considered one for the benefit of claimant only." Deterts,
supra.
Thus, the test is not whether the benefits to the employer are incidental or primary, but whether the acts of
the employee at the time of the injury were solely for his
own benefit. If the acts were for his sole benefit then
his injury does not arise out of his employment.
Here, in light of the undisputed [**4] evidence that
the company office was in claimant's home, and that the
home was used to entertain customers, the finding of the
Commission that there was no benefit to the employer
from the work being performed by claimant at the time
of her injury is not supported by the evidence and must
be rejected. See Martinez v. Industrial Commission, 32
Colo. App. 270, 511 R2d 921 (1973). Consequently,
the injury did arise out of claimant's employment and is
compensable.
The commission also erred in concluding that the injury was not in the course of the employer's business.
It is true that § 8-41-106(l)(b), C.R.S. 1973, excludes
from the definition of "employee" any person "whose
employment is but casual and not in the usual course
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of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of the
employer." However, both conditions, casualness and
course of business, must exist for the exclusion to apply. Heckman v. Warren, 124 Colo. 497, 238 P.2d
854 (1951). And, for the employee's work to be in the
usual course of the employer's business, it must merely
be "of the kind required in the employer's business and
in conformity with his established scheme or system of
doing business, . . . [**5] ." Heckman, supra.
Here, the maintenance of the home which served as
the company office and was used for entertaining customers was a necessary facet of the employer's business, and thus, the statutory exclusion was not applicable to claimant. See Royal Indemnity Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 105 Colo. 25, 94R2d697 (1939). Hence,
the conclusion of the Commission that the painting in
which claimant was engaged when injured was not in
the course of her employer's business is not supported
by the record.
Consequently, we reject both conclusions upon which
the Commission based its denial of benefits, see Deterts
v. Times Publishing Co., supra, and instead, conclude
that claimant qualified for disability benefits.
The order of the Industrial Commission is set aside
and the cause is remanded for such hearing as may be
necessary and the issuance of a new order awarding appropriate benefits.
JUDGE PIERCE and JUDGE RULAND, concur.
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Supreme Cour n: Louisiana
245 La. 450; 158 So. 2d 609; 1963 La. LEXIS 2679

December 16, 1963
CORE TERMS: Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act, garbage, apartment, customers, evening,
workmen, garage, total disability, expense account, permanent, estimates, descend, flight, route, outer,
duty
COUNSEL: [***!]
Steven. R Plotkin, New Orleans, for applicant..
W. K. Christovich, Christovich & Kearney, New
Orleans, for appellees and respondents.
JUDGES: Sanders, Justice.
OPINIONBV SANDFRS

OPINION, r^zj

r~fc-

Danielsen, sued his empK-.
and its insurer for workmen's compensation. 1*453] The
defendants resisted t1
ground that the
accident did not arise
course of plaintiffs employment. The district court denied recovery.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, nl We granted a writ
of certiorari, 244 La. 223, 151 So.2d [**610] 693, to
review the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
nl

-

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeal, are substantially these: The plaintiff, Danielsen, was employed
by Security Van Lines, Inc., as a salesman-estimator on
a commission basis. His duties required him to go to
the premises of prospective customers and prepare estimates of the charges for moving or storing household
effects. In addition, [***2] he solicited business for
his employer. He had no fixed working hours and arranged his own work schedule. He worked each week
day. including a half-day on Saturday, at hours convenient to him and the customers. He made some calls on
prospective customers during the evening. He likewise
received some telephone calls from or through Security
at his home after 5:00 o'clock p. m. However, he was

not required to service these calls during the evening,
unless he chose to do so. Danielsen performed some
"paper work" at home, particularly at the end of the
month in connection with his expense account. He also
usually reviewed the calls he was to make [*454] before leaving his home each day so as to arrange them in
proper order.
Security furnished Danielsen an automobile for use in
connection with his work. It also paid the automobile
expenses, including the gas, oil, and insurance. The automobile was kept in a garage one-half block from plaintiffs residence, the rent of which was paid by Security.
Danielsen lived in an apartment on the second floor of
a two story triplex, In order for him, to leave the apartment, it was necessary that he pass through his kitchen,
descend a [***3] flight of steps, open an, outer door, and
descend two additional steps to ground level.
On the day preceding the accident which forms the
basis of this suit, the plaintiff picked up several memoranda at Security's main office, which listed estimates
for the following day, Saturday. During the evening, he
worked on his expense account, for it was the end of the
month. He also checked the memoranda to determine
his route.
On Saturday morning, he rechecked his route, placed
the memoranda in his pocket, and descended the flight
of steps leading from his apartment. He carried a small
sheaf of rate schedules. He also carried a bag of garbage,
which he intended to place in a garbage can on his way
to the [*455] garage. He fell from one of the two outer
steps and sustained a broken hip, which he alleges has
produced permanent and total, disability.
Based upon these facts, the plaintiff contends that the
accident arose out of and in the course of his employment within the intendment of the Louisiana Workmen's

245 La. 450, *455; 158 So. 2d 609, **610;
1963 La. LEXIS 2679, ***3
Compensation Act. Hence, he asserts, workmen's compensation is payable to him for permanent total disability.
The defendants assert that the accident did not arise out
of [~*~4] or in the course of the employment. Hence,
they urge that the injury is not compensable under the
Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act.
The primary issue presented here is whether the accident occurred in the course of plaintiff s employment.
LSA-R.S. 23:1031, the pertinent section of the
Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act, provides:
"If an employee not otherwise eliminated from the benefits of this Chapter, receives personal injury by accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment, his
employer shall pay [*456] compensation in the amounts,
on the conditions, and to the person or persons hereinafter designated."
Coverage is provided under the Louisiana Workmen's
Compensation Act only if the accident occurred in the
course of the employment. By course of employment
[**611] is meant the time and space boundaries of the
employment. n2
n2 Kern v. Southport Mill, 174 La. 432, 141 So.
19; Malone, Louisiana Workmen's Compensation
Law and Practice, § 162, pp. 173-175 (1951);
Mayer, Workmen's Compensation Law in Louisiana,
pp.'55-58 (1937).

When the employment begins or ends cannot be determined by reference to an exact formula. Each case must
be resolved by a consideration of the particular facts
and circumstances. It is, of course, well settled that the
statute must be given a liberal interpretation to effectuate
its beneficent purpose of relieving the workmen of the
crushing economic burden of work-connected injuries
by diffusing the cost in the channels of commerce. n3
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n3 See Harvey v. Caddo DeSoto Cotton Oil Co.,
199 La. 720, 6 So.2d 747 and Dyer v. Rapides
Lumber Co., 154 La. 1091, 98 So. 677.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeal found that
the plaintiff's employment was not continuous. It found
that he was neither on duty nor on call for twenty-four
hours each day. Plaintiff conceded the correctness of
the finding during oral argument in this Court. In our
opinion, the evidence supports it.
[*457] This finding, however, does not fully resolve
the question of whether the accident occurred within the
course of plaintiff's employment. [***6] It simply forecloses the contention that plaintiff was in the course of
his employment at all times. We still must determine
whether or not the plaintiff had entered the course of his
employment prior to the accident. This inquiry brings
into focus the time and place relationship between the
accident and the employment.
We observe that the plaintiff fell on the steps of his residence. At the time, he was carrying a sack of garbage,
which he intended to deposit in the garbage can. He
had not reached the garage, where the company automobile was kept. The time of the accident did not fall
within fixed work [*458] hours, for the plaintiff had
none. Neither can we reasonably say that the accident
occurred while he was engaged in the performance of
his duties. In our opinion, the circumstances demonstrate that he had not as yet crossed the boundary of his
employment.
We conclude that the disabling accident did not occur
in the course of plaintiff's employment. Hence, plaintiff
cannot recover.
We have noted the cases from other jurisdictions cited
by plaintiff. Each of these rests upon its own facts. We
have elected to base our decision on the statutory language and the [***7] general principles enunciated in
the jurisprudence interpretative of it.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court
of Appeal is affirmed.
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PORTNER v. J.K. HOLDING CO.
Cite M 349 SJL2d 296 (N.CJlpp. 1986)

and insufficient; he has often lost his temper for no rational reason, even to the point
of thinking about running his truck off the
road or into cars on the road that delay
him; he often has intense headaches that
require him to walk the floor for hours if at
night and to pull his logging truck off to
the side of the road if by day; he occasionally has hallucinations, thinking that he
hears non-existent things such as a baby
crying in the night; and he no longer likes
to associate with others, including his own
wife and child. Though this evidence,
along with the psychologist's expert opinion about it, is""the basis for plaintiffs claim
that he has a compensable brain injury the
Commission made no findings about the
truth or falsity of any of i t Thus, the case
presented to the Commission has not been
decided, and it will not be properly decided,
in my view, until findings from the competent evidence are made as to whether plaintiffs emotional and mental health, personality and conduct have in fact changed
since the log hit him on the head and, if so,
what probably caused the change.
My vote is to vacate the decisio
remand to the Commission for a J
nation of the brain injury issue arer n-n
sidering all the competent evidence
presented "in its true legal Ught" Hanford v. McSwain, 230 N.C. 229, 233, 53
S.E.2d 84, 87 (1949).

Betty B, FORTNIR Employee Plaintiff.

her home, during working hours, sought
workers' compensation benefits. The Industrial Commission denied claim for benefits, affirming opinion of deputy commissioner, and claimant appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Martin, J., held that claimant's
accident neither arose out of her employment nor occurred in course thereof and,
thus, claimant was not eligible for workers'
compensation benefits.
Affirmed.
Phillips, J., filed dissenting opinion.

1. Workers' Compensation «=»610
Injury arises out of employment when
It is natural and probable consequence or
incident of employment and natural r« "
of one of risks thereof, so that ther is
some causal relationship between in y
and performance of some service of
nployment G.S. § 97-2(6).
Workers' Compensation «=»710
Claimant's injury, sustained while
anging plants from closed office at her
home, during working hours, did not arise
out of her employment and did not occur in
course thereof and, thus, she was ineligible
for workers' compensation benefits, though
she had been instructed by employer to
dispose of plants; decision to take plants to
her home was motivated by purely personal
considerations, and not for benefit of her
employer to any appreciable extent, and
cause of injury was not enhanced by employment G.S. § 97-2(6).

•.

J.K. HOLDING COMPANY, Employer,
American Insurance Company,
Carrier Defendants.
No. 8610IC216.
Court of Appeals of North Carolina.
Oct 21, 1986.
Claimant, injured while hanging plants,
which she had been asked to dispose of, at

On and before 31 August 1984, plaintiff
was employed by J.K. Holding Company, a
corporation owned by J.C. Kivett, as the
sole employee of its Statesville, N.C. office.
Her primary duties consisted of bookkeeping and secretarial work but, as the
sole employee, she performed other tasks
as well, including running personal errands
for Mr. Kivett, cleaning the office, dispos-

ing of trash, and tending to various decorative plants which she and Mr. Kivett kept
in the office. Her normal working hours
were from 9:00 to 5:00. She was paid $250
per week and was provided a tank-full of
gas each month as reimbursement for the
business use of her personal automobile.
Mr. Kivett decided to close the Statesville
office, effective 31 August 1984, and made
arrangements to lease the space to a new
tenant beginning 1 September. Since this
decision resulted in the termination of
plaintiffs job, Mr. Kivett agreed to pay
plaintiff her regular salary through the end
of 1984 as severance pay. Because he
would not be in the office on 31 August
1984, Mr. Kivett instructed plaintiff to pack
the office materials and clean and close the
office. Mr. Kivett also asked plaintiff to
dispose of the plants, except for one which
he wanted to keep. He did not tell plaintiff
what to do with the plants, but was aware
that she was likely to take them to her own
home. This was, in fact, what plaintiff did
plan to do.
Before leaving her home to go to work
on the morning of 31 August 1984, the
plaintiff stood on a chair and drove a large
nail into her porch. She intended to hang a
device, called a single tn**- on the rm,'
from which she WOUM • M•$,. *-«- i *
from the office. At 'v,^-<* ^ Mi ' v .»v
noon, plaintiff put tU
and drove to her hm
the plants quickly am
office to complete K. . *• r••
that time because her :JH*J?,»-T»— ^ ,, «' *. ,•
home and available < • •$ •.••*:•: ,.
plants. Plaintiff testified that had sh*
waited until after work to take her plants
home, her daughter would have gone to
work and, since plaintiffs husband was out
of town, no one would have been available
to assist her in hanging the plants.
Upon arriving at her home, plaintiff
stood on a chair and hung the single tree
on the nail. She stepped down from the
chair and noticed that the single tree was
crooked. She climbed back onto the chair
in order to straighten the device and fell to
the cement floor, injuring her hip. After
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being admitted to the hospital, she made
telephone arrangements for others to do
the tasks which she had not completed at
her employer's office.
Plaintiff applied for workers' compensa^
tion benefits. Deputy Commissioner Rush
found facts essentially as stated above and
concluded the plaintiffs accidental injur}'
"did not arise out of and in the course of
her employment" Her claim for benefits
was denied. The Full Commission, with
Commissioner Clay dissenting, affirmed
the Opinion and Award of Deputy Commissioner Rush. Plaintiff appeals.
Homesley, Jones, Gaines & Fields by Edmund L. Gaines, Statesville, for plaintiffappellant
Hedrick Batman, Gardner & Kincheloe
by Thomas E. Williams, Charlotte, for defendant-appellee.
MARTIN, Judge.
There is no dispute with respect to the
facts found by the Commission. The only
question involved in this appeal is whether
the Commission properly found and concluded that plaintiff is ineligible for worker's compensation benefits because her ac
cidental injury did not arise out of and in
the course of her employment We affirm
In order for an injured employee to be
eligible for workers' compensation benefits
for accidental injury, the claimant must
prove that the injury arose out of the employment and that it occurred in the course
of the employment. G.S. 97-2(6); Hoyle v.
Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., 306 N.C. 248,
251, 293 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1982). Both elements—i.e., "arising out o f employment
and "in the course o f employment— must
be satisfied or compensation will be denied
the injured employee. Hoyle, supra. Although interrelated, each of these elements
has a distinct meaning: *'[t]he term 'arising
out of refers to the origin or cause of the
accident, and the term 'in the course of
refers to the time, place and circumstances
of the accident" Id.
[1J An injury arises out of the employ
ment when it is a natural and pr<
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ciable extent*", a fact determinative of
compensability. Hoffman v. Truck Lines,
Inc., 306 N.C. 502, 506, 293 S.E.2d 807, 810
(1982). The incidental benefit accruing to
J.K. Holding Company—the disposition of
the plants so that it could vacate its office—was not so appreciable as to render
plaintiffs aesthetic positioning of the
plants at her home sufficiently work related as to justify compensation. Finally,
plaintiffs employment with J.K. Holding
Company did not enhance in any manner
the risk that she might fall from a chair at
her home, nor was such a risk incidental or
inherent to her employment
We are cognizant that the Workers' Compensation Act is to be construed liberally,
An injury occurs "in the course of" the to the end that "benefits . . . should not be
employment "when the injury occurs dur- denied by a technical, narrow, and strict
ing the period of employment at a place construction." Roper v. J.P. Stevens &
where an employee's duties are calculated Co., 65 N.CApp. 69, 73, 308 S.E.2d 485, 488
to take him, and under circumstances in (1983), disc. rev. denied, 310 N.C. 309, 312
which the employee is engaged in an activi- S.E.2d 652 (1984). However, even a most
ty which he is authorized to undertake and liberal construction of the Act does not
which is calculated to further, directly or allow or require the Industrial Commission
indirectly, the employer's business." Pow- to view the evidence unrealistically. The
ers v. Lady's Funeral Home, 306 N.C. 728, evidence in this case overwhelmingly sup730, 295 S.E.2d 473, 475 (1982).
ports a finding that the plaintiff was engaged in a purely personal activity when
[2] Applying these well established
principles to the facts of the present case, the accident occurred. Accordingly, the
it is apparent that plaintiffs unfortunate Opinion and Award of the Industrial Comaccident neither arose out of her employ- mission is
Affirmed.
ment nor occurred in the course thereof.
Although she had been instructed by her
ARNOLD, J., concurs.
employer to dispose of the plants, her decision to take them to her home and hang
PHILLIPS, J., dissents.
them on her porch during working hours
PHILLIPS, Judge, dissenting.
was motivated by purely personal considerIn my opinion the majority takes too
ations, Le., the availability of someone to
assist her. But for this reason, she would narrow a view of plaintiffs employment,
not have made the trip, and therefore she the activity that brought about her injury,
cannot be said to have been engaged in an and G.S. 97-2(6). The task that plaintiffs
errand undertaken in furtherance of her boss assigned her, clearing out the office
employer's business. See Ridout v. Roses and getting rid of the plants that adorned
Stores, Inc., 205 N.C. 423, 171 S.E. 642 it, was certainly for the employer's benefit
(1933). Moreover, plaintiffs act in stand- and how the task was carried out was left
ing on a chair on her front porch in order to to her discretion with the knowledge and
adjust the device upon which she intended expectation that she would take some of
to hang the plants was clearly an act un- the plants home and hang them up, since
dertaken for her own benefit and not "for they were hanging plants. She was at the
the benefit of [her] employer 'to any appre- halfway mark in performing the task when

consequence or incident of the employment
and a natural result of one of the risks
thereof, so that there is some causal relation between the injury and the performance of some service of the employment
Id. at 252, 293 S.E.2d at 198, quoting Perry v. Bakeries Co., 262 N.C. 272, 273-74,
136 S.E.2d 643, 645 (1964). It has been
held that the test of whether an accidental
injury "arises out o f the employment is
whether a contributing proximate cause of
the injury was a risk inherent or incidental
to the employment and one to which the
employee would not have been equally exposed apart from the employment Gallimore v. Marilyns Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 233
S.E.2d 529 (1977).

STATE v. WALDEN
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she was injured. For the task did not end
when she and the plants left the office, or
even when they arrived at her home; it
included removing the plants from the office, taking them somewhere, disposing of
them as she saw fit, and returning to the
office if the work day was not over and
other work remained to be done, as was the
case. If the accident had occurred in taking the plants from the office to the car, or
in lifting them out of the car, or on the way
to her home, or on the way back to the
office, the injury would have been compensable though all of these acts were merely
incidental to the task assigned of getting
rid of the plants. Yet the majority holds
that plaintiffs injury is not covered by the
Act though the accident occurred while she
was actually getting rid of the plants, the
ultimate task she was told to do. The
employer received the same benefit from
plaintiff hanging the plants on her porch—
the disposition of the plants—as it would
have received if she had put them in.a
garbage dump or given them to a stranger;
and that plaintiff also received a benefit
from the method of disposition that she
was free to select is in my opinion beside
the point In my view plaintiffs injury
arose out of and in the course of her employment, and the Commission's finding
and conclusion to the contrary was error.

SYSIIM>
(O § HY NUMItlI SYSTEM)
• 2 *-++*++*+*

STATE of North Carolina
Angela Evans WALDEN.
No. 8615SC233.
Court of Appeals of North Carolina.
Oct 21, 1986.
Defendant was convicted along with
three others of common-law robbery of a
349 S.E.2d-«

grocery store, and she appealed. The
Court of Appeals, 75 N.CApp. 79, 330
S.E.2d 271, remanded for further hearings
on voluntariness of defendant's in-custody
confession. The Superior Court, Alamance
County, Robert L. Farmer, J., held that
defendant's in-custody statement was voluntarily and understanding^ made, and
she appealed. The Court of Appeals, Phillips, J., held that: (1) sufficient evidence
supported finding that confession was voluntary, and (2) confession was not rendered
involuntary by defendant's belief she
would receive preferential treatment if she
confessed where remarks suggested no reward.
Affirmed.
Becton, J., concurred in result
1. Criminal Law <3=>414
Finding that defendant's in-custody
statement to police was voluntarily and
understandingiy made based on totality of
evidence was amply supported by competent evidence.
2. Criminal Law «=»519(1)
Mere fact that a confession is made
after defendant is confronted with new information normally calling for explanation
does not render confession involuntary.
3. Criminal Law «=»519(9)
Defendant's in-custody confession was
not rendered involuntary by her belief, allegedly based on officers' remarks, that
she would be rewarded if she confessed,
where remarks suggested no reward and
were too speculative to warrant such belief
by defendant
Atty. Gen. Thornburg by Asst Atty.
Gen. David R. Minges, Raleigh, for the
State.
Daniel Snipes Johnson, Graham, for defendant-appellant
PHILLIPS, Judge.
[11 This case has been here before. In
1983, after being convicted along with

Tab 5

Page 12
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GLASSER \ YOUTH SHOP Ir... el **.

SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA, Division A
54 So, 2d 686; 1951 Fla. LEXIS 1760

November 2
<• w l N S E L : [ '*1]
Watkins & Cohen, Tallahassee, and
West Palm Beach, for appellant.

i

Culver Smith, and Earnest, Lewis,, Smith & Jones,
all of West Palm. Beach, and 'Wendell C Heaton,
Tallahassee, for appellees.
JUDGES: ROBERTS, Justice, SEBRING, C . I , and
CHAPMAN, J., and DICKINSON, Associate Justice,
concur.
<

;brr<S

OPINION: [*687] ROBERTS, Justice.
This is a workmen's compensation case in which
the Deputy Commissioner, the Florida Industrial
Commission, and the Circuit Court of Palm Beach
County held successively that the claimant, appellant here, was not entitled to compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, Chapter 440, Florida
Statutes.
The undisputed facts are, in substance, as follows:
Appellant is the vice president and manager of The Youth
Shop, Inc. One of his duties as such employee was to
record the daily sales of the store, and it was his custom
to take the books home with him at night and make up his
report at home, generally in the morning before departing for work. He was not required to do so, although
"under the policy of the firm" he was authorized to do so.
On the morning in question, the appellant arose at 7:00
A.M., worked for an hour on the [**2] store records in
an "office" adjoining his bedroom on the second floor of
his home, and then descended the stairs to the first floor
to have breakfast and then go on to the store. He was
carrying his daily record book and some other papers
in a folder. While descending the stairs, he slipped and
fell, sustaining a fractured shoulder and other injuries.
The sole question here is whether the appellant's in-

]0<]

_•>.: •: se ' oi it :>f and in the :oi n s s of empI ::n ment' '"',
within le mea n ing o f Se :tion 4 10 „ 09 I "loi: ida S tati ites.
The purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as
expressed in Protectu Awning Shutter Co. et al. v.
Cline, 154 Fla.. 30, 16 So.2d 342, 343, is "to shoulder on industry the expense incident to the hazards of
industry; to lift from the public the burden to support
those incapacitated by industry and to ultimately pass
on to the consumers of the products of industry such
expense." Since industry must carry the burden, there
must then be some causal connection between the employment and the injury, or it must have had its origin
in some risk incident to or connected with the employment, or have followed from it as a natural consequence.
General Properties Co. v. Greening, [**3] 154 Fla.
814, 18 So. 2d 908; Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New
York v. Moore, 143 Fla. 103, 196 So. 495; Sweat v.
Allen, 145 Fla. 733, 200 So. 348. While there is a
presumption that the claim comes within the provisions
of the Act, the claimant is not relieved of the burden of
proving that the injury arose out of and in the course of
employment. Fort Pierce Growers Ass'n v. Storey?, 155
Fla. 769, 21 So 2d 451.
When tested by the above rules, appellant's injury cannot be said to have arisen "out of and in the course of
his employ ment." The appellant was not on the stairs
because of his employment; he would [*688] have been
there in any event, regardless of whether he had brought
his work home from the store. If the appellant had been
required to do the work at his home, then there might
be some justification for saying that his employer had
assumed the risks incident to performing the work on
appellant's own premises with the consequent liability
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. This question
is not here presented, however, and we do not decide it.
In London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Industrial
Accident Commission, 190 Cal. 587, 213 P. 977, 978f
the claimant had, with [**4] his employer's approval,
taken some work to his own home to do. He arrived

54 So. 2d 686, *688; 1951 Fla. LEXIS 1760, **4

there about 11:00 o'clock and, after finishing his calculations at about 12:30 o'clock, he ate his lunch. As
he was leaving his home for the purpose of returning to
the office, he slipped on a hardwood floor in his home
and sustained an injury. In holding that the injury did
not arise out of the course of his employment, the coun
said: "* * having remained in his home after the completion of the work for the purpose of taking his lunch,
his object in going there was accomplished, and his service to his employer was not resumed until his return
to his place of employment; and that the carrying of the
computations to the office was merely incidental to his
main purpose of returning there. He is in no different
position than if he had gone to a restaurant for his lunch
and had there slipped on the floor, or if he had finished
his work in his home late in the afternoon, and had remained at home until the following morning, intending
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to take the computations with him to the office at that
time. We think therefore that his injury, suffered under
the circumstances detailed, was not one coming within
the provisions [**5] of the act."
See also Morgan v. Hoage, 63 App.D.C. 355, 72
E2d 727; Scanlon v. Herald Co., 201 App.Div. 173,
194 N.Y.S. 663; Industrial Commission of Colorado v.
Anderson, 69 Colo. 147, 169 R 135, L.R.A.1918F,
885; Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Gintert, 128
Ohio St. 129, 190 N.E. 400, 92 A.L.R. 1032, for decisions of courts of other states in which the facts are
somewhat similar to those in the instant case.
For the reasons stated, the order of affirmance of the
Circuit Court should be and it is hereby
Affirmed.
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Oscar William Loyd, Appellant, v. Texas Employers Insurance Association, Appellee
No. 6810
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Texarkana
280 S.W.2d 955; 1955 Tex. App. LEXIS 1942

June 16, 1955
CORE TERMS: telephone, ladder, vacation, summary judgment, answered, staned, paint, subject to call,
issue of fact, conversation, furtherance, painting, embalmer, slipped, phone, leg
OPINIONBY: [**1]
HALL
OPINION: [*955] HALL, Chief Justice.
This is an action by appellant against appellee for compensation for an injury claimed by appellant to have occurred in the course of his employment as an embalmer
with Burks-Walker-Tippit Funeral Home in Tyler, Texas.
Upon motion of appellee the trial court rendered a summary judgment for it and against appellant.
Appellant brings forward one point to the effect that
the trial court erred in rendering a summary judgment
for the reason that there was a genuine "issue of fact as
to whether appellant was injured while engaged in or
about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his
employer."
The evidence shows that appellant was employed by
Burks-Walker-Tippit Funeral Home as an embalmer. On
the date of his injury he was on his vacation, but under his employment he was subject to call at any time.
Shortly before his injury he had [*956] gone to Tennessee
on a vacation. On his return home he notified his employer that he was in the city, subject to call even though
his vacation period had not ended.
The facts with respect to his injury are: Appellant was
engaged in painting the side of his house; he was standing on a [**2] ladder holding a paintbrush and a bucket
of paint when he heard his telephone ring. He started
down the ladder with his paint and brush when the foot
of the ladder slipped, causing him to fall to the ground,
breaking his leg. He never answered the telephone and
there is no evidence as to who was calling him. He alleges that as part of his employment he was required to
maintain a telephone in his residence. With reference to
how the accident happened, appellant testified:

"I staned to get off the ladder to answer the phone.
The phone was ringing. I started to get down and the
ladder slipped. I didn't want to spill the paint and I fell
on this leg (pointing)."
It is a cardinal rule pronounced many times in this
state that to sustain a judgment for a claimant the evidence must show that his injury occurred during the
course of his employment or is so intimately related to
his employment as to be a part of it. In our opinion, the
evidence wholly fails to show that on the occasion of appellant's injury he was doing anything in furtherance of
his employer's business. The evidence positively shows
that he was painting his house at the time of the injury
and while on vacation. [**3] It is true that he was injured while getting down from the ladder to answer the
telephone, but there is no evidence in the record that he
ever answered it or that any one answered it for him,
nor is there any evidence that the call was from his employer. The call could have been from some friend or a
member of his family, or even a "wrong number."
We are cited by appellant to the case of Security Union
Ins. Co. v. McClurkin, Tex.Civ.App., 35 S.W.2d 240,
242, w/r. In that case the employer maintained a telephone in appellee's home. On the occasion of the employee's injury the facts as stated in the opinion were:
"In going to the telephone, placed in his apartment by his
employer for the purpose of communicating with him,
to answer a call from his employer, the appellee was
performing the duties of his employment and furthering
the business of his employer, and the injury received by
him in answering the call was one having to do with and
originating in the work or business of his employer."
The facts in that case show further that after the call had
been completed, the employee stepped on a needle in his
home and received an injury which was held compensable.
There are two differences [**4] between that case and

280 S.W.2d 955, *956; 1955 Tex. App. LEXIS 1942, **4

the case at bar. In the McClurkin case the injury occurred after the employee received instructions from his
employer, and, second, the facts showed that in the
McClurkin case the conversation was with the employer
and concerned the business of the employer. And in said
conversation the employee received certain instructions
from his employer to be performed the next morning.
As stated above there is nothing in this record to show
who was calling on appellee's telephone, or whether the
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call was for him or some one else or from his employer
or some one else.
In such circumstances the evidence viewed in the light
most favorable to appellant does not raise an issue of
fact and the trial court was justified in rendering the
summary judgment.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
DAVIS, J., not sitting.
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ROBERT L. OWEN, Deceased, MARGARET OWEN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRYSLER
CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.
Docket No. 77415
Court of Appeals of Michigan
143 Mich. App. 182; 371 N.W.2d 519; 1985 Mich. App. LEXIS 2624

February 13, 1985, Submitted

May 21, 1985, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [***1]
Leave to appeal applied for.
DISPOSITION: Reversed.
COUNSEL: John J. Fitzgerald, for plaintiff.
Lacey & Jones (by Gerald M. Marcinkoski), for defendant.
JUDGES: V. J. Brennan, P.J., and Cynar and J. W.
Fitzgerald, * JJ.
* Retired Supreme Court justice, sitting on the
Court of Appeals by assignment.
OPINIONBY: PER CURIAM
OPINION: [*183] [**520] Margaret A. Owen's husband, Robert L. Owen, died of a heart attack on
February 4, 1979. Plaintiff filed a claim for disability compensation. After an administrative hearing the
hearing referee ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to
compensation. Defendant appealed to the Worker's
Compensation Appeal Board. The WCAB affirmed the
decision of the referee. Defendant applied for leave to
appeal to this Court. Leave was granted on September
18, 1984. We reverse.
The WCAB made the following findings of fact. The
decedent was required to travel as part of his employment
at Chrysler Corporation. He was scheduled to drive
from his home in Metamora to Metropolitan Airport and
depart on a 3:15 p.m. flight to Lebanon, Pennsylvania.
The weather was [*184] very bad; conditions were
"blizzard-like" and the wind-chill factor was 25 degrees
[***2] below zero. Owen decided to get an early start;
under clear weather conditions it would take an hour

and a half to get to the airport. Between 10:00 a.m. and
10:15 a.m. he went outside and was preparing to move
his car into his garage in order to load his suitcase. In
order to do this, Owen had to move the family's truck
which was parked in front of the car. The truck was
stuck in a snowbank. The decedent and his wife shoveled out snow and attempted to push the truck. Decedent
suffered an acute myocardial infarction and died while
attempting to extricate the truck from the snow.
The WCAB found that decedent had a history of heart
problems. A doctor testified that the exertion that morning contributed to decedent's heart attack. The WCAB
found that moving the car in order to load it was part of
decedent's special mission for his employer and, therefore, that decedent's injury arose out of and in the course
of his employment. The WCAB affirmed the decision of
the referee.
The issue in this case is whether the WCAB erred in
concluding that the death [**521] occurred in the course
of decedent's employment. Review of WCAB decisions
is limited to questions of law; factual [***3] findings
by the WCAB are conclusive in the absence of fraud if
there is any competent evidence to support them. Jones
v TRW, Inc, 139 Mich App 751; 362 NW2d 801 (1984);
Upton v General Motors Corp, 124 Mich App 61; 333
NW2d 384 (1983), lv den 417 Mich 1100.12 (1983).
This Court may, however, review the WCAB's resolution of questions of law. Jones, supra.
In order to be compensable, an employee's injury
must arise out of and be in the course of the employee's employment. MCL 418.301(1); MSA [*185]
17.237(301)(1). Generally, injuries sustained while an
employee is going to and from work are not compensable. Denny v Kostadinovski, 117 Mich App 517; 324
NW2d 19 (1981). An exception to this rule is that com-

143 Mich. App. 182, *185; 371 N.W.2d 519, **521;
1985 Mich. App. LEXIS 2624, ***3
pensation may be awarded where the employee is on a
"special mission" for the benefit of the employer. Jones,
supra. The question is whether the decedent had embarked on his special mission when he suffered his injury.
In Bush v Parmenter, Forsythe, Rude & Dethmers, 413
Mich 444, 452; 320 NW2d 858 (1982), the Michigan
Supreme Court stated:
"When an employee, having identifiable time and
space limits on his employment, makes an off-premises
journey [***4] which would normally not be covered
under the usual going and coming rule, the journey may
be brought within the course of employment by the fact
that the trouble and time of making the journey, or the
special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency of making
it in the particular circumstances, is itself sufficiently
substantial to be viewed as an integral part of the service itself. 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, §
16.10, p 4-123 (footnotes omitted)."
In Ream vLE Myers Co, 72 Mich App 238; 249 NW2d
372 (1976), this Court upheld an award by the WCAB
where the employee was injured while traveling on a
special assignment for his employer. Ream is like the
case at bar. The trip was outside the normal performance
of the decedent's duties and was clearly of special bene-
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fit to the employer. Traveling to the airport was pan of
the special mission and thus the injury suffered during
the trip was compensable.
We must still decide when the decedent's special mission commenced. The factors considered in deciding if
the preparatory acts fall within the scope of a special
mission should be viewed liberally in [*186] light of the
remedial nature of the workers' compensation [***5]
scheme.
We do not agree with defendant's contention that
the identifiable point in time and space when and
where decedent's special mission commenced was the
Northwest Airlines parking lot.
Plaintiff contends that the decedent had commenced
his special mission when he and plaintiff were attempting to move the family truck, standing between his car
and the garage, to enable the car to be driven into the
garage. The purpose of driving the car into the garage
was to place his suitcase in the car.
In our opinion moving the car into the garage for purposes of placing a suitcase in the car was at most preparation for the eventuality of travel. The activity was not
within the scope of the special mission so as to support
an award of compensation.
The decision of the WCAB is reversed.
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QUAGLINO v. ACE BAKERY, DIV. OF LAKELAND BAKERY, ita,.
Cite as. Ln.App., 275 So.2d 874

to be used and who'd pay for gas or make
any contribution to truck e x p e n s e ) .
N o r could we suppose t h a t plaintiff and
his uncle impliedly agreed that, if one was
d r i v i n g his t r u c k and caused damages, that
both would be responsible as p a r t n e r s for
d a m a g e s caused. In fact, each maintained
insurance on his own truck, and there was
never any accounting a m o n g them as to
such costs.
Only on a long trip (e. g., to Mississippi) 'would one pay gas and the other supply
the truck. O r d i n a r i l y they simply "took
t u r n s " supplying the truck.
[2] W e conclude that defendnat cont r a c t o r ' s a r r a n g e m e n t s with two (or more)
siding applicators did not constitute the applicators a p a r t n e r s h i p or cause any different result for w o r k m e n ' s compensation
purposes than c o n t r a c t i n g with a single applicator. R.S. 23:1021 subd. (6) is applicable and § 1063 is not.
[ 3 ] T o reach the c o n t r a r y result would
defeat the purpose of § 1021 subd. ( 6 ) .
T h e w o r k m a n - p a r t n e r entitled to comp
from a § 1061 principal would owe it back
(or at least his virile share, sec C.C. arts.
2872, 2873) because the partner, unlike the
corporate shareholder, is not insulated
from the legal entity's liability. See Bersudcr v. New O r l e a n s Pub. S e r v . Inc., 273
So.2d 46 (La.App.1973). T h u s the workm a n - p a r t n e r would both owe to the principal and be owed by the principal, and confusion, C.C. art. 2217, would extinguish (at
least his virile s h a r e of) the comp liability.

[4] W c do, however, reject plaintiff's
claim for penalties including attorney's
fees. T h e legal issues were far from clear
because of the breadth of our partnership
definition and the treatment of p a r t n e r s by
the courts in respect to compensation. W e
do not find d e f e n d a n t i n s u r e r was "arbit r a r y , capricious, or without
probable
cause", R.S. 22:658.
T h e j u d g m e n t is affirmed.

Marian C. Wuertz QUAGLINO, wife of
Anthony W. Quagllno, Deceased
v.
ACE BAKERY, DIVISION OF LAKELAND
BAKERY, INC. and the Hanover Insurance Group of New York.
No. 5588.
Court of Appeal of Loittainnii,
Fourth Circuit.

brought home blower used to blow flour
out of cracks in bakery machinery in order
to test it, as he had done on three or four
occasions over previous five years, and employee was electrocuted while blowing
g r a s s clippings from driveway with blower,
evidence was not sufficient to show that at
time of accident employee was acting for
employer and not merely pursuing his own
business or pleasure. L S A - R . S . 23:1031.

April 3, 1973.
Rehearing Denied May 1, 1973.

Employee's w i f e , sued for w o r k m e n ' s
compensation benefits payable on death_of
her husband. T h e Civil District Court,
Parish of Orleans, No. 465-524, Richard J.
Garvey, J., dismissed wife's claim, and she
appealed. T h e Court of Appeals, Schott,
J., held that evidence that employee, who
was stipervispiL and general m a n a g e r of
bakery, had brought home from bakery an
ele^hjcJ3lowjexr-j£lUngJiis_j^eJie_iiad_to
test it, as he had on three or four occasions over the prior four or five years, and
was thereafter electrocuted while blowing'
away grass clippings with blower,_did not
establish that cjmrjloyee was acting for_employer and not merely pursuing his own
business or pleasure.
Affirmed.
Gulotta, J., dissented and filed opinion.

1. Workmen's Compensation <®=>!69l
In order to determine w h e t h e r accident arose out of employment it is necessary to consider whether employee was
then engaged about his employer's business
and not merely pursuing his own business
or pleasure, and w h e t h e r necessities of employer's business reasonably required employee to be at place of accident at time
accident occurred. L S A - R . S . 23:1031.
2. Workmen's Compensation <S=»I558
W h e r e evidence showed that employee,
supervisor and general m a n a g e r of bakery,

G a r o n , Brener & McNeely, Milton E.
Brener, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.
A d a m s & Reese, E d w a r d J. Rice, Jr.,
N e w Orleans, for defendants-appellees.
Before R E D M A N N ,
S C H O T T , JJ.

GULOTTA

and

S C H O T T , Judge.
T h e plaintiff has taken this appeal from
a j u d g m e n t which dismissed her claim for
W o r k m e n ' s Compensation benefits arising
out of the death of her husband on July
17, 1966. T h e issue in this case is whether
decedent's death was the result of "accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment" so that it was covered by
L S A - R . S . 23:1031.
At the time of his death decedent had
been employed by the defendant bakery for
23 y e a r s and was the supervisor and general m a n a g e r . H i s duties were such that he
was on call at all times. His fatal accident
occurred at his home on a Sunday afternoon.
O n the day before his death decedent
had brought home an cJe^cjTJc_[)|ovyej of the
type which was used in the bakery for the
purpose of blowing flour from crevices and
c r a c k s and from the machinery in the bakery. T h e plaintiff testified that she had
seen this blower on three or four occasions
over the four or five years previous to the
accident when her husband had brought
the machine home in order to oil it, clean

&?5

it or brush it out. On the day of the accident, the plaintiff had been engaged in her
housework and while she was in the garage running her clothes dryer she saw her
husband occupied with the blower.
She
asked him what he was doing with the machine, to which he replied, "I really just
have to test it," or words to that effect.

}

The house occupied by plaintiff and her
husband consisted of a 4-bedroom frame
dwelling in the City of New Orleans with
a garage located to the rear of the house.
Facing the house there was a driveway on
the left side leading from the street to the
g a r a g e and consisting of paved strips,
being about 30 or 10 feet from the front of
the house to the garage.
At some point in time on this fatal day
the plaintiff had trimmed the grass along
the side of one of the concrete strips of
the driveway by means of an electric edger, having started from the garage and
having worked just past the front gate
which was near the street when she interrupted this chore and returned to the in
side of her house to look after ber cooking.
She then heard the blower in operation for
two or three minutes_ajid then stepped out
of her kitchen in order to rairiicT"husT)a7i7l
in for his meal. At that time he was in
the process of moving from the garage
down the driveway to the front gate, using
the blower with an extension cord in order
to remove the blades of grass from the
driveway. When his wife called him he
answered, "I'm killing two birds with one
stone, I'm testing," o r w o r d s to that efTecJ.
T h e plaintiff watched her husband move
with the blower in his hand toward the
front gate and at the time that he reached
the front gate he put his hand on top of
the gate in order to open the latch, whereupon he was electrocuted.
The two statements by the decedent, one
while he was in the garage and the other
while he was using the blower along his
Idriveway, were both objected to by defendants but the trial judge overruled the
objections and admitted the statements into
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evidence.
In this Court the defendants
have urged that this ruling was incorrect
and contend that the statements should be
disregarded.
For our purposes, we need
not pass upon the admissibility of those
statements because the result is the same
whether the statements are admissible or
not.
Plaintiff proved from the autopsy report
and the Assistant Coroner who examined
the decedent that his death was caused by
a heart attack resulting from an electrical
shock. According to the report, the time
of death was 5:20 P M .
Plaintiff also
proved from the testimony of an electrical
engineer and expert who inspected the
blower and the extension cord after the accident that the cause of the accident was
the fact that although the wiring system in
the machine consisted of three wires which
would necessitate a three-pronged cap for
proper performance, this particular machine incorrectly had a two-prong cap attached to the wires of the machine and
plugged into a two-wire extension cord so
t h a t depending upon h o w the plug was inserted into the electric outlet, electricity
would either be grounded at the outlet or
s u r g e through the frame of the machine.
W h e n the decedent touched the steel page
fence gate while holding the machine his
body was grounded causing electric c u r r e n t
to surge through his body.
I
It is plaintiff's position that at the time
I of his death her husband was testing the
I blower for the benefit of his employer so,
I that his death was covered for W o r k m e n ' s
Compensation even though he may at the
same time of his death have been engaged
in^ the personal business of blowing_±h£
g r a s s from his driveway.
Plaintiff contends that her husband's death was therefore from accident arising out of and in
the course of his employment.
Plaintiff
I relies on the principle of law enunciated in
Keller v. Wallace Industrial C o n t r a c t o r s ,
( L a . A p p . 1st Cir. 1969) 224 So.2d 3 1 :
" . . . a n employee, whose job gives
him wide latitude in c a r r y i n g out his du-

f ties, can be engaged in the personal mission, and at the same time, be furthering
the interests of his employer. T h e two
l interests are not mutually exclusive."

V
At the trial, the defendants offered evidence to show that shortly after the accident plaintiff stated to several individuals
that her husband had been using the blower to blow grass off the sidewalk without
making any reference to the fact that he
was testing the machine. F u r t h e r m o r e , defendants raise the question as to whether
the blower did in fact belong to Ace Bakery based on a statement made by plaintiff
to the bakery's owner shortly after the accident that she did not know where he had
gotten the blower. T h e owner and two of
the bakery's employees all testified that
they had the same type of blower in the
bakery but there was a three-prong plug.
Finally, the plaintiff testified that there
were electrical plugs and outlets in the garage w h e r e the decedent was working before the accident, and defendants contend
that if he was testing the blower for the
benefit of the bakery there was no need
for him to leave the garage in order to
complete that operation.
Unquestionably,
these factors developed by defendants tend
to weaken plaintiff's case but for purposes
of this appeal they may be disregarded in
o r d e r to provide her with the full benefit
of any doubt.

[1]

In order

for the plaintiff

to re-

cover, she must prove that her husband's
death occurred by reason of an accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment.

In the case of Kern v. South-

port Mill, 174 La. 432, 141 So. 19, it was
held that in order to determine whether the
accident arose out of the employment it is
necessary to consider (1) was the employee
then engaged about his employer's business
and not merely pursuing his own business
or p l e a s u r e ; (2) did the necessities of that
employer's business reasonably require the
employee be at the place of the accident at
the time the accident occurred?

W h e n these tests enunciated in the K e r n
case were discussed in Keller v. Wallace
Industrial Contractors, supra, the Court
held that each case of this type must be decided in the light of its own circumstances.
See also Courville v. National Food Stores
of Louisiana, Inc., 174 So.2d 251 (La.App.,
3d Cir. 1965).
[2] In the final analysis, plaintiff's
case rests only upon evidence which fairly
establishes that the blower belonged to the
bakery and upon the two statements made
by decedent to plaintiff that he was testing
the blower in the g a r a g e and was still testing the machine while blowing the grass
from his d r i v e w a y when his wife called
him to come inside. At that point he continued to blow the cuttings along the driveway and apparently intended to go out of
the gate and complete his task when the
fatal electrocution occurred.
In the first place, the evidence is
/ sufficient to show that at the time he
/ electrocuted the decedent was acting
(
his employer and not merely pursuing
\ o w i i business or pleasure.

not
was
for
his

T h e r e is no evidence to explain what decedent meant by this " t e s t i n g " or to show
the reason for or the extent of such a procedure. T h e " t e s t i n g " he spoke of may
have been necessary in his mind only because of the disastrous plug change which
directly linked the blower case to one side
of the 120-volt line.

I
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grass cuttings off pavement, he may have
intended some other personal use.
Thus, when plaintiff's evidence is evaluated there is not a preponderance to meet
the first test of the Kern case.

Furthermore, even if we were to assume
that decedent did bring the machine home
to test it for his employer's benefit, in order for plaintiff to recover it must also be
• determined that the necessity of testing the
(machine reasonably required the decedent
Ito continue with the operation of the blower
I to the gate and then presumably beyond
Ithe gate. This strains the facts and cirIcumstances of the case to produce an inference which does not follow. It hardly
seems likely that it was necessary for the
d^cjpdgnt to leave the confines of his garage in_onjer to complete his test. Fven if
he had walked a few feet i nto the drive way w i t l ^ t h e ^ m a c h n i c 11 m ight _be__argued
that this was necessary in order to complete his test, hut we know that he__had
1 gone the full 30 to -10 feet of the driveway
(in blowing the grass cuttings until he
(reached the gate and then he must have inJtended to leave the confines of the yard at
(the time his accident happened. There is
no evidence to show that his action at that
point was reasonably required in order to
accomplish any testing of the mjahinc.

When the facts and circumstances of the
instant case are submitted to the tests
enunciated in the Kern case, the conclusion
. is that plaintiff did not prove by a prcponF u r t h e r m o r e , there was no evidence to
I derancc of the evidence that decedent's
/ prove that decedent brought the machine
I death arose out of his employment by de/ home for a business purpose in the first
I fendant Ace Hakcry.
V place. T h e bakery blower had been repaired not long before this incident and
Affirmed.
there was no testimony that there was any
problem with the blower at the bakery. It
( i l ' L O T T A . Judge (dissenting).
may be that the only work decedent did on
I respectfully dissent.
the blower was to c h a n g e its three-prong
plug for a two-prong plug, to facilitate
The evidence shows that Ouaglino, as
personal use of the blower with his house's
general manager of the bakery with the retwo-prong sockets or his two-connector exsponsibility of supervision over its operatension cord. W h i l e it does seem improbation, occasionally took bakery equipment
ble that decedent would have brought the
home for repair or cleaning, or both, ft is
I blower home for the purpose of blowing clear, from the evidence, that the blower
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was o n e used in t h e bakery. F u r t h e r m o r e ,
it a p p e a r s from t h e evidence that it is
more reasonable a n d probable that the
blower w a s b r o u g h t home by the decedent
to repair o r clean t h a n to be used for the
purpose of blowing g r a s s cuttings
It is
also m o r e reasonable, from the record, that
the machine w a s being used by the decedent in f u r t h e r a n c e of its testing for the
benefit of t h e employer o r the business
Once wc conclude t h a t Quaglino w a s , in
fact, testing t h e blower by blowing grass
from the d r i v e w a y , a n y inference or conclusion t h a t when h e intended to blow grass
cuttings be>ond t h e g a t e , he converted the
use to his o w n purposes is purely speculative
I am of t h e opinion, therefore, that
plaintiff successfully c a r r i e d the burden of
showing that t h e death of Quaglino occurred from a n accident arising out of and
in the course of his employment
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent

Doris Eiermann BORDELON, Individually,
and as the Administrator of the Estate
of her minor children

carrier appealed
T h e Court of Appeal,
Gulotta, J , held that t h e r e w a s substantial
evidence t o support conclusion of a causal
connection between severe blow to abdo
men of deceased w h o h a d h a d no medical
problems until automobile accident and t h e
ensuing death of employee about six
months later a s a result of, a m o n g other
things, a blood clot in t h e mesenteric a n d
portal vein causing d e t e r i o r a t i o n a n d death
of lower bowel and upper colon, despite
testimony to t h e effect that death resulted
from deceased's obesity
Affirmed

I. Workmen's Compensation €=>554
Employer
finds him

takes

a n employee

as he

2 Workmen's Compensation <S=>I58I
T h e r e was substantial evidence to support conclusion of a causal connection be
tween severe blow t o abdomen of deceased,
who had had no medical problems until
automobile accident a n d t h e ensuing death
of employee about six m o n t h s later as a re
suit of, among other things, a blood clot in
the mesenteric and portal vein causing d e terioration a n d death of lower bowel a n d
upper colon, despite testimony to t h e effect
that death resulted from deceased's obesity

v.

TULANE INDUSTRIAL LAUNDRY, INC.
and the Phoenix Insurance Company.
No 5610.
Couit of Appeal of LouKi uui,
Fourth Clicuit

Porteous, Toledano, Hainkel & Johnson,
James L Donovan, N e w O r l e a n s , for defendants-appellants
Windhorst, Heisler, D e L a u p & W y socki, H e n r y L Klein, N e w O r l e a n s , for
plaintiff appellee
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Action w a s b r o u g h t to recover death
benefits on behalf of deceased workman
T h e Civil District Court for the Parish of
O r l e a n s , Division " H " , N o 476-644, Oliver
P C a r n e r e , J , entered decree a w a r d i n g
benefits a n d t h e employer a n d insurance

Before R E D M A N N ,
SCHOTT, JJ

GULOTTA

and

G U L O T T A , Judge
This is an appeal from a judgment
a w a r d i n g death benefits u n d e r w o r k m e n ' s
compensation a s a result of injuries r e ceived in an accident which occurred on

April 21, 1967 when t h e decedent, \lton If
Bordelon, w a s driving his laundrv truck
while in the course and scope of his em
plo>ment
Defendants seek reversal on the
g r o u n d that the death w a s not accident
connected but resulted from the decedent's
obesity a n d complications caused there
from
T h e injuries sustained bv Bordelon were
a deep skin abrasion—left arm, an abrasion
of t h e dorsum—left hand contusion with
ecchymosis left lower rib area—mid auxil
lary line, cellulitis 1 of t h e abdomen wall
Bordelon died November 23, 1967 a t the
age of 34
T h e autopsy report showed that death
resulted from t h e following conditions a
blood clot in t h e mesenteric a n d portal vein
causing deterioration and death of the low
er bowel a n d upper colon, i n inflamma
tion of t h e abdominal w i l l , congestion in
the liver, spleen and kidnev resulting from
high blood pressure causing enlargement of
the h e a r t m u s c l e , fattv metamorphosis of
the l i v e r , marked obesity (380 pounds)
Pickwickian svndrome (clinical), i e , in
adequate function of t h e lung resulting in
drowsiness a n d sleepiness
fluid in the
lungs and legs
T h e record shows that Bordelon, al
though obe^e, was active and healthy until
April 2 1 , 1967, when he suffered, in the
accident, a severe blow to his abdomen
F r o m that date forward, a m a n with no
prior medical problems began a downhill
trek toward his death
H i s deterioration
from t h e date of the accident was constant
and consistent
Bordelon w a s first seen bv D r A \
H o u s t o n on April 2 1 , 1967 Conservative
t r e a t m e n t with the use of antibiotics result
ed in no improvement
Although Bordelon
had r e t u r n e d to his former emplovment
subsequent to the accident, because of Ins
failure to respond to treatment, h e w a s or
dered by D r H o u s t o n on May 17, 1967, to
I

Cellulitis according to Dr Henrj Three
foot, an internist who testified is in in

discontinue work
A report bv. D r Hous
ton indicated that Bordelon on May 29 was
not making progress so far as his abdominal wall is concerned "
\ \ a n n n a t i o n by Dr \ ortunato J Padua
on July 29 revealed an infection of both
ears
H e found, further, wheezing in the
chest as well i s the abdomen tender to dig
ital palpitation
There were t w o hard
masses about the size of small pecans over
both rectus abdominis muscles, which, ac
cording to Dr Padua, was possibly the re
suit of previous hematoma
I t w a s bis
opinion that the trauma to the abdomen
leaving the decedent with the large masses
caused internal injury to the portal vein
and internal o r g a n s resulting eventuall) in
the portal thrombosis
The trauma, in his
opinion, is connected to the thrombosis
F u r t h e r examination bv Dr Padua on \ u
gust H revelled t i n t Bordelon w a s suffer
nig from "congestive h e i r t f a i l u r e '
l)i
Padua suggested further examination l>\
an internist
Dr H e n r y K Ibrecfoot, an internist,
saw the decedent on August 18 and 20
H e found swelling of the abdomen and dif
ficult} in breathing
O n his advice, Bor
delon w a s hospitalized on \ u g u s t 27, 1%7
and treated with a svsteni of diuretics and
dch>dratcs to remove fluid
H e w i s dis
charged on \ u g u s t M
\ t t i n t tunc, Bor
delon weighed }S7 poundsDr I b r e c f o o t
was of the opinion th it there is causal con
nection between the injury to the abdomen
e uisiiig the infection resulting in the portal
\ n n thrombosis, which iccording to the
atttops> report w is one of the causes of
death
H e explained th it the cause of the
portal vein thrombosis is most eommonlv
infection in the art i of the lbdormii, p i r
ticularl) the umbilicus / n a v e l ) arc» frc
quentlv associated with fluid in the abdo
men
His tcstunori) was supported b\ t i n t of
Dr Sidney Jacobs, ilso an internist, who
indicated that such a trauma as suffered
flnmmntion or i n f i r M o n '»f tin tissue im
m o d n t f l } tunpnth fh» skin
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mils him to do. West's Ann.Cn}.Labor Code
s 3000.
Sec publication Words and Phrases
lot other |udicial constructions and deliniiioiis.

i\. Workers' Compensation C=>ol7
Employee acts within "course of his employment." for workers' compensation purpose's, whei. performing duty imposed upon
mm by employer and one necessary to perform befort terms of contract are mutually
satisfied.
West's Ann.Cal.Labor Code
s 3fi00.
7. Workers' Compensation O=>710
Employer-employee relation is temporarily suspended, when employee is off duty,
until employee reenters employer's service.
Wests Ann.Cal.Labor Code § 3600.
S. Workers' Compensation e=>604
Where there is liability under worker?'
com}>ensation law, right to award is founded
not upon fact that injury grows out of and is
incidental to employee's employment, but
rather, upon fact that service employee is
rendering at time of injury grows out of and
is incidental to employment.
West's
Ann.Cal.Labor Code § 3600.
9. Workers' Compensation ©=>719
Ordinarily pursuant to" going and coming rule" employee cannot obtain workers'
compensation for injury suffered while going
to or coming from workplace.
West's
Ann.Cal.Labor Code § 3600.
Sec publication Words and Phrases
lor other judicial constructions and definitions

1(1. Workers' Compensation e»719
"Going and coming rule "of nonliability
for injuries suffered while employee is going
to or coming from workplace, applies even
when employee who voluntarily and regularly
takes work home is injured while commuting.
West's Ann.Cal.Labor Code § 36(H).

|MHKegel. Tobin & Truce and Nancy J.
Hankinson, Los Angeles, for Petitioner.
1. For reasons not evident in the record, Ralphs
did not dispute at trial that Moeller was still

Fred M. Charness, West Hills and Barry
Satzman, Los Angeles, for Respondent Moeller.
No appearance for Respondent Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board.
ORTEGA, Acting Presiding Justice.
Petitioner Ralphs Grocery Company seeks
to annul the respondent Workers Compensation Appeals Board's award of death benefits
to an employee's surviving minors. We conclude the injury was noncompensable and
annul the award.
JwiFACTS
Marl: Moeller was a 32-year-old meatcutter employed by Ralphs for 10 years when he
died of a heart attack while at home on a
Sunday evening, June 1. 1992. Moeller had
not worked at Ralphs since October 29. 1991,
when he went on disability leave due to an
industrial injury to his finger. Because of
declining sales, Ralphs laid off Moeller in
November 1991, while he was still on disability leave. On June 1, 1992, the day before
Moeller was scheduled to return to work
from the layoff, he suddenly collapsed and
died of a heart attack.1
On the date of death, which is also the date
of the alleged industrial injur}', Ralphs telephoned Moeller at home and told him to
report back to work the next day, .June 2,
1992. Ralphs offered Moeller a part-time
meatcutter's position without benefits. This
offer was less than what Moeller, who was in
financial difficulty, had hoped to receive.
Moeller had been diagnosed with colon
cancer in May 1991, and the layoff had eliminated his medical insurance benefits. After
the layoff, Moeller had to deplete the family
savings to pay for chemotherapy and radiation treatments. Moeller's wife worked part
time as a nurse and the couple had three
young children to support. When Moeller
received the back to work phone call, the
news that he would be working only part
time without benefits was so stressful to him
that it triggered a sudden heart arrhythmia
employed by Ralphs despite having been laid off.
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which, due to Moeller's congenital heart muscle disease, caused a fatal heart attack.
Moeller's widow, Anna Moeller, filed a
claim for workers' compensation death benefits and petitioned to be ap|>ointed guardian
ad litem and trustee for the minors. After
Ralphs denied her claim, Mrs. Moeller took
no action. Ralphs gave notice her claim
would be dismissed unless, within 180 days,
she filed an application to have her claim
adjudicated. (Lab.Code, § 5404.5.)
Mrs. Moeller filed an application, but beyond the 180-day period. The application
listed herself and the three minors as applicants. At that time, no guardian ad litem
had been appointed for the minors. Ralphs
objected that the claim had been dismissed
by operation of law under Labor Code section 5404.5.
At trial, the Workers' Compensation Judge
(WCJ) appointed Mrs. Moeller guardian ad
litem of the three minors, joined the minors
as parties to her j^ckum, and dismissed
Mrs. Moeller as an applicant under Labor
Code section 5404.5. Accordingly, the minors were the sole applicants at trial.
The WCJ found, accepting Mrs. Moeller's
expert medical witness' opinion and rejecting
Ralphs' conflicting medical evidence, that the
back-to-work phone call was so stressful it
triggered a sudden arrhythmia and fata)
heart attack. The WCJ further found the
phone call arose out of and occurred during
the course of employment, despite the undisputed evidence that Moeller had not worked
at Ralphs since October 29, 1991, had been
laid off since November 1991, and had died
the day before he was to return to work.

163

pened while Moeller was off duty, off premises, and performing no special business or
service for his employer.2
The workers' compensation system provides for compensation to injured employees
"for any injury . . . arising out of and in the
course of the employment and for the death
of any employee if the injury proximately
causes death . . . "
(Lab.Code, s 3(>00.)
This requirement is to be liberally construed
in favor of awarding benefits. (Lab.Code.
§ 3202.)
[2,3J An injury is said to arise out of
employment when it " 'occur(s] by reason of
a condition or incident of (the| employm e n t . . . . ' | Citation. | That is, the employment and the injury must he linked in some
causal fashion. |Citation. 1 However,'Ii If we
look for a causal connection between the
employment and the injury, such connection
need not be the sole cause; it is sufficient if
it is a contributory cause. (Citation]' (Citation.]" (Maker v. Worker*' Camp. Appeals
lid. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 729, 733-734, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 904, 6(>1 p.2d 1058, fn. omitted.) Here,
Ralphs does not challenge the finding that
the injury arose out of employment. Ralphs
states in its petition: "WOiile the telephone
call that occurred may be deemed to arise
out o/jfijgdecedent's employment with Petitioner as it dealt with his returning to work,
the subsequent death of Mark Moeller sometime after said telephone call was not in the
course and scope of his employment with
Petitioner."

DISCUSSION
HI We conclude the injury did not occur
in the course of employment l>ecause it hap-

[4-6] The course of employment requirement " 'ordinarily refers to the time, place,
and circumstances under which the injury
occurs.' (Citation.] Thus '"[a|n employee is
in the 'course of his employment' when he
does those reasonable things which his contract with his employment expressly or impliedly permits him to do."' ICitation.] And,
ipso facto, an employee acts within the
course of his employment when ' ''performing
a duty imposed upon him by his employer

2. Ralphs unsuccessfully challenged the timeliness of the minors' claim below and seeks writ
review ol that adverse determination. We need
not reach the issue in light of our determination
"»at the injur} was not compensable.
The minors contend, for the first time, that
Ralphs should have named them as respondents
or real parties in interest in the petition for

reconsideration. The minors assert we must dismiss Ralphs' writ petition as a result of that
omission We conclude otherwise The minors
waived the issue by failing to mention it in their
opposition brief below. Moreovei, the minors
mother, as guardian ad litem, was named and
served in the proceedings below.

After the board rejected Ralphs' petition
for reconsideration, Ralphs filed a writ petition seeking to vacate the award. We issued
a writ of review.
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On the couch was a 12-pack of Pearl Light
beer and in the kitchen were several empty
12-pack beer containers. Keith admitted to
Swanson that he had been drinking. Swansoi. had Keith blow into his field Alco Sensor
which registered that Keith's blood alcohol
wa.^ .04 percent
Officer John Brockus testified that in May
of 199f. he weni to Keith's house or, a domestic disturbance call but found no evidence of
a domestic disturbance. Two days later
lirockus spoke with Keith's eight-year-old
son Carlton at school. Carlton told him that
he had gotten into a fight with his younger
brother. His father came into the bedroom,
slapped hirij in the face, pinned him to the
floor, and punched him in the stomach three
limes with a closed fist.
lirockus then spoke with Mrs. Keith about
the incident. Brockus testified that Mrs.
Keith said that when she heard Carlton yelling she went into the bedroom and saw that r
M:. Keith hac. pinned Carlton to the floor,
and C arltoi: war- crying. Shortly thereafter
Mie noticed a red marl: on Carlton's cheek
and saw him holding his stomach.
Mrs. Keitn testified that she purchased the
heer mat probation officer Swanson saw in
the house ir. February. She had not seen
Mi. Keith drinking alcohol, but he had consumed an entire four-ounce bottle of Nyquil.
He had been suffering from a cold and his
sinuses and allergies were bothering him.
Sot and Keith denied thai Keith had told
Swanson thai he had consumed alcohol.
DISCUSSION
{!] Relying on People v. Promt (1989)
215 Cal.App.8d 452. 2(i3 Cal.Rptr. 391. Keith
contends that the admission of Brockus' testimony was error. Keith concede.- thai hearsay evidence may be admissible in -,. probation revocation Hearing, but only if k "bears a
substantial degree of trust-worthiness." (hi,
a: pp. 404-155. 263 Cal.Rptr. 391. i
He argues that the trial court's reliance on
Bnnvv and People v. Muki (19S5- 39 Cal.Md
707, 217 Cal.Rptr. 676. 704 P.2ri 748 was
misplaced. Those cases involved the introduction of documentary hearsay evidence

which had a high degree of trustworthiness
which is missing here.
In Hroimi the hearsay testimony was that
of a police officer testifying to a police department chemist's test of cocaine seized
from defendant's house. In Muki a car rental invoice and a hotel receipt both with defendant's signature were admitted into evidence.
Keith argues that documentary evidence
kept in the normal course of business has a
sufficient indicia of reliability to be admitted.
Here, however, the admission of oral hearsay
statements from a crucial witness, who has
not been shown to be unavailable, denies
Keith the right to confront and cross-examine a crucial witness at his hearing. (See
Gagnon v. Scarptlli (1973) 411 U.S. 778, 783,
93 S.Ct. 1756, 1760, 36 L.Ed.2d 656; Morrissey v. Brewer (1972; 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct.
2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484.)
[2] We agree with the People that Brown
and Maki are not as circumscribed as Keith
suggests. It matters not whether the hearsay involves documentary evidence, but
whether it bears a substantial degree of
trustworthiness. (See People v. Brown, sitpro, 215 Cal.App.3d at pp. 454-455, 263 Cal.
Rptr. 391.) Hearsay evidence that is not
clothed with the indicia of trustworthiness,
be it oral or documentary, is not admissible.
Here, the trial court could reasonably conclude that hearsay evidence of Brockus was
reliable and trustworthy.
Statements made by Mrs. Keith to Brockus tend to corroborate the account of the
incident as related by Carlton to Brockus.
She told Brockus of the fight between Carlton and his brother; that Mr. Keith was on
top of Carlton; that Carlton had a red mark
on his face, and that he was crying and
holding his stomach. That Mrs. Keith's corroborative statements were also hearsay does
not lessen their trustworthiness. As the
People point out, when testifying she did not
deny making the statements.
Quite apart from the hearsay testimony
pertaining to child abuse, there was evidence
of other probation violations. Keith had
been drinking alcohol, and there was ample,
evidence he was in possession of alcohol not-,
withstanding Mrs. Keith's testimony.

nAi^t'liS GROCERY CO. v. W.C.A.B.
58 Cal.App.4th 6 4 7

Cite as 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 161 (Cal.App. 2 Dlsl. 1997)

ibl

The first notice of probation violation alleged the alcohol violations. The probation
officer recommended 60 days in county jail.
The second notice of violation added the child
abuse allegation. Keith persuasively argues
that absent the child abuse incident, Keith
would not have been sentenced to state prison. Our decision, however, rests on the
trustworthy nature of the hearsay testimony,
not on the sentence Keith received.

Appeals Board, W.C.AJB. No. VNO 304429,
awarded death benefits to surviving minors.
Employer sought to annul award. The Court
of Appeal, Ortega, Acting P.J., held that
injur}' did not occur in course of employment.

13-5] For the same reason our decision
does not violate Keith's confrontation and
due process rights. As the Maki court observed, both Morrissey and Gagnon recognized that a parole revocation hearing is
something far different than a criminal prosecution. A probation hearing should be approached with the goal of achieving flexibility
and accommodation. Substitutes for live testimony are appropriate in probation revocation hearings under appropriate circumstances. "The use of hearsay as substantive
evidence at a revocation hearing is not per se
unconstitutional." {People v. Maki, supra,
39 Cal.3d at pp. 714-715, 217 Cal.Rptr. 676,
704 P.2d 743, citing Euerstafjer v. Israel (7th
Cir.1984) 726 F.2d 1231, 1234.)

Injur*}' sustained by employee when he
learned of job reassignment and suffered
fatal heart attack did not occur in course of
employment, for workers' compensation purposes, as it happened while employee was off
duty, at home, and performing no social
business or service for employer. West's
Ann.Cal.Labor Code § 3600.

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
STEVEN J. STONE, P.J., and COFFEE,
J., concur.
» I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM >
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lewRALPHS GROCERY COMPANY,
Petitioner,
WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS
BOARD and Casey Renee Moeller, a Minor, etc., et al., Respondents.
No. B105593.
Court of Appeal, Second District,
Division 1.
Oct. 17, 1997.
Review Denied Jan. 21, 1998.
Claimant sought workers' compensation
death benefits. The Workers' Compensation

Annulled with directions.

1. Workers' Compensation C»571

2. Workers' Compensation <£*610
Injur}' "arises out of employment," for
workers' compensation purposes, when it occurs by reason of condition or incident of
employment; that is, employment and injury
must be linked in some causal fashion.
West's Ann.Cal.Labor Code § 3600.
Set publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

3. Workers' Compensation c=»598
Causal connection between employment
and injury, need not be sole cause of injur}',
for injury to arise out of employment for
workers' compensation purposes; it suffices if
it is contributory cause. West's Ann.Cal.Labor Code § 3600.
4. Workers' Compensation <S=»617
Course of employment requirement for
workers' compensation ordinarily refers to
time, place, and circumstances under which
injury occurs. West's Ann.Cal.Labor Code
§ 3600.
5. Workers' Compensation e=>617
Employee is in" course of his employment," for workers' compensation purposes,
when he does those reasonable things which
his employment expressly or impliedly per
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ROBERTS v. STELL

Dorothy ROBERTS, Claimant
and Appellant,

causal connection existed between injury
and her employment. SDCL 62-1-1 et
seq., 62-1-1(2).

v.
Kermit STELL, d/b/a Best Western
Motor Inn, Employer and Appellee,
and
United States Fidelity & Guaranty,
Insurer and Appellee.
No. 14798.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Considered on Briefs March 6, 1985.
Decided May 1,(^985?)
Motel resident manager who fell on
employer's outside premises sought worker's compensation benefits. The Department of Labor held that claimant failed to
prove that her injury arose out of and in
course of employment, and claimant appealed. The Circuit Court, Eighth Judicial
Circuit, Lawrence County, Warren G. Johnson, J., affirmed Department's decision,
and claimant appealed.
The Supreme
Court, Henderson, J., held that claimant
who slipped and fell on motel premises
while going grocery shopping on her day
off was not injured in course of her employment, even though, claimant was required to live on motel premises.

Jerry C. Rachetto of Driscoll, Mattson,
Rachetto & Christensen, Deadwood, for
claimant and appellant.
Terence R. Quinn of Stephens, Quinn &
Buckmaster, Belle Fourche, for employer
and insurer, appellees.
HENDERSON, Justice.
ACTION
This is a worker's compensation case involving an employee's fall on the employer's outside premises. Compensation was
denied. An appeal has been filed from the
circuits court's Order affirming the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of the Division of Labor and Management, Department of Labor. We affirm.

Affirmed.
Wuest, Circuit Judge, concurred in result and filed opinion.

FACTS
Dorothy Roberts (claimant-appellant)
was employed as a motel resident manager
by Kermit Stell, d/b/a Best Western Motor
Inn (employer-appellee) in Deadwood,
South Dakota. Claimant lived in an apartment with her husband located on the motel premises just behind the office. These
accommodations were provided to claimant
as part of her compensation and allowed
her to process late registrations and telephone inquiries.

Workers' Compensation <5=>709
Claimant who slipped and fell on motel
premises while going grocery shopping on
her day off was not injured in course of her
employment, so as to be entitled to worker's compensation benefits, even though
claimant, as motel manager, was required
to live on motel premises, as grocery shopping on her day off was not in course of
her employment, ice, as alleged source of
injury, was natural phenomenon and risk
common to all in area, hazard did not originate in claimant's employment, and no

On Thursday, April 7, 1983, claimant
slipped and fell on the motel premises. She
fractured her hip, which rendered her partially and permanently disabled. Thursday i
was claimant's regular day off and she was
not on call or required to remain at the
motel, but was free to come and go as she
pleased. At the time of the accident, claimant had just returned from the beauty shop
and was leaving with her husband to go I
grocery shopping when it is claimed that/
she slipped on some ice on a walkway in
front of her apartment. Two other witnesses, however, testified that there was
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no ice in the general area in which claimant
fell.
After the incident in question, claimant
initially brought a civil action which resulted in a verdict for employer. That judgment was affirmed by this Court by an
Order dated November 30, 1984. See Roberts v. Stell, 360 N.W.2d 692 (S.D.1984).
During the pendency of the civil action,
claimant also filed this worker's compensation action which the Department of Labor
heard in July 1984. Following this hearing,
the Department of Labor entered Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law which concluded, inter alia, that claimant's activities
on April 7, 1983, were for her personal
benefit and pleasure and were not related
to her employment; that her injuries did
not result from a risk or danger peculiar or
incidental to her employment; and that
claimant failed to prove that her injury
arose out of and in the course of her employment.
Claimant thereafter appealed this decision to the circuit court which affirmed the
Department of Labor's decision. It is from
this latter Order that claimant now appeals.
DECISION
DID THE CIRCUIT COURT ERR IN
AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR WHICH HELD
THAT CLAIMANT'S INJURIES DID
NOT_RESULTXILQM-AJ^ISK_PECULIARTO HER EMPLOYMENT? WE
HOLD THAT IT DID NOT.
Injuries are compensable under the
Worker's Compensation Statutes, SDCL tit.
62, et seq., if it arises "out of and in the
course of the employment
" SDCL 621-1(2). Pickrel v. Martin Bench, Inc., 80
S.D. 376, 124 N.W.2d 182 (1963).
For an injury to arise out of "the employment", it is necessary and sufficient that
there be a causal connection between the
injury and the employment, but the employment need not be the direct or proximate cause of injury, it being sufficient

if the accident had its origin in the hazard to which the employment exposed the
employee while doing his work. Anderson v. Hotel Cataract, 70 S.D. 376. 17
N.W.2d 913; Bergren v. S.E. Gustafson
Construction
Co., 75 S.D. 497, 68
N.W.2d 477. The words "in the course
of" refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident took
place. The contents of the statute do not
limit the application to the periods during
which an employee is actually engaged in
the work that he is hired to perform....
In other words, an employee is within the
course of his employment if what he is
doing is naturally related or incidental to
his employment or he is doing that which
his contract of employment expressly or
impliedly authorizes. Wilson v. Dakota
Light & Power Co., 45 S.D. 175, 186
N.W. 828; Jacobson v. Strong & Waggoner, 66 S.D. 552, 287 N.W. 41; Lang v.
Board of Education, 70 S.D. 313, 17
N.W.2d 695.
Krier v. Dick's Linoleum Shop, 78 S.I).
116. 118-19, 98 N.W.2d 486, 487-88 (1959).
See also, Bearshield v. City of Gregory,
278 N.W.2d 166 (S.D. 1979).
In the case at bar, as outlined above,
claimant was required to live on her employer's property and was injured on her
day off when she slipped and fell as she
was leaving to go buy groceries. The Department of Labor denied claimant worker's compensation benefits because it found
her activities to be personal and not related
to her employment; the injury did not result from a risk or danger peculiar or incidental to her employment; and claimant
failed to prove her injury arose out of and
in the course of her employment. Claimant
here contends that this decision is in error
for two reasons.
First, claimant argues that because she
was required to remain on the premises
during her regular work time, she necessarily had to eat her meals there and thus
it was a definite employment necessity to
go grocery shopping. In effect, claimant
seems to be arguing that because she was
required to live on the premises and there-
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fore eat her meals there, grocery shopping* Custom Combiners, 297 N W 2d 179, 180
on her day off is "naturally related or (S D 1980), "it is not intended to be health,
incidental" to her employment and thus accident, and old age insurance and spread
within the course of her employment
Kn
general protection over risks common to
er, 98 N W 2d at 487 This contention, all and not arising out of and in the
however, is without merit
All persons course of employment"
Adkins v Rives
gainfully employed are not permitted to go Plating Corp, 338 Mich 265, 270, 61
grocery shopping during regular working N W 2d 117, 120 (1953) (emphasis supplied)
hours but are required to do so on their (quoting Simpson v Lee & Cady, 294
time off Claimant here testified that she Mich 460, 463, 293 N W 718, 719 (1940))
did not work during the week from 11 00
Assuming claimant's contention that she
a m to 3 00 p m and was free to go during
slipped on ice, the source of her injury was
this time Thus claimant could go shop
ping during this time or on her day off and a natural phenomenon and a risk common
therefore grocery shopping on her day off
to all in the Deadwood area
was not within the course of her employ
Injuries arising from exposure to a natument
ral phenomenon do not arise out of em
ployment unless the hazard imposed
Second, claimant argues that her injury
upon the employee by reason of the em
is compensable because "the source of inju
ployment is greater than that to which
ry was a risk distinctly associated with the
conditions under which claimant lived be
the public generally in the area of hazard
cause of the requirement of remaining on
is subjected
the premises " 1A A Larson, The Lati of Renshaw v Merrtgol Adler Bakery, 212
Workmen's Compensation § 24 10, at 5- Neb 662, 664, 325 N W 2d 46, 48 (1982)
170 (1982) It is asserted that the source The hazard did not originate in claimant's
of injury was the ice on the walkway in employment Her employment did not sub
front of claimant's apartment
However, ject her to any greater risk from this ha7
the Department of Labor s Findings of
ard than that endured by the public at
Fact only found that claimant slipped and
large, and no causal connection existed befell on the motel premises
No specific
tween the injury and her employment It
finding was made that ice was the cause of
therefore cannot be asserted that the inju
the fall in the Findings of Fact and Conclu
sions of Law dated September 12, 1984 * ry, which claimant regrettably suffered,
arose out of and in the course of her em
In any event, in addition to Larson,
ployment
claimant cites several cases from other
Affirmed
states for support of the argument she is
now making Inasmuch as these cases per
FOSHEIM, C J , and WOLLMAN and
mit recovery for injuries to employees re
quired to live on the employer s premises, MORGAN, U, concur
when such injuries are incurred off duty
WUEST, Circuit Judge, Acting as Su
and there is no causal connection between
the injury and the employment, and the preme Court Justice, concurs in result
accident does not have its origin in the
WUEST, Acting Justice (concurring in
hazard to which the employment exposed
the employee, Kner, 98 N W 2d 486, their result)
holdings and rationale are rejected
I concur with the result reached by the
Although it is a general rule of this state majority in this case but not with the con
"that worker's compensation statutes elusion "the source of her injury was a
natural phenomena and a risk common to
should be liberally construed in favor of
injured employees," Moody v L W Tyler, all in the Deadwood area '
* But an August 17 1984 Decision by the Depart

ment of Labor alluded to a fall on ice

STATE v WEISENSTEIN
S D 201
Cite as 367 N W 2d 201 (SO 1985)
and moral understanding that he hid to tell
truth SDCL 19-9-7 19-9-9
STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff
and Appellee.
3 Criminal La* <3=M1I7
v
When reviewing exercise of judicial
Kurtis Lee WEISENSTEIN, Defendant
discretion members of Supreme Court mav
and Appellant
not consider whether the\ would ha\e
No 14588
made similar ruling rather thev must con
sider whether in view of law and circum
Supreme Court of South Dakota
stances of particular case a judicial mind
Considered on Briefs Nov 29 1984
could reasonably have reached such conclu
sion
Decided May 1, 1985
4 Witnesses 0=77 79(2)
Defendant was convicted in the Circuit
Court, Third Judicial Circuit Codington
County, Thomas G Ries, J , of sexual con
tact with children under 15, and defendant
appealed The Supreme Court Morgan J
held that (1) victim who was five years
old at time of incident and six at time of
trial, was competent to testify at trial (2)
trial court did not abuse discretion in per
mitting State to use leading questions in its
direct examination of victim, (3) conviction
was supported bv sufficient evidence (4)
there was no error in refusing to give
defendant's proposed instructions and (5)
eight yeir sentence was not excessive or
disproportionate
Affirmed
Henderson, J , concurred in result
1 Witnesses <3=>40(1), 15(2)
In order to be competent witness child
must have sufficient mental capacity to
observe, recollect and communicate, and
some sense of moral responsibility these
tests are joint not several, and trial court
must be satisfied that all four require
ments are met SDCL 19-9-7
2 Witnesses <s=10(l), 15(2)
In prosecution for sexual contact with
children under 15, victim who was five
years old at time of incident and six at time
of trial was competent to testify at trial as
trial judge determined as result of search
mg preliminary examination apart from
jury, that victim had ability to observe and
recollect, good capacity to communicate,

In prosecution for sexual contact with
children under 15 trial court did not abuse
its discretion in its control of examination
and determination of competence of victim
to testify and in deciding on questions it
wanted to ask in order to test victim s
competence as witness and in not allowing
either side to question victim who was fi\e
years old at time of incident and six at time
of trial SDCL 19-9-7
5 Witnesses e=»2H
In prosecution for sexual contact with
children under 15 trial court did not abuse
discretion in permitting State to use leid
mg questions in its direct examination of
victim who was five \ears old at time of
incident and six at time of trial as State
elicited four brief narrative responses be
fore asking a yes or no question and State
asked no leading questions until ex imma
tion centered on events surrounding rh irge
against defendant SIM L 19 11 20
6 Criminal Law o=135
Identity of criminal defendant is mate
rial fact
7 Criminal Law ®=>Y>2(\)
Circumstantial evidence
support conviction

alone

may

8 Criminal Law <e=llr>9 2(1)
Test on review of < rimin il < onvic hon is
whether evidence including circumstantial
evidence and reasonable inferences there
from sustains rational theorv of guilt
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C. Patrick Rowan, Appellant, v. University of Nebraska, Appellee
No. 43227
Supreme Court of Nebraska
207 Neb. 588; 299 N.W.2d 774

December 29, 1980, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY:
Appeal from the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation
Court.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
HEADNOTES:
Workmen's Compensation. As a general rule, the compensation act extends to and covers workmen only while
engaged in, on, or about the premises where their duties are being performed, or where their service requires
their presence as a pan of such service at the time of injury, and during the hours of service of such workmen.
COUNSEL: Martin A. Cannon of Matthews & Cannon,
P.C., for appellant.
Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General, and John R.
Thompson for appellee.
JUDGES: Krivosha, C.J., Boslaugh, McCown, Clinton,
Brodkey, White, and Hastings, JJ. Krivosha, C.J., dissenting. White, J., joins in this dissent.
OPINIONBY: BOSLAUGH
OPINION: [*589] [**774] This is an appeal in a proceeding under the workmen's compensation act. The
plaintiff, who was employed as an associate professor
of art by the defendant, was injured in an accident on
April 10, 1978, while working in a private studio at his
home. [**775] The plaintiff was standing on a ladder
attempting to open a window when the window came
loose causing him to fall to the floor.
After the hearing before a single judge of the compensation court, the plaintiff recovered an award for medical
and hospital expenses. There was no award for temporary total disability because the defendant had continued
to pay the plaintiff his regular salary.
On rehearing before three judges of the compensation

court, the judgment was reversed and the petition dismissed, one judge dissenting. The court found that the
accident in which the plaintiff was injured did not arise
out of or in the course of his employment. The principal issue upon the appeal is whether the evidence was
sufficient to sustain this finding.
The plaintiff was first employed by the defendant in
1971 as a visiting instructor in art. He later became an
assistant professor and was promoted to associate professor in 1976. When the defendant was hired he was
told that, in addition to his teaching duties, he was expected to do as much creative work as possible. Prior
to February 1978, the plaintiff used a classroom at the
university as a studio. This was not a satisfactory arrangement because the classrooms were crowded, there
was no privacy, and the lighting, heating, and cooling
in the classroom was not satisfactory.
[*590] In February 1978, the plaintiff purchased a
residence that had a separate building on the property
which could be used as a studio. The defendant had no
objection to the plaintiff doing his creative work at his
home and knew that he was doing so. The plaintiff had
been working on a sculpture project described as a table
painting series when the accident happened.
The defendant furnished none of the materials used in
the plaintiffs creative work, and the finished product
was the property of the plaintiff. The only contribution from the defendant was shipping expense incurred
in exhibiting the plaintiffs work at other institutions.
As a general rule, the compensation act extends to and
covers workmen only while engaged in, on, or about
the premises where their duties are being performed, or
where their service requires their presence as a part of
such service at the time of injury, and during the hours
of service of such workmen. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48151(6) (Reissue 1978) provides; "(6) Without otherwise
affecting either the meaning or the interpretation of the
abridged clause, personal injuries arising out of and in
the course of employment, it is hereby declared: Not

'207 Neb. 588, *590; 299 N.W.2d 774, **775

to cover workmen except while engaged in, on or about
the premises where their duties are being performed, or
where their service requires their presence as a part of
such service at the time of the injury, and during the
hours of service as such workmen, and not to cover
workmen who, on their own initiative, leave their line
of duty or hours of employment for purposes of their
own."
The evidence in this case is that the plaintiff was required to perform creative work but there was no requirement that it be performed away from the premises
of the employer. The dean of the College of Arts and
Sciences testified that the college did not encourage art
professors to do their art work in any particular place,
such as their home, but merely encourages them to do the
work. The evidence indicates [*591] that before 1978,
the plaintiff did his creative work in classroom space
furnished by the defendant.
The plaintiff was in a situation similar to that of an
employee who was required to satisfy certain requirements as a pan of the employment but was at liberty to
choose the time and place where he would accomplish
the work. In such a situation the activity performed by
the employee is generally considered to be of but incidental benefit to the employer and not covered by the
compensation act. See Meyer v. First United Methodist
Church, 206Neb. 607, 294N.W.2d611 (1980).
The essential inquiry is whether the plaintiff was injured as a result of a risk [**776] connected with the
employment. In Henry v. Village of Coleridge, 147
Neb. 686, 24 NW.2d 922 (1946), a volunteer fireman
who slipped and fell at his home while responding to
a fire alarm was denied compensation. The injury was
not compensable because the accident did not have its
origin in or was not incidental to the employment, and
the employment did not expose the employee to a greater
hazard than if he had not been so employed. See, also,
Sheets v. Glenwood Telephone Co., 135 Neb. 56, 280
NW 238 (1938).
The plaintiff in this case was not at a place where his
service required him to be at the time he was injured.
The defendant was not required to assume the risk incidental to the defective window in the private studio.
The evidence was sufficient to sustain the finding that
the accident did not arise out of or in the course of the
plaintiffs employment by the defendant.
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
DISSENTBY: KRIVOSHA
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DISSENT: Krivosha, C.J., dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority in this
case. While I find no fault with the legal propositions
relied upon by the majority in its opinion, I do not view
the evidence as does the majority. In my view, the record
clearly establishes that the appellant was [*592] not only
urged to perform creative work outside of the classroom but was required to do so. The testimony reflects
that the appellant's immediate supervisor, Professor Dan
Howard, who was chairman of the department of art,
discussed with Rowan what would be required in the
way of creative design. He was informed by Professor
Howard that he must do as much creative work as time
would possibly allow and make all and any attempts to
exhibit his work. As noted by the majority, the appellee
considered this so significant that it paid the cost of shipping the artwork to its place of exhibition. The evidence
is without dispute that appellant was advised that faculty
members were expected to put in somewhere in the area
of 70 hours a week, including 18 to 21 contact hours,
with the remaining hours devoted to creative research,
advising, and committee assignments. Appellant testified that in his conversation with Professor Howard he
was advised that creative activity and scholarly research
was an integral, imperative part of his duty and a condition of his employment. The dean of the college acknowledged that he considered the doing of professional
work at home a part of appellant's job as a member of
the faculty.
It may be true that under certain circumstances work
performed by a college professor at home may be unrelated to his employment and, therefore, not covered
by the workmen's compensation act; however, in this
case, the employer did not deny that appellant was expected to perform this work, including the work done
at home. Had the employer denied this fact, the majority opinion might be correct. But here both the employer and the employee testified that the work being
performed at the time of the injury was considered by
the employer as part of the employee's duties. It is difficult to see how we can find, as a matter of law, that
the work was not a part of the employee's duties. The
majority appears to give little credence to the requirement of a college professor to either [*593] "publish or
perish." That view, in my judgment, ignores the reality
of the matter. Had the university wished to maintain
control over the safety of the studio facilities used by
the faculty, it could have easily provided the appellant
with adequate facilities and instructed him not to perform the required work at home. Quite to the contrary,
it not only failed to provide him with adequate facilities but encouraged him to use his home facilities in lieu
of those which were not otherwise adequately provided

z07 Neb. 588, *593; 299 N.W.2d 774, **776

by the university. Many types of employment are of
such nature that they are not performed solely within
identifiable premises controlled and operated by the employer. It occurs to me that our decision in this case
today, under the facts presented, does violence to our
oftstated rule that the workmen's compensation act is
to be construed liberally so that its beneficent purposes
may [**777] not be thwarted by technical refinement of
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interpretation. SecHalerv. Gering Bean Co., 163Neb.
748, 81 N.W.2d 152 (1957); Franzen v. Blakley, 155
Neb. 621, 52 NW.2d 833 (1952). Under the facts in
this case, I would have found that the injury arose out
of and in the course of the appellant's employment and
was compensable.
White, J., joins in this dissent.
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[2] When an application for a temporary injunction is set down for a hearing, the court can make a restraining order
to maintain the status until the application is heard on the appointed day, but no
writ should issue until the hearing. At
that time, the restraining order will have
served its purpose and the question then
is whether a temporary injunction should
issue and continue in effect until the further orders of the court. Francis v. Scott,
supra; Madison Limestone Co. v. McDonald, supra.
The fiat or order of March 13, 1970, directed the register to issue an injunction
upon complainant entering into bond. An
injunction was issued and at the time
of its issuance no date for a hearing had
been set. So up to this point it appears
that the trial judge had not made a restraining order to maintain the status.
But a week later the trial judge set
"the above-styled cause" for hearing and,
as shown above, several subsequent orders
of continuance referred to a hearing on
complainant's application for temporary
injunction.
So we think it reasonable to assume that
the trial court in its fiat of March 13,
1970, actually intended to make a restraining order as authorized under § 1059,
Title 7, Code, and to consider the writ issued on that day by the register under the
court's direction to have had the effect of
a restraining order, although a bond was
required of complainant.
Furthermore, we deem it reasonable to
assume that respondents did not consider
that the writ which issued on March 13,
1970, was to operate as a temporary injunction rather than as a restraining order.
They did not file a motion to dissolve
or to discharge, but participated in at least
three separate hearings on complainant's
application for a temporary injunction.

After those hearings were completed, the
trial court on July 24, 1970, ordered the
issuance of a temporary injunction which
he decreed should "be made permanent."
If the writ which was issued on March
13, 1970, had been treated as a temporary
writ of injunction, then there would have
been no cause to order the issuance of a
temporary injunction.
[3] We treat the writ which was issued
on March 13, 1970, as having operated as
a temporary restraining order which spent
its force when the trial court in its decree of July 24, 1970, ordered the issuance of a temporary writ of injunction.
Francis v. Scott, supra; Madison Limestone Co. v. McDonald, supra.
[4] As shown above, the trial court,
following the hearings on complainant's
application for temporary injunction,
granted a permanent as well as a temporary injunction.
The granting of a permanent injunction
on an application for temporary injunction, as was the case here, was held to be
reversible error in Methvin v. Hayncs,
254 Ala. 58, 46 So.2d 815, and in Persons
v. Summers, 274 Ala. 673, 151 So.2d 210.

RUSSELLVILLE GAS COMPANY v.JHJGGAR

RUSSELLVILLE GAS COMPANY,
Incorporated
v
"
Cecil Judson OUGGAR.
8 Olv. 49.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
Aug. 25, 1971.
KohcnriiiK Denied Sept. 22, 1071.

Workmen's compensation proceeding.
The Circuit Coint, Franklin County, Kennedy Williams, J., awarded benefits, and
employer appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals, Wright, J., held that where liquid petroleum gas truck driver, who took truckhome with him at night and on weekends
and who was required to respond to requests for delivery after working hours,
was not responding to calls to deliver gas or
to call from employer directing performance of some service at time of his fall,
which occurred when he was going from his
house to where truck was parked in yard,
injury sustained as result of such fall did
not arise out of and in course of claimant's
employment.
Reversed and rendered.

Under the cases last cited, the decree of
the trial court is reversed in so far as it
purports to make permanent the temporary writ of injunction.
We are not disposed on this appeal to
reverse the decree of the trial court to the
extent that it orders the issuance of a
temporary injunction. In that respect the
cause is remanded for further appropriate
proceedings.
Reversed in part and in part remanded.

HEFL1N, C. J., and MERRILL, HARVVOOD and MADDOX, JJ., concur.
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Certiorari denied, Ala., 260 So.2d 395.
Workmen's Compensation <§=>7I4
Where liquid petroleum gas truck driver, who took truck home with him at night
and on weekends and who was required to
respond to requests for delivery after working hours, was not responding to call to deliver gas or to call from employer directing
performance of some service at time of his
fall, which occurred when he was going
from his house to where truck was parked
in yard, injury sustained as result of such
fall did not, for purposes of obtaining workmen's compensation benefits, arise out of
and in course of claimant's employment, on
theory that claimant's home had become
'premises" of employer. Code of Ala., Tit.
2
<>> § 2620).
260 So 2d— 25V 2

London, Yancey, Clark & Allen and Max
Hudson, Birmingham, and Guin, Guin,
Bouldin & Porch, Russellville. for appellant.
Taylor & Taylor, Russellville, for appellee.
WRIGHT, Judge.
This is a case involving a claim for
Workmen's Compensation. Claimant, Cecil
Judson Duggar, was employed as a driver
of a liquid petroleum gas truck by Russellville Gas Company, Inc. Duggar was paid
a salary and commission. At night and on
weekends he took the truck home with him.
Other drivers for the company did the
same. If a customer within his territory
needed a delivery at night or on weekends,
Duggar made such delivery directly from
his home if the truck contained the necessary gas. If it was emptied he refilled it
at the plant and returned to his home He
often took calls for deliveries at his home
after regular working hours, lie was under instruction to respond to calls day or
night. If he left his home for any reason
during off hours, he was to notify his employer where be could be located. In addition to a phone at his home, be bad a twoway radio in the truck. During the past
vear of his emplo>ment, prior to injury, he
had probably received ten to twenty calls
for service v\bile at his home.
On Monday, January 12, l°7(), at about
6:30 a. m., while going from his house to
where the truck was parked in the yard,
claimant slipped and fell on ice and snow on
his driveway. The fall resulted in a broken
hip. Complications from the injury resulted. Blood clots formed in the veins of the
leg requiring an operation for removal.
Some clots passed on to the lungs and heart
causing infarctions. The infarctions resulted in damage to the lungs decreasing lung
capacit) and affecting breathing. He was
hospitalized foi a long JM nod «>f lime and
was permanently disabled His hospital and
medical expanses exceeded f'HHK).
Upon trial, j\\f\^mcnt was rendered
against the employer, appellant here. The
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court found that the accident resulting in
claimant's injury "arose out of and in the
course of his employment while plaintiff
was about to get into a liquid petroleum
gas delivery truck at his home where the
truck was kept during the hours when the
defendant's gas office was not open, and
from which he answered calls for gas service and made deliveries from d u r i n g such
periods, and that the accident consisted of
the plaintiff falling on ice. * *
*"
Award was made for 8 5 % permanent partial disability for 300 weeks at $39.74 per
week, or a total of $11,922.00 compensation.
T h e r e was also awarded a total of $9,022.95
for medical expenses. An attorney's fee
of $3,141.81 was allowed plaintiff's attorney.
T h e amended final judgment was entered March 12, 1971. After denial of a motion for new trial, defendant below brings
the matter here by certiorari.
Appellant in brief
tion presented here
injuries arose out of
his employment with

stated the sole quesis whether appellee's
and in the course of
appellant.

T h e facts s u r r o u n d i n g the injury of appellee as herein related are without material conflict. It appears the finding of the
court that appellee was injured by accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment resulted from the unusual situation in which the employee at night and on
weekends kept his delivery truck at his
home and made deliveries, if called by customers of appellant. As a result the court
apparently reached the conclusion that such
a r r a n g e m e n t made the home of appellee the
premises of the employer. H a v i n g determined that appellee was injured by accident while on the premises of the employer,
the court concludes that he was in the
course of his employment.
We cannot accept either the finding of
fact or conclusion of law indicated by the
judgment of the trial court.
Title 26, Section 2 6 2 ( j ) , Code of
bama 1940 appears as follows:

Ala-

" W i t h o u t otherwise affecting either
the meaning or interpretation of the
abridged clause, injuries by an accident
arising out of and in the course of his
employment, it is hereby declared: Not
to cover workmen except while engaged
in, or about the premises w h e r e their
services require their presence as a part
of such service at the time of the accident, and during the hours of service as
such workmen, * * * "
T h e words of Justice Harwood written in
the case of Allen v. Genry, 39 Ala.App. 281,
97 So.2d 828, and quoted by Justice Merrill
in the case of Glens Falls Ins. Co. of Glens
Falls, N. Y. v. Anderson, 280 Ala. 626, 197
So.2d 276 appear as follows:
" T h e word 'premises' is an elastic and
inclusive term.
Leroy Fran7, Inc., v.
City of New Rochelle, Sup., 124 N . Y . S .
2d 525; and it does not have one definite
and fixed meaning, but its meaning is to
be determined by its context and is dependent on circumstances in which used,
Gibbons v. Brandt, 7 Cir., 170 F.2d 385;
the term may mean a room, shop, building, or any definite area. State v. Goodchild, 151 Me. 48, 115 A.2d 725."
Justice Merrill in Glens Falls Ins. Co. of
Glens Falls, N. Y. v. Anderson, supra, further discusses the term "premises" and relates it to control or right of control over
the activities of the employee by the employer. W e would discern no difficulty in
applying Justice Harwood's "elastic" definition of premises to the home of appellee
in the instant case had he been engaged in
the service of appellant at the time of his
injury. However, to permit the home of
appellee to be categorically designated as
the premises of appellant at all times when
occupied by appellee would, in effect, provide protection of Workmen's Compensation to appellee at all times without any
means of control of his activities by appellant. H e could claim compensation for falling in the bathtub. W c do not think even
the benevolent purposes of W o r k m e n ' s
Compensation were intended to be extended
so far.

Ma.

RUSSELLVILLE GAS CO. v. DUGGAR
Cite ns 260 So 2d 395
H a d appellee been responding to a call to
deliver gas to a customer, or to a call from
his employer directing performance of some
service at the time of his injury, we conceive of no difficulty in placing him within
the protection of the compensation law.
U n d e r the facts as presented, wc cannot do
so. W e consider the accident suffered by
appellee to no more have arisen out of and
in the course of his employment than if he
had been any workman arising in the morning and proceeding to his means of transport to his place of employment. T h e fact
that his means of transportation was a vehicle provided by his employer and which
might have been used by him to perform a
service for his employer if called during
the weekend is merely incidental.
T h e case of Wooten v. Roden, 260 Ala.
606, 71 So.2d 802, is in many respects similar to the case at hand. T h e statute under discussion there was as here—Title 26,
Section 2 6 2 ( j ) .
It was stated there that
Section 262(j) is recognized as placing a
limitation upon the phrase of "arising out
of and in the course of his employment,"
contained in Title 26, Section 253, Code of
Alabama 1040. With such concept in mind,
it surely cannot be said that an unrealistic
definition of the term "premises" may be
allowed to negate the requirement of the
existence of a master-servant relationship
at the moment of the accident. T h e injury
must have had its origin in some risk incident to the employment. Such risk is incident to the employment when it is connected with duties being performed under the
obligations of such employment.

395

Place v. Middleton, 39 Ala.App. 481, 103 So.
2d 812; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Manasco, 271 Ala. 124, 123 So.2d 527.
Reversed and rendered

In re RUSSELLVILLE GAS CO., Inc.,
a Corporation

Cecil Judson DUGGAR.
Ex parte Cecil Judson DUGGAR.
8 Dlv. 453.
Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 30, 1972.

W o r k m e n ' s compensation proceeding
T h e Circuit Court, Franklin County, Kennedy Williams, J., awarded benefits, and
cmplover appealed T h e Court of Civil Appeals 260 So 2d y\^, reversed and rendered,
and employee petitioned for certiorari. The
Supreme Court, Heflin, (' J , held that on
certiorari, Supreme Court will review
Court of Civil Appeals only on questions
of law and not on findings of facts or
application of law to facts, except as to
facts as are stated in opinion of Court of
Civil Appeals, so that a review may be effected without an examination of record
filed in Court of Civil Appeals.

F o r want of any evidence to support the
finding of fact and the improper application of the law to the facts, the judgment
of the trial court must be reversed.

Certiorari C=64(l)

T h e remaining assignment of error pertains to the setting of attorney's fee for
plaintiff's attorney. T h e reversal of the
judgment on other grounds dispones of that
question. For future consideration of the
trial court on the question of attorney's
fees, wc suggest study of Title 26, Section
262(a) and the following cases: Sam's

On certiorari, Supreme Court will review Court of Civil Appeals only on questions of law and not on findings of farts
or application of law to facts, except as
to facts as are stated in opinion of Court
of Civil Appeals, so th.it ,i review may be
effected without an examination of record
filed in Court of Civil Appeals

W r i t denied.
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T Y R R E L L V. STANDARD UNDERGROUND
CABLE CO.

District Court of Perth Amboy, New Jersey.
June 4, 1932.
1. Corporations <§=»407(5).

Physician rendering services to injured
employee at request of superintendent of
corporation could recover against corporation
therefor.
2. Master and servant <§=»348.

Compensation Statute is binding only on
parties to statutory contract (Comp. S t Supp.
§ **23G—1 et seq.).
3. Master and servant G»393r/2«

tf.

J.
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on two grounds: (1) That the agreement
should have been in writing, and (2) that the
plaintiff comes within the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act (Comp. St.
Supp. § **236—1 et seq.).
[1] The defendant relies mainly upon the
case of Moore v. Derees, 97 N. J. Law, 378,117
A. 480. I do not agree with such contention
because in that case the services were rendered by the physician to the employee, at the
request of the employee; but, in this case, the
evidence is that the physician acted at the request of the defendant corporation through its
superintendent, who was the manager in
charge of the plant at the tune of the accident, and, as such, would have a right to bind
the company.

Physician rendering services to injured
[2,3] The Compensation Statute is only
employee at request of superintendent of cor- binding upon the parties to the statutory conporate employee was not bound by Compensa- tract, and they and they only are entitled to
tion Law (Corap. St. Supp. § **23&—1 et seq.). its benefits and are bound by its terms. The
plaintiff is not bound by the Compensation
Act. Dias v. N. J. Manufacturers' Co., 132 A.
Action by George W. Tyrrell against the 101, 4 X. J. Misc. R. 102; Rosecrans v. Reiner, 4 N. J. Misc. R. 769.
.Standard Underground Cable Company.
There will be a judgment for the plaintiff
Judgment for plaintiff.
David T. Wilentz, of Perth Amboy, for in the sum of $184, and interest from July 3,
1927, in the sum of $54.30.
plaintiff.
John C. Stockel, of Perth Amboy, for defendant.
GOLDBERGER, J.
The summons in this case was issued in
1927 by the plaintiff, who is a physician in the
-city of Perth Amboy, to recover the sum of
$184, which represents his bill for services
rendered to one James Kozak, an employee of
the defendant corporation.
The facts, as I remember them, are that in
May, 1927, Kozak was injured in an accident
during the course of his employment, and he
was removed to the Perth Amboy City Hospital in an unconscious condition. Dr. Tyrrell,
a member of the staff, was present at the time.
A hurried examination of the patient caused
the plaintiff to get in touch with the defendant corporation through its superintendent,
Mr. Hawley, and the plaintiff, advised Mr.
Hawley that the patient was in a very bad
way, and would require an unusual amount of
care, including special nurses, in order to
bring about a recovery. The plaintiff was requested by Mr. Hawley to give all the attention necessary to bring about the recovery of
the patient, who had been injured by reason
of his clothes having come in contact with a
rapidly revolving shaft, which shaft caused
bis clothes to strangle him for several minutes before the machine could be stopped. The
patient had hemorrhages of the brain and
odema of both lungs, and a part of his flesh
was torn away from his body.
The defendant corporation resists payment

VAN DEVANDER v. WEST SIDE M. E.
CHURCH.

No. 216.
Supreme Court of New Jersey.
June 2, 1932.
Master and servant ®=>375(l).

Where minister strained his back while
removing barrel of ashes from cellar of parsonage, accident held not to "arise out of employment."
Accident did not "arise out of the employment/' since the minister was performing an act personal to himself and his
family, and not connected with his employment as a minister, for carrying ashes is
not incidental to that office, directly or indirectly; contention that the church imposed upon the minister the care of the
parsonage not being sustainable, since the
care of a dwelling house ordinarily falls
upon the occupant and does not have to be
imposed.
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of
"Arising Out of Employment," see Words
and Phrases.]

$=»For other cases see same topic and KEY NUMBER m ail Key Number Digests and Indexes
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Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Law by Don J. Van Devander, opposed
by the West Side M. E. Church, employer. To
review a judgment of the Compensation Bureau awarding compensation, the employer
brings certiorari.
Award set aside.
Argued January term, 1932, before
TRENCHARD, DALY, and DONGES, JJ.
McDermott, Enright & Carpenter, of Jersey
City, for prosecutor.
Miller & Barowitz, of Jersey City, for respondent
PER CURIAM.
This writ brings up a determination of the
Compensation Bureau awarding compensation to the respondent for injuries alleged to
have been sustained as the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment by prosecutor.
The respondent is a Methodist minister, and
was assigned by the bishop to arid employed
as pastor by the prosecutor, West Side M. E.
Church. His stated salary was $3,450 per annum, and he was housed in the church parsonage (and was apparently required to live
there), for which the sum of $700 was deducted from his salary, making a cash payment of
$2,750. He was furnished no janitor service
for the parsonage, and was required to do all
housework, groundkeeping, and care of the
furnace himself. On November 11,1930, while
removing a barrel of ashes from the cellar of
the parsonage, he strained his back. The
question presented here is whether or not thia
accident was one arising out of and in the
course of the employment.
The only testimony, outside of the medical
evidence, was that of the petitioner. He testified that he was required to keep the house
in condition for use by the members of the
congregation, and that, in fact, it was used for
weddings, christenings, and other parish meetings.
We are inclined to think that it was error to
hold that the accident arose out of the employment Petitioner was performing a household
duty for his own benefit which he would have
been required to perform if he lived in a house
owned by himself. In Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N.
J. Law, 72, 86 A. 458, 460, the act was said to
cover risks "which are within the ordinary
scope of the particular employment in which
the workman is engaged." Now the employment here was that of a minister. Carrying
ashes is certainly not incidental to that office,
directly or indirectly. Petitioner takes the
position that the church imposed certain additional duties, namely, care of the parsonage.
But it does not seem that this is so. Care of
a dwelling house ordinarily falls upon the occupant and does not have to be so "imposed."
What the church did was to refuse to furnish

service which would relieve him of this burden.
The case of Lauterbach v. Jarett, 1S9 Apa
Div. (N. Y.) 303, 17S N. Y. S. 4S0, 4S1, seems to
be in point There a janitress who was furnished with living quarters in the building
she cared for was injured by the falling of
plaster while eating in her own apartment
It was said: "In no proper sense can it be
said that she was janitress of her own apartment merely because it happened to be a part
of the building of which she was the janitress."
It was also said: "She was in the building
in a dual capacity. Her family was domiciled
in one of the apartments. Her personal relations to her family were distinct and separate
from her relations to her employers."
This reasoning is sound. In the instant
case we think that at the time of the accident
the respondent was performing an act personal to himself and his family, and not connected with his employment as a minister.
The award is set aside, with costs.

FIRST NAT. BANK OF PHILADELPHIA,
PA., V. STONELEY.

No. 425.
Supreme Court of New Jersey,
May 27, 1932.
Judgment <§=»I38(3).
Showing in respect to attorney's lack of
notice of trial day, together with defense, required opening of default judgment on note.
Affidavit of merits and answer were duly
filed, and defense alleged that defendant
had not signed, executed, or delivered
notes in question, in addition to which defendant's counsel, in affidavit filed on application for rule to show cause, explained
in great detail reason for nonappearance;
that he had relied on clerk in circuit or
opposing counsel, nnwarrantedly perhaps,
to give him timely notice of trial day; that
he received no notice; and that default
judgment against defendant was result

Suit by the First National Bank of Philadelphia, Pa., against Ernest Stoneley. On
defendant's rule to show cause why default
judgment should not be set aside.
Judgment opened, and a new trial granted.
Argued May term, 1932, before TRENCHARD, CASE, and BROGAN, JX

$=»For other cases see same topic and KEY NUMBER in all Key Number Digests and Indexes

